055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[weig2000]

Let's not get ahead of ourselves and project the current build rate of 4 055's per year too far into the future.

Is China able to sustain such build rate and, indeed, even at a higher rate? Yes, it definitely can, but will it? should it? I highly doubt it.

China currently has zero large modern blue-water destroyer (> 10k tons), yet it will have two carriers in service by next year, and is very likely to have four carriers around 2025. Based on this projection, PLAN will need minimum 8-12 055's by then. It is therefore much more likely the build rate is based on that plan, rather than on whether what it is capable of, or GDP numbers, exchange rates, etc. The reason we're seeing such a high build rate right now is because PLAN is significantly behind schedule in terms of number of 055's needed to support carriers.

I believe once the number of 055's in service is more or less aligned with the number of carriers and other blue-water navy activities, the 055's build will slow down to a more sustainable rate. It simply doesn't make sense to build 4 055's a year far into the future. I do think, 055 will have multiple upgrades and therefore will continue to be built for long time to come, though.

 

[AndrewS]

Let's not get ahead of ourselves and project the current build rate of 4 055's per year too far into the future.

Is China able to sustain such build rate and, indeed, even at a higher rate? Yes, it definitely can, but will it? should it? I highly doubt it.

China currently has zero large modern blue-water destroyer (> 10k tons), yet it will have two carriers in service by next year, and is very likely to have four carriers around 2025. Based on this projection, PLAN will need minimum 8-12 055's by then. It is therefore much more likely the build rate is based on that plan, rather than on whether what it is capable of, or GDP numbers, exchange rates, etc. The reason we're seeing such a high build rate right now is because PLAN is significantly behind schedule in terms of number of 055's needed to support carriers.

I believe once the number of 055's in service is more or less aligned with the number of carriers and other blue-water navy activities, the 055's build will slow down to a more sustainable rate. It simply doesn't make sense to build 4 055's a year far into the future. I do think, 055 will have multiple upgrades and therefore will continue to be built for long time to come, though.

My comment was on 4 destroyers or cruisers per year.

If China ends up with a fleet of 140 AEGIS ships, then of course there will be mix between smaller Type-52D destroyers and larger Type-55 cruisers.

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And if we're talking about force structure planning, there is a big difference in missions between the US Navy and Chinese Navy.

The US Navy is based around distant power projection, which requires aircraft launched from carriers. But the flight operations cycle only operates for half of the day, so the carrier has to be protected by AEGIS air defence destroyers/cruisers during that time.

In comparison, the primary mission of the Chinese Navy is to establish maritime and air superiority within a contested First Island Chain, to prevent any hostile forces from reaching the Chinese mainland, and to support Taiwan operations.

But the short distances in the First Island Chain mean that China doesn't have to rely solely on aircraft carriers to provide air cover for its ships, because airbases on the Chinese mainland are only 500KM from Korea, 700km from Okinawa, 800KM from Sasebo on the Japanese Home Islands for example. That means a huge number of Chinese aircraft potentially available for operations in these areas, which would provide air cover for as many Naval forces as China decides to field.

And having the capability to establish maritime superiority within the First Island Chain is going to require a very large number of cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, submarines etc.

And if there is only a marginal increase in cost of say 25% for a Type-55 versus a Type-52D, my view is that they might as well go top heavy in favour of the Type-55 in the force structure.

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And you bring up an interesting point on even higher construction rates.

Let's say China has an economy which has grown from 1.3x (today) to 2x (2030) the size of the USA.
And that in the military realm, the Western Pacific is still contested space.

Would China then aim for an AEGIS fleet twice the size, in order to force the US to back off? That would mean 6 ships per year, and with a 35 year service life, that is a end-size Chinese fleet of 210 AEGIS ships.

It's something to ponder.

 

[latenlazy]

My comment was on 4 destroyers or cruisers per year.

If China ends up with a fleet of 140 AEGIS ships, then of course there will be mix between smaller Type-52D destroyers and larger Type-55 cruisers.

---
And if we're talking about force structure planning, there is a big difference in missions between the US Navy and Chinese Navy.

The US Navy is based around distant power projection, which requires aircraft launched from carriers. But the flight operations cycle only operates for half of the day, so the carrier has to be protected by AEGIS air defence destroyers/cruisers during that time.

In comparison, the primary mission of the Chinese Navy is to establish maritime and air superiority within a contested First Island Chain, to prevent any hostile forces from reaching the Chinese mainland, and to support Taiwan operations.

But the short distances in the First Island Chain mean that China doesn't have to rely solely on aircraft carriers to provide air cover for its ships, because airbases on the Chinese mainland are only 500KM from Korea, 700km from Okinawa, 800KM from Sasebo on the Japanese Home Islands for example. That means a huge number of Chinese aircraft potentially available for operations in these areas, which would provide air cover for as many Naval forces as China decides to field.

And having the capability to establish maritime superiority within the First Island Chain is going to require a very large number of cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, submarines etc.

And if there is only a marginal increase in cost of say 25% for a Type-55 versus a Type-52D, my view is that they might as well go top heavy in favour of the Type-55 in the force structure.

---

And you bring up an interesting point on even higher construction rates.

Let's say China has an economy which has grown from 1.3x (today) to 2x (2030) the size of the USA.
And that in the military realm, the Western Pacific is still contested space.

Would China then aim for an AEGIS fleet twice the size, in order to force the US to back off? That would mean 6 ships per year, and with a 35 year service life, that is a end-size Chinese fleet of 210 AEGIS ships.

It's something to ponder.

Don’t forget, *if* OBOR takes off they will also need a large enough fleet to defend their own supply lines through the Indian Ocean. A PLAN that needs the capabilities to win two theaters would by necessity be an order bigger than a PLAN that only needs to worry about one.

