055 Large Destroyer Thread II

[Lethe]

I'll put these two parts and reply to them together.

My view is that the additional man power efficiencies gained in this set up are probably not worth the reduction in flexibility that you would get by having all of your surface combatants have at least one onboard organic helicopter.

I do get where you are coming from, but I think the manpower gains in efficiency here are relatively small when looking at it form the scale of the entire navy, and the compromise in making a large portion of your blue water surface combatant fleet be unable to organically support a helicopter is not worth it.

I see the benefits in having more twin hangar blue water surface combatants -- but that should only be done when all blue water surface combatants have at least one helicopter onboard imo, and should not be at the cost of having some blue water combatants be unable to support a helicopter organically.
The costs from that can just be chalked up to a premium for ensuring fleet wide helicopter flexibility.

I think it is useful to review where this discussion is coming from. I think PLAN should have an affordable dual-hangar ASW combatant, because having two helicopters significantly improves per-unit ASW performance as well as independent operating capability more generally (by ensuring a helicopter is available "most" of the time, rather than "some" of the time), this in the context of a PLAN that confronts a very high-end submarine threat, now has the helicopter platform (Z-20F) that it needs for ASW, and the budget to acquire it in numbers. It sounds like we are not necessarily too far apart on this score.

The other, more pointed angle where this discussion is coming from is around the question of a future medium destroyer (052E or a clean-sheet design that is roughly the same size or perhaps a little larger) as a complement to 055. For such a destroyer to make sense, it must be significantly cheaper than 055 such that one can build and operate more ships and therefore offer better availability (for any required deployment) and superior coverage (within a task force) than by going with 055 alone. For the same resources as building (and operating) ten 055s, you want to be able to build and operate, say, fifteen 052Es. If the costs of the medium destroyer are too great, then you are better off scrapping it and just building more 055s. My concern is that if you simply "shrink" 055 then the resulting platform is unlikely to be a cost-effective complement to 055. Previously I described it as getting 67% of 055 for 80% of the cost. I suspect that in order to generate the required savings relative to 055, you actually have to make real sacrifices to the capability and mission set, rather than just scaling down the radars somewhat and giving it less magazine depth and less range/endurance. I think justifying a future medium destroyer as a complement to 055 is actually quite challenging, eliminating the organic helicopter is about making that concept work, not an end in itself to create a more concentrated and efficient distribution of helicopters across the fleet.

 

[Blitzo]

I think it is useful to review where this discussion is coming from. I think PLAN should have an affordable dual-hangar ASW combatant, because having two helicopters significantly improves per-unit ASW performance as well as independent operating capability more generally (by ensuring a helicopter is available "most" of the time, rather than "some" of the time), this in the context of a PLAN that confronts a very high-end submarine threat, now has the helicopter platform (Z-20F) that it needs for ASW, and the budget to acquire it in numbers. It sounds like we are not necessarily too far apart on this score.

The other, more pointed angle where this discussion is coming from is around the question of a future medium destroyer (052E or a clean-sheet design that is roughly the same size or perhaps a little larger) as a complement to 055. For such a destroyer to make sense, it must be significantly cheaper than 055 such that one can build and operate more ships and therefore offer better availability (for any required deployment) and superior coverage (within a task force) than by going with 055 alone. For the same resources as building (and operating) ten 055s, you want to be able to build and operate, say, fifteen 052Es. If the costs of the medium destroyer are too great, then you are better off scrapping it and just building more 055s. My concern is that if you simply "shrink" 055 then the resulting platform is unlikely to be a cost-effective complement to 055. Previously I described it as getting 67% of 055 for 80% of the cost. I suspect that in order to generate the required savings relative to 055, you actually have to make real sacrifices to the capability and mission set, rather than just scaling down the radars somewhat and giving it less magazine depth and less range/endurance. I think justifying a future medium destroyer as a complement to 055 is actually quite challenging, eliminating the organic helicopter is about making that concept work, not an end in itself to create a more concentrated and efficient distribution of helicopters across the fleet.

Hmmm

I think this is getting a bit too in the weeds because we're talking about fairly small financial differences (in the scheme of the PLAN's entire naval procurement) for relatively small design differences and capability requirements.

That said, I do agree that it makes sense for a future medium destroyer class to complement the 055 and be significantly cheaper than 055.
However, I don't think such a ship is incompatible with having two helicopter hangars and a requisite capability that you would want for a medium destroyer. A clean sheet, larger ship of say 8,000+ tons with two hangars, 64 VLS, high end sensor suite, in a new hullform and newer propulsion systems (including prime movers) I think should be fairly viable -- keeping in mind that the 055 will have a successor/future variants as well that are likely to incorporate significantly more capable and costly systems too.

 

[Hitomi]

I think such a drone should have a dipping sonar and sonobuoys, and ideally better endurance than a comparable manned helicopter. With VL-ASROC type weapons, the ability to carry a torpedo is probably not essential but still useful.



