Well, the PLA does have a decent sized VTOL helicopter drone that we've seen mockups on 075 for, and from external pics it looks similar in size to MQ-8C and may have a SSR and EO ball as standard.
Assuming it has a deployable payload capability, it may be able to carry some sonobuoys too.
Personally I think having a small hangar for one such drone would be a fair compromise for additional helicopter capability without needing a whole proper extra helicopter hangar.
I think such a drone should have a dipping sonar and sonobuoys, and ideally better endurance than a comparable manned helicopter. With VL-ASROC type weapons, the ability to carry a torpedo is probably not essential but still useful.
I think the importance of having every blue water capable surface combatant able to support at least one helicopter is important simply because having no helicopter is unacceptable in this day and age.
Blue water capable combatants need to be able to operate independently in low to medium intensity environments, and I think the flexibility an onboard helicopter provides cannot be understated in that regard, while having no helicopter onboard for such a scenario would be potentially devastating.
On the one hand, we can see that almost all modern surface combatants support at least one helicopter, so it is easy to think that they are essential. On the other hand, in USN we see that there are 28 Burke I/IIs that lack organic helicopters and remain in service today. I would contend that this single example is more meaningful than all of the rest of the world's examples put together because the context maps so neatly onto the question of a medium destroyer as a complement for 055.
USN was a large and well-resourced Navy that confronted formidable air and submarine threats and was able to respond to those threats with a diverse array of vessels optimised for different purposes. In designing Burke, the impetus was to create a next-generation surface combatant platform with high-level of AAW performance that was nonetheless significantly cheaper than Ticonderoga. In order to achieve this cost reduction, among other sacrifices, organic helicopters were dropped from the design, which was easy enough to do because the fleet was otherwise littered with helicopters. Only when most of those other helicopter-carrying ships were retired were helos added to create Burke IIA.
PLAN was a large and well-resourced Navy that confronted formidable air and submarine threats and was able to respond to those threats with a diverse array of vessels optimised for different purposes. In designing 052E, the impetus was to create a next-generation surface combatant platform with high-level of AAW performance that was nonetheless significantly cheaper than 055. In order to achieve this cost reduction, among other sacrifices...
After all, if you're operating in a task group with 10 helicopters across 10 ships (one helicopter each), or 10 helicopters across 5 ships (two helicopters each) with 5 ships without hangars (zero helicopters each), you still have 10 helicopters across the task group in each situation.
But if you're a ship without a hangar at all, then you're screwed if you ever have to deploy independently and need a helicopter capability.
At the task-force level, the difference is one of efficiency. The ten helicopters across ten ships scenario will have significantly more personnel across the helicopter detachments, each drawing a wage, consuming limited supplies, bunking in limited volumes. And when something breaks and spare parts are required, it is more likely that the problem will not be able to be solved within the ship but will require support from other ships or ashore, which is both time-consuming and can itself be a source of failures (helicopter sorties to deliver helicopter parts needed due to helicopter sorties). Or alternatively, the ten helos across ten ships scenario may simply be operating with higher total levels of spare parts, in turn further driving up costs and further eating into weight/volume margins.
If you do have to deploy independently with only one helo, you will often be screwed when you need to deploy it as well, as noted in the
Proceedings article: "If a single-aircraft detachment is deployed as part of a carrier strike group, it has supplies and the support of other aircraft in close vicinity to keep its aircraft operational. Detachment 48.7, however, was on an independently deployed ship, making the lack of a second aircraft detrimental to the overall mission."
Fortunately, like USN, PLAN is large and well-resourced enough to field different types of ships optimised for different missions.