071 LPD thread

[Blitzo]

Taiwan's air force and navy consists of 150 severely outdated F-16s (A/B), 4 obsolete destroyers, a bunch of smaller corvettes, and zero (might as well be) submarines. It doesn't take an idiot to see that within 24 hours the PLAAF and PLAN will have total and complete control of the skies and waters surrounding Taiwan. They can probably do this using only 50% of their assets.

After that it's just a matter of securing a beachhead under close air support.

Do not ignore their IDFs, their Mirage 2000s, nor should their many frigates be ignored.
That said, the ROC's current air force and surface navy organization is something which the PLA are probably most "easy" to deal with.

But for conducting an amphibious assault and the relevant joint operations needed to do it with minimal losses, the threat is AShMs and SAMs, of which the ROC have many modern and capable systems, and which the PLA will have their job cut out for them trying to find and eliminate even the majority of them let alone all of them. Rapidly locating and destroying the relevant launchers and fire control systems for AShMs and SAMs will not be an easy task if one assumes the ROC military are competent in their concealment tactics, especially in context of the performance of similar anti-armour and anti-scud missions during Desert Storm and Allied Force.

 

[Hendrik_2000]

What are you talking about?
The point of my reply was to say that it is very presumptive to believe that any bombing+SOF+missile campaign will be able to remove all ROC AShM capabilities, and it takes only a fraction of them to remain in operation to be able to credibly threaten the big ships like LPDs of an amphibious assault force disembarking amphibious IFVs relatively close to shore.


And my reply that you quoted was made to cunnilingist, not to plawolf.

Sorry I am replying to cunninglingist what a terrible name But press the wrong button

 

[cunnilingist]

Priority targets will of course be identified and killed as quickly as possible.

But how long do we think the PLA will give itself to try and find all of those sites before starting an amphibious assault, and what proportion of the AShM sites will they be able to successfully deny and destroy?


I suspect it will be far more likely that they end up missing some sites, and that at the very least the PLA overall will conduct any sort of amphibious assault with the presumption that some level of AShM threat still remains.

Like I said anything that gets through will be intercepted by PLAN assets. In a Taiwan scenario there will be a LOT of PLAN ships in the strait with dual-, quad-packed VLS. LPDs will not operate by themselves.

And this is assuming no 055s will participate in the invasion. When the 055s are put into service the PLAN can just sit back and watch the fireworks.

 

[Blitzo]

Like I said anything that gets through will be intercepted by PLAN assets. In a Taiwan scenario there will be a LOT of PLAN ships in the strait with dual-, quad-packed VLS. LPDs will not operate by themselves.

And this is assuming no 055s will participate in the invasion. When the 055s are put into service the PLAN can just sit back and watch the fireworks.

If the ships were operating in open water then I agree that whatever small no. of AShMs that are fired at them will have a fairly high chance of interception.

But if the LPDs are disembarking amphibious IFVs only some 25km or closer from the beach, well, that is right in the littorals where things like radar horizon and littoral geographical features like islands and hills will signfiicantly complicate low and medium altitude air defence.


They could try to significantly offset that risk by having very disciplined airborne early warning dedicated to watch over the amphibious assault ships, and to have CAP against any AShMs, or better yet to develop a way to datalink shipborne AAW firing solutions with AEW&C data... but the thrust remains, that even a small number of AShMs remaining will pose a meaningful threat to large amphibious assault ships disembarking their payloads in the littorals close to the beach.


The presence or lack of presence of 055 in the amphibious assault force won't make that much of a difference imo

 

[plawolf]

Because the Zubrs they have will be far from enough to spearhead an amphibious assault and we do not know how many they actually plan to order and how long it will take to fulfill their o

If they get some 20 Zubrs or so, then maybe we can start talking about Zubrs replacing 071s as the primary means of spearheading the first wave of an amphibious assault.



Until then, I think LPDs are the best (or at least the "least worst") option for the PLA to conduct a first wave amphibious assault with.

Spearhead and main force are not the same thing.

And as I said, the spearhead will be special forces, airborne (paratroopers) and helicopter borne air cav.

Trying to find well hidden AShM and SAM launchers from the skies can be hard, that’s why you need boots on the ground to help.

Those spearhead forces are primarily there to locate and destroy enemy high value targets with either direct action and/or directing air and missile strikes in.

Their secondary job is to draw enemy forces out of hiding for the Air Force and missile corps to easier pound.