On the one hand, we can see that almost all modern surface combatants support at least one helicopter, so it is easy to think that they are essential. On the other hand, in USN we see that there are 28 Burke I/IIs that lack organic helicopters and remain in service today. I would contend that this single example is more meaningful than all of the rest of the world's examples put together because the context maps so neatly onto the question of a medium destroyer as a complement for 055.

USN was a large and well-resourced Navy that confronted formidable air and submarine threats and was able to respond to those threats with a diverse array of vessels optimised for different purposes. In designing Burke, the impetus was to create a next-generation surface combatant platform with high-level of AAW performance that was nonetheless significantly cheaper than Ticonderoga. In order to achieve this cost reduction, among other sacrifices, organic helicopters were dropped from the design, which was easy enough to do because the fleet was otherwise littered with helicopters. Only when most of those other helicopter-carrying ships were retired were helos added to create Burke IIA.

PLAN was a large and well-resourced Navy that confronted formidable air and submarine threats and was able to respond to those threats with a diverse array of vessels optimised for different purposes. In designing 052E, the impetus was to create a next-generation surface combatant platform with high-level of AAW performance that was nonetheless significantly cheaper than 055. In order to achieve this cost reduction, among other sacrifices...



At the task-force level, the difference is one of efficiency. The ten helicopters across ten ships scenario will have significantly more personnel across the helicopter detachments, each drawing a wage, consuming limited supplies, bunking in limited volumes. And when something breaks and spare parts are required, it is more likely that the problem will not be able to be solved within the ship but will require support from other ships or ashore, which is both time-consuming and can itself be a source of failures (helicopter sorties to deliver helicopter parts needed due to helicopter sorties). Or alternatively, the ten helos across ten ships scenario may simply be operating with higher total levels of spare parts, in turn further driving up costs and further eating into weight/volume margins.

If you do have to deploy independently with only one helo, you will often be screwed when you need to deploy it as well, as noted in the Proceedings article: "If a single-aircraft detachment is deployed as part of a carrier strike group, it has supplies and the support of other aircraft in close vicinity to keep its aircraft operational. Detachment 48.7, however, was on an independently deployed ship, making the lack of a second aircraft detrimental to the overall mission."

Fortunately, like USN, PLAN is large and well-resourced enough to field different types of ships optimised for different missions.

With regard to the ability of sharing spare parts, wouldn't simple cargo drones that allow part exchanges for general emergency repairs during wartime to simplify this issue. Coverage range might be limited somewhat depending on drone size and capability but I think the issue might not be a big as you think in the current era of technology.

Regarding your argument about the higher manpower consumption just to support single helos on every Bluewater combatant, rather than just thinking about the costs of training, sustaining them and potentially losing them, what about the other benefits they might bring such as them being able to assist in repairs of the facilities of the ship especially during wartime among other things. (similar argument between human loaders and autoloaders for tanks at current tank calibers)

I think it is useful to review where this discussion is coming from. I think PLAN should have an affordable dual-hangar ASW combatant, because having two helicopters significantly improves per-unit ASW performance as well as independent operating capability more generally (by ensuring a helicopter is available "most" of the time, rather than "some" of the time), this in the context of a PLAN that confronts a very high-end submarine threat, now has the helicopter platform (Z-20F) that it needs for ASW, and the budget to acquire it in numbers. It sounds like we are not necessarily too far apart on this score.

The other, more pointed angle where this discussion is coming from is around the question of a future medium destroyer (052E or a clean-sheet design that is roughly the same size or perhaps a little larger) as a complement to 055. For such a destroyer to make sense, it must be significantly cheaper than 055 such that one can build and operate more ships and therefore offer better availability (for any required deployment) and superior coverage (within a task force) than by going with 055 alone. For the same resources as building (and operating) ten 055s, you want to be able to build and operate, say, fifteen 052Es. If the costs of the medium destroyer are too great, then you are better off scrapping it and just building more 055s. My concern is that if you simply "shrink" 055 then the resulting platform is unlikely to be a cost-effective complement to 055. Previously I described it as getting 67% of 055 for 80% of the cost. I suspect that in order to generate the required savings relative to 055, you actually have to make real sacrifices to the capability and mission set, rather than just scaling down the radars somewhat and giving it less magazine depth and less range/endurance. I think justifying a future medium destroyer as a complement to 055 is actually quite challenging, eliminating the organic helicopter is about making that concept work, not an end in itself to create a more concentrated and efficient distribution of helicopters across the fleet.

I would not argue against the cost efficiency of concentrating firepower and capability of ships versus building more ships since I do agree, but I believe the extra costs also go into area coverage and overall resilience of the fleet but ultimately this argument should be finished between the finance department and the strategy department of the PLAN.

 

[snake65]

Hmmm

I think this is getting a bit too in the weeds because we're talking about fairly small financial differences (in the scheme of the PLAN's entire naval procurement) for relatively small design differences and capability requirements.

