055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[Bhurki]

which are

1. ... and
2. ...

#23 052d
#6 055

 

[Deino]

Two ships launched today.

So altogether 9 DDGs this year, or am I wrong ?

 

[lcloo]

So altogether 9 DDGs this year, or am I wrong ?

I didn't keep track of this but a lot of Chinese posters on CJDBY are quoting 9 DDGs launched this year, so I believe, yes, 9 DDGs were launched this year.

 

[Bhurki]

I didn't keep track of this but a lot of Chinese posters on CJDBY are quoting 9 DDGs launched this year, so I believe, yes, 9 DDGs were launched this year.

23 Feb, 052D#17 Jiangnan shipyard
16 Apr, 052D#18 Jiangnan shipyard
10 May, 052D#19 & 052D#20 Dalian shipyard
28 Aug, 052D#21 Jiangnan shipyard
12 Sept, 055#5 Jiangnan shipyard
26 Sept, 052D#22 Jiangnan shiyard
26 Dec, 052D#23 & 055#6 Dalian shipyard

 

[asif iqbal]

Why is Type 055 refereed to as a DDG

clearly it’s a CG

So Type 052D should be separate

7 x DDG
2 x CG

 

[AndrewS]

So altogether 9 DDGs this year, or am I wrong ?

For the past 20 years, we've seen Chinese military spending at a modest 2% of GDP.

But 9 DDGs this year would eventually mean a fleet of 300 DDGs. Last year, it was 7 DDGs.

Even my previous high estimate was only 6 DDGs per year.

If this indicative of Chinese military spending overall, it begs the question, the US and Russia routinely spend almost twice as much (4% of GDP) on the military.

So has China switched to a permanently higher level of military spending?

If so, congratulations are in order for the American national security establishment.

With the trade war and China designated as military enemy number one, they've hastened the day when China displaces the US military from the Western Pacific.

 

[Richard Santos]

Not withstanding the editorial that manages to be simultaneously righteous, mocking, indignant and triumphalist long before the notional triumph, the high GDP percentage spent historically by established military powers on defense is the artifact of already having large, modern and capital intensive forces in service to support, not of any preternatural superiority of the new power in converting money to fighting power. So it is hardly surprising that the power in the early stage of a build up and with relatively little established force can spend much greater fraction of the budget on build up and thus appear to be outbuilding the established power. The magical power to spend less and yet appear to be gaining more will decline asymptotically as assets already in service becomes ever numerous in relation to new annual procurements. Furthermore, some established power customarily sustain higher tempo of peacetime operation and maintains more of their available forces in higher states of readiness than do most other powers. This further makes comparison the GDP spend to fighting effectiveness gained or maintained rather deceptive.

 

[obj 705A]

correct me if I'm mistaken but recently there are usually 6 DDGs being built simultaneously at Dalian right? 4 in the drydock plus modules enough for two more beside them, this is the first time ever that Dalian was able to launch 4 DDGs a year, so since they were able to finish 4 out of 6 in one year this means now it takes Dalian just 18 months to finish a type 055 which is quite impressive, both Dalian & Jiagnan are becoming more & more efficient at building DDGs faster, people are saying that "eventually" the rate of DDG production will come down, and while partially I agree with that but it's anybody's guess when will this "eventually" come, so personaly I wouldn't be surprised at all if next year both Jiagnan & Dalian would break their own records again that they have set in 2019 & end up launching 9 or more DDGs in 2020.

 

[AndrewS]

Not withstanding the editorial that manages to be simultaneously righteous, mocking, indignant and triumphalist long before the notional triumph, the high GDP percentage spent historically by established military powers on defense is the artifact of already having large, modern and capital intensive forces in service to support, not of any preternatural superiority of the new power in converting money to fighting power. So it is hardly surprising that the power in the early stage of a build up and with relatively little established force can spend much greater fraction of the budget on build up and thus appear to be outbuilding the established power. The magical power to spend less and yet appear to be gaining more will decline asymptotically as assets already in service becomes ever numerous in relation to new annual procurements. Furthermore, some established power customarily sustain higher tempo of peacetime operation and maintains more of their available forces in higher states of readiness than do most other powers. This further makes comparison the GDP spend to fighting effectiveness gained or maintained rather deceptive.

Response below

...China becomes the sole global superpower—economically, militarily and geopolitically— by the middle of this century.

Mitt Romney

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-Mitt Romney is a Republican Senator and lost out to John McCain as the Republican nominee for President of the United States.

Remember that my high estimate is that 6 DDGs per year results in a steady state fleet size of 200 DDG, which would be roughly equivalent to 2x US Navy.

And more broadly speaking, let's say the Chinese military has "standards" that are roughly equivalent to the US military.
For China to eventually field a military 2x the US, I reckon China would have to devote almost 3% of GDP by 2030, with that percentage steadily dropping afterwards.

And you've forgotten to add the adjective "bitter" to the description of the "righteous, mocking, indignant and triumphalist" tone as you put it.

Personally I would have preferred Chinese military spending to stay at a modest 2% of GDP, in favour of domestic economic development.

 

[Dante80]

There is no indication whatsoever that PLAN is shooting for a 200 destroyer navy.