For the beach landings themselves, you will see the Zubrs, and maybe 726s moving in first to put boots and treads on the ground, but even at extended ranges, the 071s will still be well within coastal AShM range using 726s.

All LCACs and 726s does is allow the LPDs to stay out of coastal artillery range at best, but the 071s can launch their 726s directly from port on Chinese coast and they will still be within AShM range of Taiwan’s coastal batteries. So there is little benefit from sitting further back from the coast, as that just gives the defenders more time and opportunity to shoot at you since you will be on station far longer.

Yes, reducing the distance to the coast increases risk, but so does staying on station for a long time, as you would have to if you were relying on 726s to land the bulk of the forces carried by those 071s at extended ranges.

To do that, you need to maintain intensive naval and air SEAD/DEAD, CAP, interdiction, CAS and strike operations for several hours at least.

In my estimation, the increase in risk to the 071 from forward deploying to a few miles off the coast for maybe half an hour at most before pulling back; is going to be lower than for those 071s to stay a few dozen miles off the coast for most of the day.

It’s far easier to mount a massive naval and air operation to close down the airspace over the beachhead and deploy swarms of drones, CAS birds and strikers to almost instantly hit any enemy forces that reveal themselves for an hour or two at most; rather than having to do pretty much the same thing for several hours more.

Not only is the prolonged cordon time demand significantly more attacking assets to be made available to allow for rotations on and off station for refuelling and re-arming; you may also have to settle for a far less robust presence and attack on account of needing to hold assets back as reserves to be used when your first wave of assets run low on fuel and/or ammo; it also gives the enemy much time to organise a big counter attack to try and punch through your cordon to hit those high value LPDs and warship escorts.

Your suggested approach is the western steamroller method to minimise losses. But that takes a long time of preparatory strikes to degrade enemy defences sufficiently to allow that approach.

If you follow the western playbook, you only deploy LDPs once all the AShM and air threat has been completely elmiminted and you only got coastal artillery to worry about.

In that position, so long as your LPDs stay a few score miles off the coast, they are perfectly safe. So it doesn’t matter if it takes all day for their LCACs to ferry all the troops and gear ashore. The PLAN won’t have that luxury of being able to count on having the leisurely time to create that kind of a safe zone.

If you cannot stay out of enemy attack range, as the PLAN won’t be able to until they can kill every enemy AShM launched and fighter (which they are unlikely to be given enough time to do), then the best way to minimise risk is to minimise your exposure time to those threats.

There is nothing stopping the PLAN 071s from launching their 726s at extended ranges to accompany their Zubrs on the way in.

Only the PLAN 071s won’t be sitting around waiting for their 726s to come back for a second load. They will be racing toward shore at full speed themselves, while all the IFVs start coming out of the vehicle deck to pack the well deck.

Once the 071s get close enough to shore, the IFVs are going to pile out ASAP, then the 071s and escorts are free to race back as fast as they charged in.

 

[Iron Man]

I do not envision a US style ARG as the complete force in trying to assault and establish a beach head in a Taiwan contingency.
It won't be merely 071 LPDs, but it will also include LSTs, the various LCACs, the larger LCUs, and even STUFTs.

I expect the ships which are not involved in the first wave to do day 1 heavy lifting in terms of logistics after a beach head has been established -- but I do not envision LPDs to do that role on day 1. Instead, I think LPDs, with their large carrying capacity, are better suited to using most of that capacity on day 1 for fighting vehicles, and to rely on a combination of LSTs, LCACs, and LCUs for logistics, and on day 2 to rely on a combination of all those ships doing ferrying missions.

Where in any of my posts did I claim that ARGs would be the "complete force" in assaulting a beach? Go ahead and link and quote. Even 6 full ARGs would be just a small fraction of the forces needed to successfully establish and hold a beachhead on Taiwan, forces which would have to number in the hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of vehicles. By comparison an MEU can supply 800 troops and several dozen vehicles.

What I said was that the best use of ARGs is as a SECONDARY assault force against a SECONDARY site that is lightly defended due to a more difficult to access beach or a more remote location. The main force will most definitely assault a beach that every last transport ship in the PLAN could attack, but which will also therefore be heavily defended. Taiwan knows its own shoreline. China knows Taiwan's shoreline. Taiwan knows that China knows its shoreline. The point is that the guessing game will be significantly more complicated if Taiwanese defenders have to split their defenses amongst two or more sites; they are probably already planning for this contingency. There are also not very many sites where large transport ships could attack, but many more sites where ARGs could attack. IMO this the key to using ARGs, which is the ARG's flexibility and unpredictability brought about by their ability to land on so many types of terrain. You may have a good clue about where the main force may try to land, but far less clue about where the ARGs are going to land. As I said, they aren't going to be a large force, but if you don't deal with them, they will establish a beachhead that will be more and more difficult to dislodge with each passing day.

