Please read it carefully. I didn't say it's a great ASW platform. I said it's a great platform that can also carry a lot of ASW helicopters (as well as other types of helicopters).
If you are carrying a lot of ASW helicopters and you are operating those ASW helicopters from 075 in a theater of war as you have described in your last few pages of proposals for using 075s, then you are operating your 075 as a ASW platform by definition.
I'll rephase my argument using your words -- "075 is a great platform, which can carry a lot of helicopters of various roles, ASW helicopters, but it should not be used in a manner where it carries a lot of ASW helicopters to conduct the ASW mission, unless significant extenuating circumstances forces it to be used in that manner (namely if the opposing submarine threat is so great, and if the 075s are not required to be used in their amphibious assault role in the future)".
At the same time, is it actually safer for LHD to be sitting in a port without air defense ships around it or be as part of a large fleet?
A port during time of war will have extended land based air power and air defenses as part of its own defensive screen -- but more importantly it will also be defended by the "large fleet" that is deployed out at sea which would function as the outermost layer of defense.
Based on the maritime geography of China, the western pacific, and the location of various opfor capabilities, yes being in certain ports would absolutely be safer than being out at sea.
I think you are over simplifying my comments. I'm advocating for 075s to operate as part of a larger fleet rather than sitting in port and doing nothing. And if it's part of a large fleet, then it's helicopters will get used for different missions. You seem to ignore my comments about other missions and just focus in on ASW.
I'm focusing on your ASW proposal because that is the one I consider to be most egregious.
Depending on the conflict and the stage of the conflict, it would be far more logical -- if not necessary and vital -- to preserve your 075s in port where they can be defended by land based friendly aircraft, air defenses, than sending them out at sea to "contribute" to a stage of the conflict where their presence is not absolutely essential.
The problem is that you are seeing 075s during a stage of conflict (prior to the amphibious assault stage) as if they are a net gain in capability for a conflict by sending them out into battle --- whereas in reality if they are sent out into battle they are a liability because 075s are so important to the amphibious assault stage of the conflict that they will require substantial naval escorts to make them sufficiently survivable.
By sending 075s into battle, you either:
1: risk losing your precious, vital 075 that you need to keep alive until the amphibious assault phase of the conflict
2: risk compromising your naval task force's mission by dedicating so many escorts to preserve your 075s
That is why I've repeatedly said that the only way it makes sense to send 075s into battle for the ASW mission (or indeed, as part of any sort of naval task force prior to the amphibious assault phase of the conflict), is if you are forced to throw all of your capabilities and the kitchen sink at the enemy because they are just so capable, and if you do not plan to do an amphibious assault operation in the near future anyway in which case the primary and unique 075 capability is not that important and you have greater freedom to
risk your 075s for other missions.
oh, that's nice of you. If I disagree with you, I'm rejecting to understand, like I'm stupid, rather than I just disagree with you.
If PLAN loses a 075, it will still be able to conduct amphibious assaults with other 075s, 071s. It has 8 071s! If we are talking about Taiwan, 072s and RoRo ships are all going to be used.
If PLAN loses a carrier, it will have no way of maintaining presence in that very important area East of Taiwan. So yeah, I consider losing a carrier to be a bigger loss than a 075. I would want them to be able to keep that carrier safe and control the area East of Taiwan with all possible naval assets.
I think this is something which your previous posts had not described.
The issue I had with your previous posts is that you made it sound like it would be normal or natural to use 075s or 076s in the ASW mission.
Whereas what you're really describing here, is stating that you think the ASW threat that the PLAN faces would be so severe that they are forced to throw everything they have at it (even suboptimal platforms), and also arguing that you don't think 075s are essential to an amphibious assault operation (thus willing to risk a loss of a 075).
In other words, you are describing a situation where you believe the PLAN are being
forced to use 075s in the ASW role because they have no other choice.
If that's the case, then I have no disagreement with you.
You said "Where are CSGs with 075s in it? Let's look beyond China. Which country does it?"
Clearly, America and France do operate LHDs alongside a CSG. And if LHD operate along side a CSG, then they will be asked to help CSGs in the areas that they can. Different military have different needs. USN does not have a shortage of quality SSNs, so it doesn't need LHA/LHDs to assist with ASW.
In PLAN's case, ASW is one such need. There are also other roles that it will be asked to do that's not amphibious assaults.
The USN and MN operate LHDs alongside CSGs, but LHDs are rarely a fixture as part of a CSG except for photo ops.
Instead, during times of battle, LHDs operate with CSGs
in the same theater where they are used for their own respective missions that they are optimized for.
LHDs for amphibious assault and employment of rotary air power, while CSGs provide fixed wing strike, AEW, area air defense, ASW.