071 LPD thread

[Iron Man]

Okay, it was a miscommunication.

But based on my reading of your posts it seemed like you were proposing an MEU or ARG type organization would be part of your beach assault proposal.

From what I remember, and reading over your posts over the last couple of pages, nowhere in your previous posts did you describe your ARG suggestion to merely be a secondary force to attack secondary sites. I could only operate under the assumption that you were suggesting your ARG would be a component in the main amphibious assault force.


And just in case I did misread or miss out what you actually meant (and feel free to point out anything that I missed), can you please not bite my head off? I'm not trying to maliciously misrepresent your argument or anything. More often than not if a point is misunderstood it's because it was accidentally misread.

We've had this discussion before, and this is the exact point that I brought up in the previous discussion. What I envision for a Taiwan scenario is a main force which includes every landing ship except the ARGs. The ARGs would attack a secondary site to split and complicate the defenses. You would have to split off disproportionately more forces to defend against a second attack compared to what the PLAN separates from its main force, and more importantly you would have much less clue as to where the ARGs intend to attack until maybe just a couple hours before they land (assuming you still had any ISR capabilities left to use).

I can see a utility to have multiple ARGs to attack secondary sites, however IMO the Chinese Navy does not yet have the LPD, LHD and LST forces to be able to mount both a sufficiently large main force along with a number of smaller secondary forces to attack secondary sites.

Optimally, the Chinese Navy would have a main landing force that might look something like a "super ARG" with multiple LPDs, LHDs, and many LSTs, while having two or three other ARGs with an LPD, LHD and a handful of LSTs, all of which are able to conduct sizeable independent first wave beach assault and seizure operations.


Of course, this is operating under the assumption that having a main assault force where a significant proportion of the overall "first wave" should concentrate together to have the best chance of breaking through the enemy defencesis a good thing to begin with, which is how I think the PLA may want to plan an amphibious assault in the immediate future with the resources they have.

The PLAN definitely does not currently have the amphibious capability to attack a secondary site. It doesn't even currently have a single functional ARG in the strictest sense. Whatever chance the Chinese military has currently of taking and holding a beachhead would IMO require everything they have concentrated at a single site. Moreover, attacking a second site would require not just a single ARG, it would likely require several ARGs, and maybe even some LSTs, though the presence of LSTs would then start limiting the number of beaches the ARGs could attack.

My concern is about whether the amphibious IFVs and their crew will be able to make the 40km journey from LPD to shore and still be in competent fighting condition by the time they get there, especially in rough seas.

The speed of the VN18 (export ZBD05) has a water speed of 25km/h. In rougher seas that might be even lower. To make a 40km journey might take at least 2 hours or more.

Why quote the speed of the export VN18 at 25km/hr instead of the domestic ZBD-05 at 45km/hr? Plus I am not really concerned about the fighting capability of an IFV after a trip over the water, even after a 2 hour trip in rough seas; this seems like no big deal to me. If you are prone to seasickness, then you probably didn't join the marine corps in the first place.

German fixed defences on the beach and immediately inland to beach were definitely intact, yes.

However, I still expect substantial mobile and live resistance, even if most of the beach fixed defence positions are destroyed by rocket artillery and LACMs and airstrikes.

Tanks, mobile artillery, IFVs, infantry, ATGM teams, and other mobile units, will be the main opfor to face on the beach.

IMO it will be difficult to ID and bombard mobile infantry and AFVs if they have hidden themselves well, and those forces will probably only begin to reveal themselves as the beach assault begins.
Of course, things like rocket artillery and gun bombardment against likely sites of the enemy will be able to soften them substantially, especially with wide area cluster munitions, but I am very hesitant about how well all such sites and units will be identified by ISR.


That is why I think the fire support for the beach assault will have to be flexible and responsive, which I think CAS will be most optimal for.

I think we agree on the fundamentals in this area, it is more about how much of the ROC's beach defences will include mobile forces and how many of them the PLA are able to neutralize before the first wave of the amphibious assault is launched.

If PLAAF/PLANAF is able to establish air superiority/supremacy (and I think China would not even consider invading if it could not do so), then all manner of drones and planes with IRST sensors will have freedom to roam over the beaches and even deeper into Taiwanese territory, not to mention the satellites taking pictures overhead. It's not like they have to cover every last coastline along Taiwan, just the beach and surrounding area they intend to assault. How could any vehicle in the area consistently hide in this environment? Plus we are no longer in the days of blowup tanks and jeeps. If your "tank" is full of hot air, an IRST sensor will look at that and laugh. If you're "hiding" under a camo tarp, an IRST sensor will look at that and laugh. Maybe a few could get lucky, but there would certainly not be any concentration of defending vehicles that could escape detection. And if they are hiding, they are certainly not mobile. And if they are mobile, they are not hiding.