Yes, though I was talking about deploying amphibious IFVs rather than a 726 LCAC in regards to the AShm threat.

The problem I see with the amphibious IFV vs LCAC deployment tactic from an LPD, is that the amphibious IFV means an LPD is able to send more vehicles onto the beach at the same time, but it tends to force the LPD to get closer to shore given the slower water speed of the IFV. An LCAC otoh has a much greater ferry speed from the LPD to shore which allows the LPD to stay further from the beach, but it has the problem where the number of vehicles it can deposit onto the beach at one time is many times lower than that of amphibious IFVs disembarking directly from an LPD.

There is no need to "force" the LPD to stop closer to shore to disembark IFVs in a shorter time. Camp the LPD 40km from shore. Send out all the IFVs at that time. Half an hour later send out all the ACVs. They arrive at the beach at the same time. Problem solved.

Well, operation overlord occurred under circumstances where the allies had already carried out substantial bombing raids and had effectively achieved air superiority.

I fully expect the PLA to field the full range of air, missile and naval firepower they have in conjunction with substantial ISR to achieve air superiority, sea control in the strait and in proximity to the island, and to disrupt the command, logistics and communications of the defenders.
Naval gunfire, aerial bombardment and perhaps even cross strait long range rocket artillery, will be fielded to try and substantially soften up any landing sites.

However even if all that is achieved to a realistic standard (and the ability to successfully execute the early stage air and naval victories is far from a given), I still expect substantial live resistance against an amphibious landing to exist on the beach.

One way of substantially countering the defenders on the beach -- assuming the PLA are able to establish air superiority and conduct SEAD/DEAD over most of the western part of the island -- is by substantial and very competent CAS and air strike support, in particular from fixed wing aircraft.
But IMO, the PLA will not be able to do that on such a scale in the near future. They definitely have the weapons and the hardware to do it, look at all the various PGMs and targeting pods they've tested and offered for export. They're not exactly lacking in platforms either -- the couple hundred JH-7/As in air force and navy, the H-6Ks, and J-10 variants, would all be excellent candidates to equip targeting pods and PGMs onto, especially stand off wing kits so they can deploy their weapons farther from the island and any residual air defences that may still exist. (And J-16s of course, though it seems like the PLAAF seem to intend to equip a variety of PGMs and a new targeting pod on it.)
But the PLA have yet to buy into serious CAS capability and to have the ISR and joint training to test and continuously retest the well oiled machine.

Land based cross strait long range rocket artillery is another way of supplementing these sort of defender-softening operations, as well as naval gunfire artillery (though that means putting ships within a couple dozen km of the shore), but to have a more responsive, flexible and persistent anti-beach fire support capability -- and thus to make any resistance only minimal or token -- a very robust capability to call down precision air strikes must be developed.
Competent and widespread JTACs and FACs in the marines, army, but also an equivalent aboard naval ships, are essential.

The Allied forces certainly had air superiority, but they certainly did not effectively suppress the defenses on the beach, as the Germans had almost all of their pillboxes and artillery pieces intact along with the wire, ditches, mines, tank barriers and other deterrent infrastructure on the beaches. A PLAN landing force would certainly not make this same mistake. As for PLAAF/PLANAF CAS, this is surely coming. It's not like anyone doubts that this is a capability that is already nascent in both the air forces and growing over time. In any case, CAS is not relevant in a beach assault as Taiwanese static defenses are the main targets. These static defenses are just as easily dealt with by cross-strait rocket barrages and ship- and shore-based LACM waves as by the attacks from the air. What the PLA will need CAS for is if/when it pushes inland and has to deal with more mobile defenses.

 

[Iron Man]

Why people keep thinking 071s will be the spearhead in a Taiwan scenario when the PLAN has been investing in Zubrs is a little perplexing to me.

Yeah, why do people? The answer is nobody. I think you should read our posts more carefully before you attempt to critique them.

The first wave will more likely be heli-borne air cavalry, airborne and special forces teams sent in to use speed and forward air controllers to take out coastal defence missile batteries, radars, fortifications, artillery, troops and any other high value and/or weakly defended targets they can find.