 

[AndrewS]

Don’t forget, *if* OBOR takes off they will also need a large enough fleet to defend their own supply lines through the Indian Ocean. A PLAN that needs the capabilities to win two theaters would by necessity be an order bigger than a PLAN that only needs to worry about one.

True, but for the next 15 years at least, there's no point worrying too much about the Indian Ocean, if the waters off the Chinese mainland are still contested. And these waters will still be contested if there are still US bases in Japan, South Korea, Philippines.

We can see the Phillippines already wavering, but South Korea and Japan are another story.

China would need to demonstrate absolute military superiority AND also become a much more important and better economic partner, before SK or JP would decide an alliance with the US is pointless.

 

[latenlazy]

True, but for the next 15 years at least, there's no point worrying too much about the Indian Ocean, if the waters off the Chinese mainland are still contested. And these waters will still be contested if there are still US bases in Japan, South Korea, Philippines.

We can see the Phillippines already wavering, but South Korea and Japan are another story.

China would need to demonstrate absolute military superiority AND also become a much more important and better economic partner, before SK or JP would decide an alliance with the US is pointless.

If we’re talking fleet end size though we’re by default talking past the next 15 years. China’s OBOR efforts, and by extension their security needs in the Indian Ocean, aren’t going to wait for US allies in the Pacific theater to get along.

 

[plawolf]

If we’re talking fleet end size though we’re by default talking past the next 15 years. China’s OBOR efforts, and by extension their security needs in the Indian Ocean, aren’t going to wait for US allies in the Pacific theater to get along.

Indeed, as Chinese power grows in the Pacific, the chances of military conflict there will increase as China closes the gap with the US and it’s regional allies.

But, if war could be avoided, beyond a certain point, the chances of military conflict will start to fall again, as it dawns on America and it’s allies that they might actually loose such a war.

When that happens, I think the US will instead shift the tensions to other far away places where it and its allies still enjoy regional military superiority.

Also, if it could somehow trick or bribe India into taking the lead to threaten Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean, so much the better as far as America is concerned.

As such, China has a difficult balancing act it need to maintain.

Developing too many bases and forward deploying too many assets in the Indian Ocean might trigger exactly the kind of Indian hostility you might wish the PLAN to counter.

But to not have extensive bases and support infrastructure means you need bigger ships which could have both the fuel/provisions storages to make cruises to the Indian Ocean, and the weapons load to fight intensive battles long enough until relief could arrive.

In that context, the 055 has distinct advantages over the 054 and 052 classes.

The rumoured Chinese arsenal ship might also have such long distance deployments without port support in mind.

Such a strategy would mean a bigger than normal proportion of a fleet would be 055s, which will act as primary shooters as well as command ships.

I could easily see a fleet of 4 x 054A/B, 2-4 052C/Ds and 6-8 055s in support of 1-2 carriers as the core of the surface component.

You would have 4 055s as AAW outriders with an 054 paired with them as support to counter enemy subs, with the 054 loading more ASROCS and only using its HQ16s to help defend itself and the 055.

The 052s and remaining 055s act as sweepers to catch anything the slips past.

The bulk of the AAW shooting would be done by the 055s, whose larger munitions load should mean much longer combat persistence compared to 052s or 054s. As the outrider 055s munitions loads deplete, you can switch them with the inner layer sweeper and command 055s. Throw in some arsenal ships and you have a fleet that could fight for considerably longer than any other CSG without needing to return to port to rearm.

It might also be worth monitoring the PLAN’s floating dry dock ship developments over the next few years and decades.

One of the main problems with rearming ships at sea is the sea shifting the ship about.

With a floating dry dock, you can largely take that out of the equation if you dry dock your ships, and then use a Goliath crane with specially designed loaders to load missiles 8/16/32 at a time.

With one of these, they could potentially rearm an entire fleet within a day or two.

 

[Tam]

Radars being the most expensive part of the ship, ship steel and tonnage the cheapest. For cost effectiveness, AAW favors larger ships with more missiles per radars ratio for efficiency. In this regard, the Type 055 favors more than the 052D and 054A/B. On the other hand, ASW favors more hulls on the water as opposed to fewer larger ships given a set budget. This favors frigates and corvettes if you want to be a more ASW intensive navy. With a navy that is heavily concerned with both AAW and ASW, you will see a navy that gravitates both towards these two polar positions in terms of mix.

 

[Deino]

Guys ... can we stay on Topic please??

This is by now a far too political discussion and a Chinese invasion of India via sea or the Himalaya is IMO clearly OFF-topic.

Deino

 

[AndrewS]

Radars being the most expensive part of the ship, ship steel and tonnage the cheapest. For cost effectiveness, AAW favors larger ships with more missiles per radars ratio for efficiency. In this regard, the Type 055 favors more than the 052D and 054A/B. On the other hand, ASW favors more hulls on the water as opposed to fewer larger ships given a set budget. This favors frigates and corvettes if you want to be a more ASW intensive navy. With a navy that is heavily concerned with both AAW and ASW, you will see a navy that gravitates both towards these two polar positions in terms of mix.

Yes, that analysis applies to long-range AAW or AAW against high-performance missiles requires a large fixed cost in terms of expensive radar electronics.

But for medium or short range AAW, the cost of the Type-54 radar is cheap compared to the cost of the hull.

 

[Tam]

Yes, that analysis applies to long-range AAW or AAW against high-performance missiles requires a large fixed cost in terms of expensive radar electronics.

But for medium or short range AAW, the cost of the Type-54 radar is cheap compared to the cost of the hull.

When I said that I wasn't thinking just the 054A but beyond that to its successor, to all future frigates globally in general. The kind of radars used by the 054A is something you would want to leave behind in the past.