09V/09VI (095/096) Nuclear Submarine Thread

[Hendrik_2000]

Does China have sufficient nuclear material or does it have to import?

China has one of the largest uranium mine and processing facility in the world. though they also have uranium mine concession all over the world
China now claims to be “a uranium-rich country” on the basis of some two million tonnes of uranium, though published known in situ uranium resources were 366,000 tU to $130/kg at 1/1/15, of which 173,000 tU were reasonably assured, and in situ inferred resources were 193,000 tU in the 2016 edition of the 'Red Book', which are modest in relation to the country's needs. New discoveries in the north and northwest in sandstones, and deep hydrothermal ones in southeast China have raised expectations. There is also potential in lignite, black shale and phosphates. Over 2013-14 about 71,000 tU was added to known resources in northern China – in the Yili, Erlian, Erdos, Songliao and Bayingebi basins as well as Longshoushan – and 29,000 tU in southern China in the Rouoergai and Dazhou uranium fields. The 2016 Red Book tabulates 366,000 tU in 21 deposits in 13 provinces, 39% of the total in Inner Mongolia, 21% in Jiangxi, 14% in Xinjiang and 12% in Guangdong.

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ina: Nuclear Fuel Cycle
China's Nuclear Fuel Cycle
(Updated August 2020)

• China has become self-sufficient in most aspects of the fuel cycle.
• China aims to produce one-third of its uranium domestically, obtain one-third through foreign equity in mines and joint ventures overseas, and to purchase one-third on the open market.
• China's two major enrichment plants were built under agreements with Russia but much current capacity is indigenous.
• China’s R&D investment in nuclear technologies is very significant, particularly in high-temperature gas-cooled and molten salt-cooled reactors.

China has stated it intends to become self-sufficient not just in nuclear power plant capacity, but also in the production of fuel for those plants. However, the country still relies to some extent on foreign suppliers for all stages of the fuel cycle, from uranium mining through fabrication and reprocessing, but mostly for uranium supply. As China rapidly increases the number of new reactors, it has also initiated a number of domestic projects, often in cooperation with foreign suppliers, to meet its nuclear fuel needs.
The national policy is to obtain about one-third of

one-third of uranium supply domestically, one-third from Chinese equity in foreign mines, and one-third on the open market. Increasingly, other stages of the fuel cycle will be indigenous. Uranium demand in 2020 is expected to be over 11,000 tU (with 58 reactors operating), in 2025 about 18,500 tU (for 100 reactors) and in 2030 about 24,000 tU (for 130 reactors). UxC reports that China imported over 115,000 tU over 2009-14, notably 25,000 tU in 2014 and 10,400 tU to July in 2015. With annual consumption currently about 9000 tU, much of this will be stockpiled.

China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) maintains a strong monopoly on the nuclear fuel cycle in China, notably the front end, forcing China General Nuclear Power (CGN) to work around this, principally with international ventures, some involving large capital outlays. With the merger of SNPTC and CPI to form SPI in 2015, so that SNPTC took over all the nuclear-related business of CPI to function as an active subsidiary of SPI, SNPTC said it intended to get into both uranium mining and fuel fabrication.

CNNC is also the main operator in the fuel cycle back end, evidenced by a series of agreements with Areva for a reprocessing plant. That in November 2015 was part of a wider agreement in relation to all aspects of the fuel cycle, and foreshadowing an intention to take equity in Areva NC (now Orano), in connection with evolving agreements to build a reprocessing plant based on Areva technology.

 

[Blitzo]

I don't believe so. I understand that you write about the PLA quasi-professionally in Western publications, so you have to maintain at least the appearance of "objectivity" and couch your writing in caveats. However, China's recent history is clear - if 40 years ago someone projected that China's economy would grow eighty-fold and account for a third of the planet's manufacturing (measured in nominal dollar terms, which vastly understates its scale), they would have been laughed at at best. Yet that's exactly what happened.

When discussing China, we should always bear in mind exactly what it is: a fifth of humanity united under the best-governed superstate in history and commanding the mightiest industrial infrastructure ever assembled by man. So yes, 10 nuclear submarines a year and 10 carriers in a decade and change isn't just perfectly normal, it's banal.

I'll do the caveat thing myself now and grant you that 10 subs isn't going to be a perpetual steady state. That number will come down when China has built enough of them that there isn't enough ocean for them.