This will probably be happening all along the coast, with a few choice mass landing sites pre-selected, but the PLA will probably only commit to final landing site(s) depending on where the first wave is most successful at taking out coastal defences.

The second wave will probably be more air cav to support the Zubrs, who will bring the heavy armour.

These will link up with the first wave units already established, and push up to secure a beachhead as the 071s move up to disgorge its massed IVF payload as fast as possible before pulling back for another load.

What waves? There will be only one wave on the first day. And that will consist of EVERYTHING. Every last thing, including the kitchen sink. Every last ship that China possesses that can carry troops, vehicles, and equipment onto the shores of Taiwan will beach/unload at the same time. Every helo that can land troops will land them at the same time. Attacking in waves sounds fancy but does nothing more than allow defenders to pick off smaller waves of attackers when instead they could be overwhelmed by a single massive wave attacking at once from all sides. The only legitimate reason for any kind of series of "waves" would be because the transport ships have nothing left to disgorge onto the beaches and have to sail back to the mainland to pick up more troops, vehicles, and equipment. That's a 5-6 hour trip each way plus loading and unloading time. That would be an entire day kind of affair.

Moving more IVFs down from vehicle decks faces several bottle necks that will mean your LPDs have to spend a good amount of time on station waiting for them all to file out. Time the LPD itself will be vulnerable to enemy missile and artillery attack.

Not even remotely. The amount of increased time it would take to file IFVs out of the vehicle decks out the side ramps two at a time as compared to three at a time from the well deck is not even worth mentioning in the context of an assault that takes hours to unfold. And go ahead and name one artillery piece that Taiwan possesses that can reach out to 40-45km from shore and be sighted OTH against a seaborne target. As for the missile threat, this is a total wash given both the negligible time difference in the context of the larger operation as well as the fact that any ARG would be protected by a CSG or SAG embedded with the ARG. And if you do face any kind of substantial antiship missile threat from Taiwanese shores during your actual assault against a beach, this would certainly be considered a total failure on someone's part and worthy of a court martial and/or termination of command.

 

[Blitzo]

Spearhead and main force are not the same thing.

And as I said, the spearhead will be special forces, airborne (paratroopers) and helicopter borne air cav.

Trying to find well hidden AShM and SAM launchers from the skies can be hard, that’s why you need boots on the ground to help.

Those spearhead forces are primarily there to locate and destroy enemy high value targets with either direct action and/or directing air and missile strikes in.

Their secondary job is to draw enemy forces out of hiding for the Air Force and missile corps to easier pound.

I think we have different ideas about what kind of force the word "spearhead" refers to in this context.

IMO, for a Taiwan invasion scenario, a "spearhead" would be the initial force that moves to seize a beach head or a staging area for the main force to later land at and to continue inland with.

What you describe, IMO, is more like enabling operations to search and destroy, sabotage, path find, and designate targets for. It is the mission profile for SOF and helicopter air assault, but they are not intended to seize the beach itself but rather to make the beach seizing operation easier.

For the beach landings themselves, you will see the Zubrs, and maybe 726s moving in first to put boots and treads on the ground, but even at extended ranges, the 071s will still be well within coastal AShM range using 726s.

All LCACs and 726s does is allow the LPDs to stay out of coastal artillery range at best, but the 071s can launch their 726s directly from port on Chinese coast and they will still be within AShM range of Taiwan’s coastal batteries. So there is little benefit from sitting further back from the coast, as that just gives the defenders more time and opportunity to shoot at you since you will be on station far longer.

Technically speaking, yes, an 071 deploying 726s will still be "in range" of land based AShMs.
That is to say, the flight range of AShMs will be able to encompass 071s deploying 726s at range from the beach.

However, for land based ASHMs to be able to conduct those kinds of OTH anti ship targeting, they will need ISR assets, usually airborne or dedicated radar stations. I expect that by this part of the conflict, the ROC's airborne ISR forces will all be destroyed (P-3Cs, E-2s, and even fighter aircraft as well), with substantial degradation if not destruction of their land based anti ship ISR kill chain.

That means, despite the 100-200km ranges of ROC land based AShMs, their actual practical range will be limited to the horizon. That is why I believe there is a much greater AShM risk to 071s if they are deploying IFVs closer to shore (say within 40km) vs deploying 726 LCACs further from shore, over the horizon.

Yes, reducing the distance to the coast increases risk, but so does staying on station for a long time, as you would have to if you were relying on 726s to land the bulk of the forces carried by those 071s at extended ranges.

To do that, you need to maintain intensive naval and air SEAD/DEAD, CAP, interdiction, CAS and strike operations for several hours at least.