That said, I do agree that it makes sense for a future medium destroyer class to complement the 055 and be significantly cheaper than 055.
However, I don't think such a ship is incompatible with having two helicopter hangars and a requisite capability that you would want for a medium destroyer. A clean sheet, larger ship of say 8,000+ tons with two hangars, 64 VLS, high end sensor suite, in a new hullform and newer propulsion systems (including prime movers) I think should be fairly viable -- keeping in mind that the 055 will have a successor/future variants as well that are likely to incorporate significantly more capable and costly systems too.

You just described Indian P-15A/B

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

You just described Indian P-15A/B

Despite that, India's P-15A to P-15B transition is actually still better than their recent anticipation of P-15B's transition to the successor-class of destroyers (i.e. P-18) can somehow be fast-tracked.

If the preliminary information available for the P-18 is anything reliable, jumping from P15B straight to P-18 is like jumping from 052C straight to 055. I'm not sure how their naval engineers came out with things like this when they don't even have an indigenous UVLS in active service.

 

[bobsagget]

I agree that carrying a torpedo on a helicopter drone for ASW probably isn't a good use of it.

I think that giving a helicopter drone a dipping sonar probably is not a good idea because of how much volume a dipping sonar takes, and unless your helicopter drone is of a sufficient minimum size, the amount of fuselage volume that will bite into (and in turn, the amount of volume for fuel lost) would not be worth it.

I think an EO/IR ball, a surface search radar as integral, with side mounted sonobuoy employment pods would already be plenty capable for a MQ-8C sized helicopter UAV.






I'll put these two parts and reply to them together.

My view is that the additional man power efficiencies gained in this set up are probably not worth the reduction in flexibility that you would get by having all of your surface combatants have at least one onboard organic helicopter.

I do get where you are coming from, but I think the manpower gains in efficiency here are relatively small when looking at it form the scale of the entire navy, and the compromise in making a large portion of your blue water surface combatant fleet be unable to organically support a helicopter is not worth it.

I see the benefits in having more twin hangar blue water surface combatants -- but that should only be done when all blue water surface combatants have at least one helicopter onboard imo, and should not be at the cost of having some blue water combatants be unable to support a helicopter organically.
The costs from that can just be chalked up to a premium for ensuring fleet wide helicopter flexibility.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

i mean usn invested way way back long ago

 

[bobsagget]

I think it is useful to review where this discussion is coming from. I think PLAN should have an affordable dual-hangar ASW combatant, because having two helicopters significantly improves per-unit ASW performance as well as independent operating capability more generally (by ensuring a helicopter is available "most" of the time, rather than "some" of the time), this in the context of a PLAN that confronts a very high-end submarine threat, now has the helicopter platform (Z-20F) that it needs for ASW, and the budget to acquire it in numbers. It sounds like we are not necessarily too far apart on this score.

The other, more pointed angle where this discussion is coming from is around the question of a future medium destroyer (052E or a clean-sheet design that is roughly the same size or perhaps a little larger) as a complement to 055. For such a destroyer to make sense, it must be significantly cheaper than 055 such that one can build and operate more ships and therefore offer better availability (for any required deployment) and superior coverage (within a task force) than by going with 055 alone. For the same resources as building (and operating) ten 055s, you want to be able to build and operate, say, fifteen 052Es. If the costs of the medium destroyer are too great, then you are better off scrapping it and just building more 055s. My concern is that if you simply "shrink" 055 then the resulting platform is unlikely to be a cost-effective complement to 055. Previously I described it as getting 67% of 055 for 80% of the cost. I suspect that in order to generate the required savings relative to 055, you actually have to make real sacrifices to the capability and mission set, rather than just scaling down the radars somewhat and giving it less magazine depth and less range/endurance. I think justifying a future medium destroyer as a complement to 055 is actually quite challenging, eliminating the organic helicopter is about making that concept work, not an end in itself to create a more concentrated and efficient distribution of helicopters across the fleet.

Tbh the type 55 is really the optimal size perhaps make it 18,000 tons fully loaded. If you still have to build more smaller ships you now have to have many times the amount of crew and maintenance is still a costly pita

 

[Blitzo]

You just described Indian P-15A/B

Partially, if not for the P15A/B being somewhat underarmed for its size and... Well everything else.

 

[antiterror13]

Despite that, India's P-15A to P-15B transition is actually still better than their recent anticipation of P-15B's transition to the successor-class of destroyers (i.e. P-18) can somehow be fast-tracked.

If the preliminary information available for the P-18 is anything reliable, jumping from P15B straight to P-18 is like jumping from 052C straight to 055. I'm not sure how their naval engineers came out with things like this when they don't even have an indigenous UVLS in active service.

It is just purely an ambitious plan and the respond to the Chinese Type 055 ... it won't happen until 2035 if ever

 

[by78]

Some interior images of a 055. The first two images show the engine/generator control room. Note the damage control team member in the first two images; damage control are on duty around the clock. The last three images show the sleeping quarters.