No lol, on SDF I express my thoughts with less reservations.

Let me put it clear -- the idea of 10 nuclear subs launched in a year is currently at the very far high end of what may be possible from this facility.

But at this stage the idea or the "expectation" that launching 10 nuclear subs in one year is "normal" based on their current nuclear sub production trends and in the immediate future, is massive overreach.



There's no one to impress here, please leave the excess chauvinism for reddit..

 

[Blitzo]

True. But for labour intensive shipbuilding, the pace of work is really dependent on the available trained manpower and the associated supply chain.

That is much more difficult for Bohai to ramp up or ramp down, because it's an isolated shipyard which primarily does military work.

In comparison Jiangnan can flex between commercial and naval surface ships.
Plus Jiangnan is near other shipyards and at the centre of the shipbuilding supply chain and trained shipbuilding labour.

Bohai does do other things as well, the nuclear submarine production part of the yard is a significant part of the yard, but not the only part.

Again, I think the idea of 10 nuclear subs in a year is at the more far end side of things, but it's raised as a possibility.

Actually BAE is building a new paint hall at Barrow for its nuclear submarine construction work.
And their construction rate will be roughly 1 submarine every 3 years.

Hence why I suspect paint/adhesive toxicity and the associated mess is actually an issue.

I agree that a dedicated facility improves speed and efficiency

Well BAE doing that certainly makes them the only other major submarine yard that I know of.

 

[Blitzo]

Somehow I doubt they will lay down more than 3 subs a year. The best Soviet and American yards were laying down 3-4 subs at their peak; whereas China is much weaker in nuclear submarines. Plus modern SSNs are even more complicated than the older boats. And we know that China's military development is very methodical and some would argue even conservative. I think we'll see a few small batches of the new SSN followed by years of testing and only then mass production (max 3 units a year).

Has 10 nuclear subs a year ever been achieved in the modern era, post WW2? 10 per year for China isn't happening. Isn't the typical rate something like 2 every three years or so? Even if we ignore teething issues needing correction and LRIP for something like the Type 095 after the first "trial" manufacturing set, achieving 10 per year would be beyond realistic. China this and that but it's not 10 SSNs per year insane.

zxcv872 described the USN's nuclear sub production in the cold war quite well.

During the USSR's peak, submarines from Sevmash alone were alsocommissioned in quite a fast rate.

Obviously I don't think China would or should seek to match anything near the insanity that the USSR was attempting, but one only needs to observe the below to recognize what even a fraction of that production say in the 1960s and 1970s could mean... or of the USN in the cold war.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

No lol, on SDF I express my thoughts with less reservations.

I'm sure you do. What I'm saying is that writing for the audience you write for - not just in The Diplomat but on Reddit as well (since you brought it up) - has rubbed off on you. You're doing a constant dance of "on the other hand, we don't know if, etc." to maintain your credibility with that crowd.

Not that I condemn any of it, mind you. I read your pieces with interest and consider you one of the foremost writers on the PLA in the English language.

There's no one to impress here, please leave the excess chauvinism for reddit..

I don't think I'm being chauvinistic, just factual. The fact is that China's industrial capacity is both unmatched and improving with remarkable alacrity. The fact is that China has for decades consistently outperformed even the most optimistic estimates. The fact is that China built one of the largest submarine construction halls in the world, took a look at it and said, "You know what would be even better, another one" and nobody had an inkling that was in the cards.

Forgive me if I learn from the decades of consistent data that what's considered "outperforming" should just be called what it is: normal. But maybe I'm missing something that the splendidly well-informed membership on this site can help me with.

Again, I think the idea of 10 nuclear subs in a year is at the more far end side of things, but it's raised as a possibility.

I'm not married to 10; call it 7 or 8, hell, 6 a year. It certainly isn't 1 every 3 years or whatever pitiful rate Britain can muster.

Obviously I don't think China would or should seek to match anything near the insanity that the USSR was attempting

But that's just the thing, isn't it. What was a maniacal sprint for the Soviet Union is a comfortable jog for China.

 

[Blitzo]

I'm sure you do. What I'm saying is that writing for the audience you write for - not just in The Diplomat but on Reddit as well (since you brought it up) - has rubbed off on you. You're doing a constant dance of "on the other hand, we don't know if, etc." to maintain your credibility with that crowd.