In any case preventing reinforcements from reaching the beachhead is classic tactical interdiction, something best performed from the air via both helicopters and fixed wing aviation. Actually even rocket artillery could perform interdiction against Taiwanese forces moving towards the beach. If done right, the only targets that the landing force should have to deal with are the remnant forces not destroyed by the pre-assault bombing and the leakers that get past the air interdiction assets. Actually air interdiction is also known as "deep air support" (DAS), the counterpoint to CAS. So if we are talking about getting and holding a beachhead, CAS will be a minimal part of the equation.

 

[Blitzo]

We've had this discussion before, and this is the exact point that I brought up in the previous discussion. What I envision for a Taiwan scenario is a main force which includes every landing ship except the ARGs. The ARGs would attack a secondary site to split and complicate the defenses. You would have to split off disproportionately more forces to defend against a second attack compared to what the PLAN separates from its main force, and more importantly you would have much less clue as to where the ARGs intend to attack until maybe just a couple hours before they land (assuming you still had any ISR capabilities left to use).

Sorry, I legitimately don't remember having this discussion around these lines before, but I'll take your word for it.

In any case, I agree that having the ability to attack secondary sites is very useful.

The PLAN definitely does not currently have the amphibious capability to attack a secondary site. It doesn't even currently have a single functional ARG in the strictest sense. Whatever chance the Chinese military has currently of taking and holding a beachhead would IMO require everything they have concentrated at a single site. Moreover, attacking a second site would require not just a single ARG, it would likely require several ARGs, and maybe even some LSTs, though the presence of LSTs would then start limiting the number of beaches the ARGs could attack.

Agreed.

Why quote the speed of the export VN18 at 25km/hr instead of the domestic ZBD-05 at 45km/hr? Plus I am not really concerned about the fighting capability of an IFV after a trip over the water, even after a 2 hour trip in rough seas; this seems like no big deal to me. If you are prone to seasickness, then you probably didn't join the marine corps in the first place.

Because I don't have a reliable source for whether the ZBD05's water speed is actually 45km/hr or not, and discussions about ZBD05 on CDF with some people I thought were credible in past years have suggested the 25 knot speed that has been cited on a few English language websites are exaggerated.
But we do have a reliable source from norinco's VN18 specs for 25km/hr for export, so I'd prefer to be conservative.

That said, I'd very be happy to be proven wrong, in particular if jobjed has a source he trusts.

If PLAAF/PLANAF is able to establish air superiority/supremacy (and I think China would not even consider invading if it could not do so), then all manner of drones and planes with IRST sensors will have freedom to roam over the beaches and even deeper into Taiwanese territory, not to mention the satellites taking pictures overhead. It's not like they have to cover every last coastline along Taiwan, just the beach and surrounding area they intend to assault. How could any vehicle in the area consistently hide in this environment? Plus we are no longer in the days of blowup tanks and jeeps. If your "tank" is full of hot air, an IRST sensor will look at that and laugh. If you're "hiding" under a camo tarp, an IRST sensor will look at that and laugh. Maybe a few could get lucky, but there would certainly not be any concentration of defending vehicles that could escape detection. And if they are hiding, they are certainly not mobile. And if they are mobile, they are not hiding.

I would certainly hope the PLA are able to conduct an effective and comprehensive A2G kill chain after achieving air superiority.

I suppose I'm mostly concerned about how comprehensive the PLA's ISR will be able to ID all of the hidden mobile forces vs how well the ROC will be able to hide themselves amongst the terrain, and using things like decoys, and wide dispersion to many small units.

The PLAAF definitely has a lot of A2G ISR assets at their disposal they can bring to bear, like SAR equipped Tu-154s, many UAVs, and fixed wing fighters with EO pods, and ELINT/SIGINT GX aircraft. But past aerial campaigns like Operation Allied Force showed it could be quite difficult to target well concealed armour and infantry.
The technology the PLA have are definitely different to what NATO had in 1999 and the distance and the total force they can bring to bear to their target is also arguably much more favourable to the PLA than what NATO had in Kosovo... but for the purposes of discussion (and I hope definitely for the PLA's planning), I prefer to err on the side of conservatism.



When I say "mobile" forces, I'm thinking that they will be fixed and hidden during the PLA bombardment, but once the PLA assaults the beach the mobile forces will move to engage them from their hiding spots.

