The first wave would certainly not include anything logistical. The jeeps that would come with the MBTs would be mounting antitank missile launchers, mortar launchers, and HMGs. Maybe not even the second wave. However, this certainly does not mean that the ARG will not have logistics vehicles or equipment. Once the beachhead is secured over a matter of hours, subsequent trips by the 726 and Z8s would certainly involve mostly or totally logistical equipment/vehicle transport from ARG to shore. On a small, highly connected island the size of Taiwan, if you can't secure a beachhead in a matter of hours, you're done. You can drive from the Taipei in the north to Kaosiung City in the south in less than 3 hours. Even if PLAAF/PLANAF manages to bomb every last piece of highway, road, and rail line, you could still go off-road and manage the entire length of the island in 8-10 hours cross-country. So we're not talking attack waves that originate from the mainland coastline in order to secure a beachhead. We're talking attack waves that originate from the ARG and whatever else came along with the ARG. So the first invasion force that originates from mainland coastline needs to be able to both secure the beachhead and hold the beachhead against reinforcements that arrive from elsewhere in Taiwan. For that you need logistical support to already be with you, not something that comes the next day after your spent ARG goes back to the mainland, loads up and comes back.
I do not envision a US style ARG as the complete force in trying to assault and establish a beach head in a Taiwan contingency.
It won't be merely 071 LPDs, but it will also include LSTs, the various LCACs, the larger LCUs, and even STUFTs.
I expect the ships which are not involved in the first wave to do day 1 heavy lifting in terms of logistics after a beach head has been established -- but I do not envision LPDs to do that role on day 1. Instead, I think LPDs, with their large carrying capacity, are better suited to using most of that capacity on day 1 for fighting vehicles, and to rely on a combination of LSTs, LCACs, and LCUs for logistics, and on day 2 to rely on a combination of all those ships doing ferrying missions.
OTH requires nothing more than 40-45km from shore at most; that would get you below radar as well as visual horizon. That represents about a half hour trip for a 726. There is no land-based artillery or antiship guns possessed by Taiwan that could reach out that far; I also don't know of any Taiwanese joint capabilities to remote target whatever fires they may have. Antiship missiles are a non-factor since they are a threat regardless of how far out the ARG sits.
Yes, though I was talking about deploying amphibious IFVs rather than a 726 LCAC in regards to the AShm threat.
The problem I see with the amphibious IFV vs LCAC deployment tactic from an LPD, is that the amphibious IFV means an LPD is able to send more vehicles onto the beach at the same time, but it tends to force the LPD to get closer to shore given the slower water speed of the IFV. An LCAC otoh has a much greater ferry speed from the LPD to shore which allows the LPD to stay further from the beach, but it has the problem where the number of vehicles it can deposit onto the beach at one time is many times lower than that of amphibious IFVs disembarking directly from an LPD.
In any case, MEUs aren't meant to attack heavily defended shores, as swimming IFVs are just sitting ducks while they beach to all manner of attacks from entrenched tanks, guns, mortars, missiles, and artillery. The beach has to already be mostly cleansed of defenders by air strikes prior to landing, with only minimal to token resistance remaining; air superiority or even air supremacy will have already been achieved. The Chinese military will not be repeating another D-Day on Taiwanese beaches.
Well, operation overlord occurred under circumstances where the allies had already carried out substantial bombing raids and had effectively achieved air superiority.
I fully expect the PLA to field the full range of air, missile and naval firepower they have in conjunction with substantial ISR to achieve air superiority, sea control in the strait and in proximity to the island, and to disrupt the command, logistics and communications of the defenders.
Naval gunfire, aerial bombardment and perhaps even cross strait long range rocket artillery, will be fielded to try and substantially soften up any landing sites.
However even if all that is achieved to a realistic standard (and the ability to successfully execute the early stage air and naval victories is far from a given), I still expect substantial live resistance against an amphibious landing to exist on the beach.
One way of substantially countering the defenders on the beach -- assuming the PLA are able to establish air superiority and conduct SEAD/DEAD over most of the western part of the island -- is by substantial and very competent CAS and air strike support, in particular from fixed wing aircraft.
But IMO, the PLA will not be able to do that on such a scale in the near future. They definitely have the weapons and the hardware to do it, look at all the various PGMs and targeting pods they've tested and offered for export. They're not exactly lacking in platforms either -- the couple hundred JH-7/As in air force and navy, the H-6Ks, and J-10 variants, would all be excellent candidates to equip targeting pods and PGMs onto, especially stand off wing kits so they can deploy their weapons farther from the island and any residual air defences that may still exist. (And J-16s of course, though it seems like the PLAAF seem to intend to equip a variety of PGMs and a new targeting pod on it.)
But the PLA have yet to buy into serious CAS capability and to have the ISR and joint training to test and continuously retest the well oiled machine.
Land based cross strait long range rocket artillery is another way of supplementing these sort of defender-softening operations, as well as naval gunfire artillery (though that means putting ships within a couple dozen km of the shore), but to have a more responsive, flexible and persistent anti-beach fire support capability -- and thus to make any resistance only minimal or token -- a very robust capability to call down precision air strikes must be developed.
Competent and widespread JTACs and FACs in the marines, army, but also an equivalent aboard naval ships, are essential.