Not that I condemn any of it, mind you. I read your pieces with interest and consider you one of the foremost writers on the PLA in the English language.

What you described is just called being realistic.

Hell I would argue that even my suggestion of 10 nuclear subs launched in a year is approaching fanboyism and is one of the most out-there ideas I've floated in a while, and there's a reason I said it with so many caveats.

I don't think I'm being chauvinistic, just factual. The fact is that China's industrial capacity is both unmatched and improving with remarkable alacrity. The fact is that China has for decades consistently outperformed even the most optimistic estimates. The fact is that China built one of the largest submarine construction halls in the world, took a look at it and said, "You know what would be even better, another one" and nobody had an inkling that was in the cards.

Forgive me if I learn from the decades of consistent data that what's considered "outperforming" should just be called what it is: normal. But maybe I'm missing something that the splendidly well-informed membership on this site can help me with.

I'm not married to 10; call it 7 or 8, hell, 6 a year. It certainly isn't 1 every 3 years or whatever pitiful rate Britain can muster.

But that's just the thing, isn't it. What was a maniacal sprint for the Soviet Union is a comfortable jog for China.

I fully agree China to have significant ambitions wrt its nuclear submarine (SSN and SSBN) fleet requirements, but at this stage we just don't have the evidence to comfortably claim the kind of construction rates you describe are guaranteed with that air of confidence.

It's called not counting your chickens until they're hatched.


Putting it another way, if in the year 2010, one had claimed that "China would launch 8x13000 ton destroyers and an additional 29x7000 ton destroyers by late 2020, and in one of those years China will launch 10 destroyers" --- then such a person would have been laughed out of the room and their claims dismissed as overambitious and unsupported by present evidence of the time.
And in 2010, such a hypothetical dismissal of that kind of claim would have been appropriate, simply because at that time we didn't have anything near the evidence of that kind of production ambition or speed of that ambition to support it, and because that kind of claim was unprecedented at the time.

In the same way as now, in 2020, the idea of launching 10 nuclear subs in a year obliges us to dismiss it because they just haven't yet demonstrated the production rate yet to make 10 nuclear subs a year to be a reasonable claim.
If in a few years they are launching 6 nuclear subs a year, then sure, the idea of 10 could be much more easily entertained.
But when the new facility has yet to even build one submarine, I think we need to treat it with appropriate caution.


If your argument is that China is seeking a more ambitious nuclear submarine launch rate than the UK, then sure lol I don't think anyone would challenge you on that.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

And in 2010, such a hypothetical dismissal of that kind of claim would have been appropriate, simply because at that time we didn't have anything near the evidence of that kind of production ambition or speed of that ambition to support it, and because that kind of claim was unprecedented at the time.

I think this gets to the core of our methodological dispute. I claim that it would be completely appropriate to not just to entertain the comparable claim today, but to hold it as the likeliest one, not just because it turned out to be the correct one, but because China has a well-established track record of delivering exactly that kind of outsized performance. I hesitate to even call it "outsized" since even the current surface ship build rate is not where I'd like it to be and certainly not commensurate with China's size and stature. There's a history here that should be given its due credence, we're not dealing with an unknown quantity.

In the same way as now, in 2020, the idea of launching 10 nuclear subs in a year obliges us to dismiss it because they just haven't yet demonstrated the production rate yet to make 10 nuclear subs a year to be a reasonable claim.

Who's making the claim matters. I know the "claim" is just you estimating an upper bound on the yard's capacity, but before you go off and write an odyssey of caveats, consider the simplest explanation: China built a yard with that capacity because it intends to use it.

If you were being "realistic" (by how you define the term), then you should remind your readers of the possibility that your very reasonable and respectable estimates are underestimates as often as you remind them that they may be overestimates by patiently listing every possible thing that can go wrong. Realism works both ways.

If your argument is that China is seeking a more ambitious nuclear submarine launch rate than the UK, then sure lol I don't think anyone would challenge you on that.

That was just a passing smack at Britain. Britain doesn't belong in this discussion or any like it.

