Pumping out depends not just on hull construction. Matching production of military grade nuclear reactors and fuel is required. And a lot of highly skilled staff to operate them.
And I don't think those are going to be major problems that would continue bottlenecking China's underwater fleet expansion any longer than they had to.
It's 2024, not 1994.
that production bankrupted the Soviet Union and also killed the USA and it was a deliberate policy by US to force USSR to try and match the US pace knowing they would fall for the trap which they did
Nuclear submarines are very expensive to build and maintain so I think the Chinese policy of slow production for a sustained period of time is not a bad idea and China wont be falling for that trap
And today, China is the one with 20 nuclear-powered submarine assembly bays, not the US.
Of course, I'm not claiming that all those 20 bays will definitely be used solely for the new construction of SSNs and SSBNs, as some of those can (if not will) be used for the maintenance and refueling of older submarines. It's also valid that a sustained, stable annual rate of SSN+SSBN production is key to maintain shipyard workforce size and efficiency.
However, being "slow" in a time of reignited arms race across the Pacific while getting strangled ever tighter by the US&LC across the eastern and southern coastlines and borders isn't exactly smart. That means 2-3 SSNs per year isn't going to cut it anymore - Especially once a new design has become proven and reliable for serial production.
A stable build rate of 4-5 SSNs per year from, say, early-2025 onwards would mean an additional 40-50 new/next-gen SSNs by the end of 2034. I don't think it is wrong to have 40-50 new/next-gen SSNs that can credibly threaten US&LC warships and bases/installations that are farther away from home (i.e. 2IC, 3IC and the Indian Ocean), especially based on the presently (or soon to be) available capability which can enable such prospects into reality. If anything - Would Beijing prefer to intercept and disrupt the enemy forces' advances much farther away from home, or is Beijing content with doing so only when they're much closer if not right on China's doorstep?
There's also the need to consider that not every single SSN would be able to be on-station at once, as some of them must go through replenishment, maintenance and refueling at any given time. This means the actual number of SSNs that are available for combat duty at any given time is actually lower than what the total number of SSNs in the fleet tends to tell on paper. (And, to-be-fair, this is the same for just about any class and type of warships around the world.)
Plus, compared to have only 10-or-so underwater enemy threats to deal with, imagine having to deal with multiple 10s of them.
And then, there is China's nuclear deterrence capability to speak of. Apart from land-based (TELs, silos) and air-based (tactical/strategic bombers) deterrence, sea-based deterrence (submarines) should also be receive more attention, especially in light of China's recent rapid nuclear arsenal buildup.
That means more SSBNs being built = More SSBNs that can conduct deterrence patrol at any given time = More SSBNs that can survive enemy actions during wartime = More vectors of which the enemy homeland can be attacked from = More nukes that can be thrown at enemy cities in case sh1t truly hits the fan.