In any case preventing reinforcements from reaching the beachhead is classic tactical interdiction, something best performed from the air via both helicopters and fixed wing aviation. Actually even rocket artillery could perform interdiction against Taiwanese forces moving towards the beach. If done right, the only targets that the landing force should have to deal with are the remnant forces not destroyed by the pre-assault bombing and the leakers that get past the air interdiction assets. Actually air interdiction is also known as "deep air support" (DAS), the counterpoint to CAS. So if we are talking about getting and holding a beachhead, CAS will be a minimal part of the equation.

I was more thinking about CAS rather than interdiction, that is to say circumstances where amphibious assault forces come into contact with mobile forces that had survived initial bombardment.

Obviously it would be optimal to engage any reinforcements before they come into contact with one's amphibious forces, and also to engage any surviving mobile forces that had survived the initial bombardment too.

 

[Iron Man]

Because I don't have a reliable source for whether the ZBD05's water speed is actually 45km/hr or not, and discussions about ZBD05 on CDF with some people I thought were credible in past years have suggested the 25 knot speed that has been cited on a few English language websites are exaggerated.
But we do have a reliable source from norinco's VN18 specs for 25km/hr for export, so I'd prefer to be conservative.

That said, I'd very be happy to be proven wrong, in particular if jobjed has a source he trusts.

The EFV weighed in at 36t and had a max water speed of 46km/hr, so I don't see why it would be difficult to believe that the 27t ZBD-05 could achieve a similar speed, even if it had weaker engines.

I would certainly hope the PLA are able to conduct an effective and comprehensive A2G kill chain after achieving air superiority.

I suppose I'm mostly concerned about how comprehensive the PLA's ISR will be able to ID all of the hidden mobile forces vs how well the ROC will be able to hide themselves amongst the terrain, and using things like decoys, and wide dispersion to many small units.

The PLAAF definitely has a lot of A2G ISR assets at their disposal they can bring to bear, like SAR equipped Tu-154s, many UAVs, and fixed wing fighters with EO pods, and ELINT/SIGINT GX aircraft. But past aerial campaigns like Operation Allied Force showed it could be quite difficult to target well concealed armour and infantry.

The technology the PLA have are definitely different to what NATO had in 1999 and the distance and the total force they can bring to bear to their target is also arguably much more favourable to the PLA than what NATO had in Kosovo... but for the purposes of discussion (and I hope definitely for the PLA's planning), I prefer to err on the side of conservatism.

When I say "mobile" forces, I'm thinking that they will be fixed and hidden during the PLA bombardment, but once the PLA assaults the beach the mobile forces will move to engage them from their hiding spots.

Even if worst comes to worst and the PLA's ISR forces get shut down, the landing force would presumably still have dozens of Z-9/19s and Z-10s from the 075s flying shifts over the beachhead and surrounding areas waiting for hidden enemy vehicles to open fire or go on the move, at which point they become easy targets for HJ-10s without need for any intermediary ISR assets, assuming they were even able to stay hidden in the first place. Remember helos can also do CAS and have FLIR sensors.

 

[Blitzo]

The EFV weighed in at 36t and had a max water speed of 46km/hr, so I don't see why it would be difficult to believe that the 27t ZBD-05 could achieve a similar speed, even if it had weaker engines.

Yes, and it would depend on how much weaker the engines were. Other things like the hydrodynamics of the ZBD05 vs the EFV would probably play a part in terms of how well each can hydroplane.

I would love to get proven wrong if there is some solid evidence supporting ZBD05 doing 45km/hr. My reasons for skepticism is merely because a couple of people I placed in high regard a few years back said that number was exaggerated.

Even if worst comes to worst and the PLA's ISR forces get shut down, the landing force would presumably still have dozens of Z-9/19s and Z-10s from the 075s flying shifts over the beachhead and surrounding areas waiting for hidden enemy vehicles to open fire or go on the move, at which point they become easy targets for HJ-10s without need for any intermediary ISR assets, assuming they were even able to stay hidden in the first place. Remember helos can also do CAS and have FLIR sensors.

Yes, attack helicopters will definitely have a part to play, but I fear slightly for the survivability of helicopters against an enemy with modern MANPADS.

In any case, it's less that I fear the PLA's ISR kill chain will get shut down, so much as I fear how effective they will be at actually IDing all or even only most of the opposing units needed to be eliminated.

 

[Iron Man]

Yes, and it would depend on how much weaker the engines were. Other things like the hydrodynamics of the ZBD05 vs the EFV would probably play a part in terms of how well each can hydroplane.

I would love to get proven wrong if there is some solid evidence supporting ZBD05 doing 45km/hr. My reasons for skepticism is merely because a couple of people I placed in high regard a few years back said that number was exaggerated.