In my estimation, the increase in risk to the 071 from forward deploying to a few miles off the coast for maybe half an hour at most before pulling back; is going to be lower than for those 071s to stay a few dozen miles off the coast for most of the day.

It’s far easier to mount a massive naval and air operation to close down the airspace over the beachhead and deploy swarms of drones, CAS birds and strikers to almost instantly hit any enemy forces that reveal themselves for an hour or two at most; rather than having to do pretty much the same thing for several hours more.

Not only is the prolonged cordon time demand significantly more attacking assets to be made available to allow for rotations on and off station for refuelling and re-arming; you may also have to settle for a far less robust presence and attack on account of needing to hold assets back as reserves to be used when your first wave of assets run low on fuel and/or ammo; it also gives the enemy much time to organise a big counter attack to try and punch through your cordon to hit those high value LPDs and warship escorts.

Your suggested approach is the western steamroller method to minimise losses. But that takes a long time of preparatory strikes to degrade enemy defences sufficiently to allow that approach.

If you follow the western playbook, you only deploy LDPs once all the AShM and air threat has been completely elmiminted and you only got coastal artillery to worry about.

In that position, so long as your LPDs stay a few score miles off the coast, they are perfectly safe. So it doesn’t matter if it takes all day for their LCACs to ferry all the troops and gear ashore. The PLAN won’t have that luxury of being able to count on having the leisurely time to create that kind of a safe zone.

If you cannot stay out of enemy attack range, as the PLAN won’t be able to until they can kill every enemy AShM launched and fighter (which they are unlikely to be given enough time to do), then the best way to minimise risk is to minimise your exposure time to those threats.

There is nothing stopping the PLAN 071s from launching their 726s at extended ranges to accompany their Zubrs on the way in.

Only the PLAN 071s won’t be sitting around waiting for their 726s to come back for a second load. They will be racing toward shore at full speed themselves, while all the IFVs start coming out of the vehicle deck to pack the well deck.

Once the 071s get close enough to shore, the IFVs are going to pile out ASAP, then the 071s and escorts are free to race back as fast as they charged in.

Umm I agree that during the initial beach seizure phase (aka what I describe as the "spearhead") -- it makes sense to try and consolidate as much CAS, CAP and ISR and SEAD/DEAD together as possible.


Btw, when you suggest that my approach is "Your suggested approach is the western steamroller method to minimise losses. But that takes a long time of preparatory strikes to degrade enemy defences sufficiently to allow that approach.

If you follow the western playbook, you only deploy LDPs once all the AShM and air threat has been completely elmiminted and you only got coastal artillery to worry about."

But I've always thought about an amphibious assault as requiring a substantial (though rapid) missile and air bombardment to rapidly destroy ROC air and naval forces and C2 facilities, along with SOF and air assault to sabotage and designate targets etc...

Surely you're not suggesting the PLA should conduct an amphibious assault under the conditions where the ROC still have an air force, a navy and an unmolested C2 system??

 

[Blitzo]

Where in any of my posts did I claim that ARGs would be the "complete force" in assaulting a beach? Go ahead and link and quote. Even 6 full ARGs would be just a small fraction of the forces needed to successfully establish and hold a beachhead on Taiwan, forces which would have to number in the hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of vehicles. By comparison an MEU can supply 800 troops and several dozen vehicles.

Okay, it was a miscommunication.

But based on my reading of your posts it seemed like you were proposing an MEU or ARG type organization would be part of your beach assault proposal.

From what I remember, and reading over your posts over the last couple of pages, nowhere in your previous posts did you describe your ARG suggestion to merely be a secondary force to attack secondary sites. I could only operate under the assumption that you were suggesting your ARG would be a component in the main amphibious assault force.


And just in case I did misread or miss out what you actually meant (and feel free to point out anything that I missed), can you please not bite my head off? I'm not trying to maliciously misrepresent your argument or anything. More often than not if a point is misunderstood it's because it was accidentally misread.

What I said was that the best use of ARGs is as a SECONDARY assault force against a SECONDARY site that is lightly defended due to a more difficult to access beach or a more remote location. The main force will most definitely assault a beach that every last transport ship in the PLAN could attack, but which will also therefore be heavily defended. Taiwan knows its own shoreline. China knows Taiwan's shoreline. Taiwan knows that China knows its shoreline. The point is that the guessing game will be significantly more complicated if Taiwanese defenders have to split their defenses amongst two or more sites; they are probably already planning for this contingency. There are also not very many sites where large transport ships could attack, but many more sites where ARGs could attack. IMO this the key to using ARGs, which is the ARG's flexibility and unpredictability brought about by their ability to land on so many types of terrain. You may have a good clue about where the main force may try to land, but far less clue about where the ARGs are going to land. As I said, they aren't going to be a large force, but if you don't deal with them, they will establish a beachhead that will be more and more difficult to dislodge with each passing day.