 

[Blitzo]

I think this gets to the core of our methodological dispute. I claim that it would be completely appropriate to not just to entertain the comparable claim today, but to hold it as the likeliest one, not just because it turned out to be the correct one, but because China has a well-established track record of delivering exactly that kind of outsized performance. I hesitate to even call it "outsized" since even the current surface ship build rate is not where I'd like it to be and certainly not commensurate with China's size and stature. There's a history here that should be given its due credence, we're not dealing with an unknown quantity.

The fact that 10 nuclear submarines a year is dared to even be uttered imo is already a reflection of the history that is being given credence.

Who's making the claim matters. I know the "claim" is just you estimating an upper bound on the yard's capacity, but before you go off and write an odyssey of caveats, consider the simplest explanation: China built a yard with that capacity because it intends to use it.

If you were being "realistic" (by how you define the term), then you should remind your readers of the possibility that your very reasonable and respectable estimates are underestimates as often as you remind them that they may be overestimates by patiently listing every possible thing that can go wrong. Realism works both ways.

If who's making the claim matters, well in this case I'm making the claim and I specifically made efforts to put it out there very much as a very far high end launch rate as an upper bound. My own estimates do of course also have lower bounds, but I don't describe them here because I think everyone is already aware of what a lower bound can be.

I fully agree that China intends to use the production capacity of this new facility, however as I've written in previous pages in replies to others and also over the last few years on this topic -- we don't know what the sustained full rate production of this facility is, and 10 nuclear submarines a year from where we are at right now would definitely be on the high end of what we think the combined capacity (eastern and southern halls) could do, which is why I say it is an upper bound possibility.

This is specifically in relation to the "10 nuclear submarines in a year" idea that you described as "normal". The issue I have is just this particular post, bolded part specifically:

10 nuclear submarines per year isn't prepping for war. This is China, and to China 10 nuclear submarines per year is simply normal.

If you agree that statement is an overreach at this point in time, then I have no other disagreement.

 

[silentlurker]

China built a yard with that capacity because it intends to use it.

Have you taken any Business or Systems management course before? In the most systems running at higher throughput lowers your production effeciency.

Having a few extra empty areas to store extra components or prep for the next assembly stage sounds like a perfectly sound reason to not design a yard larger than needed.

 

[kentchang]

No doubt China has the industrial capacity and resources to fund and construct 10 nuclear subs a year but why should China do that?

The primary mission for 09V still seems to be the protection of SSBN's. If the steady-state number for China's SSBN fleet is around a dozen, three dozen SSN's seem to make sense. To assign 09V's a major land attack role is both political unwise and unnecessary in the APAC region. Australia is not worth it.

From a different angle, if we look at the ratio between PLAN and USN major surface combatants, it seems China is content to be at 1:2 to 1:3. Half of 70 is 35.

Both point to a very sustainable and efficient 2 to 3 per year production rate. So if you are rich, you build a factory that can surge to 4 to 6 just in case. 2 SSN's and 1 SSBN per year is very decent pace stretching beyond 2030. Who knows what technology or direction undersea platforms will be. Don't forget the more boats you have, the more factory space/time you need for overhauls/MLU's especially beyond 2030.

If I am a planner, I must ask what are my resource constraints, who am I trying to impress, how much do I need to do the impressing, what my enemy is projected to have, and most important of all, how likely will there be a shooting war. China made a huge bet on peace in the 1990's to focus on the economy and very little on military. It won big. Now China is almost caught up with the hardware deficit. How likely will there be a war between China and the US in the next 20 years? Not very likely so why overbuild? In the end, a nation's wealth is measured by how much money in the bank, not how much rusting metal in the junkyard. By 2030 when China's economy is twice that of the US in PPP terms, does US really matter? To compare China/US in 2030 is like comparing US/China in 2010. By 2030, I think it will be the US that will give up trying to keep up with China.

Last point, the USN FY2021 budget, despite all the talk, has money for only one Virginia and one Columbia subs. USN's submarine fleet is declining to a low of 56 (42 SSN + 1 SSGN + 13 SSBN) by 2029 (

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). US faces two oceans with two enemies China and Russia. USN will be paying for the Columbia program for the next decade while the total defense budget must go down. If I am China, why do I need more than a dozen 09V's and six 09VI's? I rather spend the money saved on other game changing toys. This line of reasoning points to an a two subs per year pace being adequate. Factor in the need to replace all the subs built before 2000, a 'surge' rate of 3 per year for the next dozen years still sound the most reasonable. I am cheap. Three is a lot!