Unless they are big shrimps with ties to that area of the Chinese defense sector, I'm not going to hold them in any greater regard than any other military enthusiast. You can if you want. Regardless, even if they only hydroplaned at 20km/hr or whatever I don't see any legitimate reason to fear for the combat effectiveness of an IFV doing so over a 2 hour trip from ship to shore.

Yes, attack helicopters will definitely have a part to play, but I fear slightly for the survivability of helicopters against an enemy with modern MANPADS.

In any case, it's less that I fear the PLA's ISR kill chain will get shut down, so much as I fear how effective they will be at actually IDing all or even only most of the opposing units needed to be eliminated.

The threat of MANPADS will always be there, but pre-assault bombing should make them far less of a threat to helicopters once landing commences. As for PLA's ISR forces, as I said before, they don't need to be spread out over a large area, only over the target beach and the surrounding areas that can attack the beach. If the PLA cannot even manage to have an effective ISR kill chain over this limited space, it probably shouldn't be invading Taiwan in the first place.

 

[Blitzo]

Unless they are big shrimps with ties to that area of the Chinese defense sector, I'm not going to hold them in any greater regard than any other military enthusiast. You can if you want. Regardless, even if they only hydroplaned at 20km/hr or whatever I don't see any legitimate reason to fear for the combat effectiveness of an IFV doing so over a 2 hour trip from ship to shore.

Okay.

The threat of MANPADS will always be there, but pre-assault bombing should make them far less of a threat to helicopters once landing commences. As for PLA's ISR forces, as I said before, they don't need to be spread out over a large area, only over the target beach and the surrounding areas that can attack the beach. If the PLA cannot even manage to have an effective ISR kill chain over this limited space, it probably shouldn't be invading Taiwan in the first place.

I would hope that is the case if such an amphibious assault ever has to be carried out.

 

[Lethe]

Attack helicopters have never been validated in a high-end threat environment. Of course that's true of a great many staples of the modern military apparatus, but attack helicopters have more question marks over them than most.

See:

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[Iron Man]

Attack helicopters have never been validated in a high-end threat environment. Of course that's true of a great many staples of the modern military apparatus, but attack helicopters have more question marks over them than most.

See:

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I'm not sure how you could even remotely use that article in this thread. That was ONE single example of ONE single helicopter getting destroyed where the enemy had the intel and the drop on an incoming attack. Yes, if you fill the sky with lead that helos are not designed to defend against, some (or rather one) of them will possibly go down; that's called physics. The point isn't to send attack helos into a hail of lead from defenders who know exactly where you are and exactly when you're going to be there, and then somehow magically expect them all to survive. Not only that, the latter half of the article was spent praising not disparaging the role of the Apaches in GWII. I don't think this was the best article for you to choose if your goal was to cast doubt on the effectiveness of attack helicopters in modern warfare.

 

[cunnilingist]

Rand report on US military capabilities.

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I thought this was particularly interesting. This was part of a section detailing US involvement in a Taiwan scenario.

I think this is a pretty good indicator of where China is at militarily right now.

~1000 aircraft. wow.

 

[Iron Man]

Rand report on US military capabilities.

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I thought this was particularly interesting. This was part of a section detailing US involvement in a Taiwan scenario.

I think this is a pretty good indicator of where China is at militarily right now.

~1000 aircraft. wow.

Not sure where they get "five" CSGs from. In a Taiwanese conflict, the number is 3. 1 immediately available on the spot (the single forward-based CSG in Yokosuka), and 2 more probably within two weeks, sailing full steam from the ME and Atlantic theaters. 3 more CSGs would be on reserve standby("MCO-S/R"), available for reactivation within 30 days. 1 more CSG would be available for reactivation within 90 days ("MSS"). In other words, a conflict lasting 2 weeks or more would allow the USN to bring 3 CSGs to the area. A conflict lasting a month or more would allow the USN to gather 6 CSGs to the area. A conflict lasting 3 months or more would allow 7 CSGs to be assembled. The other 4 carriers would in their extended maintenance cycles and would not be available for combat. However, this is a theoretical capability, and it is not clear to me whether the USN has the logistics capability to surge all 7 CSGs into the same theater and adequately maintain their full combat capabilities for the duration of their deployments. To my knowledge this has never been demonstrated. There have been instances of 7 CSGs all active at the same time (actually only Summer Pulse 2004 comes to mind), but importantly they were deployed in several different theaters; in addition, months of planning went into it, with all CSGs having months of forewarning, as well as at the start of the surge 5 CSGs were already active and only 2 had to be surged. Perhaps RAND is suggesting that 5 CSGs are the limit of Western Pacific logistical capability.