I can see a utility to have multiple ARGs to attack secondary sites, however IMO the Chinese Navy does not yet have the LPD, LHD and LST forces to be able to mount both a sufficiently large main force along with a number of smaller secondary forces to attack secondary sites.

Optimally, the Chinese Navy would have a main landing force that might look something like a "super ARG" with multiple LPDs, LHDs, and many LSTs, while having two or three other ARGs with an LPD, LHD and a handful of LSTs, all of which are able to conduct sizeable independent first wave beach assault and seizure operations.


Of course, this is operating under the assumption that having a main assault force where a significant proportion of the overall "first wave" should concentrate together to have the best chance of breaking through the enemy defencesis a good thing to begin with, which is how I think the PLA may want to plan an amphibious assault in the immediate future with the resources they have.

There is no need to "force" the LPD to stop closer to shore to disembark IFVs in a shorter time. Camp the LPD 40km from shore. Send out all the IFVs at that time. Half an hour later send out all the ACVs. They arrive at the beach at the same time. Problem solved.

My concern is about whether the amphibious IFVs and their crew will be able to make the 40km journey from LPD to shore and still be in competent fighting condition by the time they get there, especially in rough seas.

The speed of the VN18 (export ZBD05) has a water speed of 25km/h. In rougher seas that might be even lower. To make a 40km journey might take at least 2 hours or more.

The Allied forces certainly had air superiority, but they certainly did not effectively suppress the defenses on the beach, as the Germans had almost all of their pillboxes and artillery pieces intact along with the wire, ditches, mines, tank barriers and other deterrent infrastructure on the beaches. A PLAN landing force would certainly not make this same mistake. As for PLAAF/PLANAF CAS, this is surely coming. It's not like anyone doubts that this is a capability that is already nascent in both the air forces and growing over time. In any case, CAS is not relevant in a beach assault as Taiwanese static defenses are the main targets. These static defenses are just as easily dealt with by cross-strait rocket barrages and ship- and shore-based LACM waves as by the attacks from the air. What the PLA will need CAS for is if/when it pushes inland and has to deal with more mobile defenses.

German fixed defences on the beach and immediately inland to beach were definitely intact, yes.

However, I still expect substantial mobile and live resistance, even if most of the beach fixed defence positions are destroyed by rocket artillery and LACMs and airstrikes.

Tanks, mobile artillery, IFVs, infantry, ATGM teams, and other mobile units, will be the main opfor to face on the beach.

IMO it will be difficult to ID and bombard mobile infantry and AFVs if they have hidden themselves well, and those forces will probably only begin to reveal themselves as the beach assault begins.
Of course, things like rocket artillery and gun bombardment against likely sites of the enemy will be able to soften them substantially, especially with wide area cluster munitions, but I am very hesitant about how well all such sites and units will be identified by ISR.


That is why I think the fire support for the beach assault will have to be flexible and responsive, which I think CAS will be most optimal for.

I think we agree on the fundamentals in this area, it is more about how much of the ROC's beach defences will include mobile forces and how many of them the PLA are able to neutralize before the first wave of the amphibious assault is launched.

 

[Jeff Head]

I think the chances of a huge invasion of Taiwan are growing more and more remote.

I believe the PLAN certainly has the contingency plans to conduct such an attack if necessary...but I also believe that they are building LPDs and soon perhaps LHDs, along with their many LSTs (which they have been building more new ones) and the Zubrs for different operations that are going to be more focused in the nearer term on the South China Sea and other areas within a few hundred miles of the mainland.

In addition, they are building a force that they can use later for going across the Blue Water with a large task force if necessary and securing their own SLOCs and the terminus points of those SLOCs.

In other words, say that develop good relations with a nation in Africa or South America where they begin to build up a loard and ongoing economic interest that ios then threatened either locally or by some other force. They are going to want to be able to get their and either scure that location, or even take it back if necessary and I believe these are the operations that the PLAN is prpeparing for in the mid to long term.

In those scenarios, the force structure they are putting together makes a lot of sense for them right now and into the future.