055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[antiterror13]

I agree. I see the 52D continuing for a while yet, and the 55 also continuing.

Perhaps as many as 18 Type 52Ds which would allow for six of those per fleet plus the two Type Type 52Cs per fleet as well. Then probably at least 12 Type 55s with four per fleet, or up to eighteen to allow for six per fleet.

Also it depends on how they orgnize the carrier battle groups with respect to the fleets. If they want their escorts to be rotated through but not (at the time they are part of the escort) to be a part of each fleet, you may see an addition two Type 052Ds and one Type 055 per carrier...which would mean another two Type 054A/B per carrier...or the potentil Type 057.

As I say, it will depend on how they organize the crriers with respet to the three fleets.

I believe they might rotate esort dutie through the various escorts, but while they are escorting a CSG, they are on detached duties.

Such an organization would then end up with up to:

6 x Type 055 per fleet
6 x Type 052D per fleet
2 x Type 052C er fleet
10 x Type 054A/B per fleet (up to this number, perhaps 8 per fleet)

Then for the carriers:

1 x Type 055 per carrier
2 x Type 052Ds per carrier
2 x Type 054A/B er carrier.

If we factor in three fleets and four carriers you end up with:

22 x Type 055 DDGs
26 x Type 052D DDGs
06 x Type 052C DDGs
38 x Type 054A/B

This is a total of:

54 DDGs
38 FFGs

A modern surface fleet of 92 vessels in the mid to late 2020 time frame.

Again, I agree with this.

What the Type 55 brings is a deeper well for VLS, and probably the type of fleet/group command facilities within the ship that we see on a US Ticonderoga CG, allowing the Type 55 to operate in a battle-space coordination/control role in a stronger manner than a Type 052D perhaps. Also, as I say, with 112 VLS, she brings much deeper well for VLS missiles for better overall fleet defense.

All in all a very amazing transformation that the PLAN will have made in a 25 year period...absolutely amazing actually.

It is indeed super amazing ... some people (most youngsters ?) may don't realize how backward PLAN was in 1980s - 1990s ... even in early 2000s

PLAN didn't have modern DDG until received Sovs from Russia in 1999 .. and now the ship is being heavily upgraded (or has completed?)

In 1990s PLA budget was merely under $8B (less than Taiwan) .. even in 2000, the budget was only ~$15B ... but now over $150B (at least 2x in PPP)

 

[antiterror13]

It won’t happen for 30 years. The issue of what japan’s role in the West Pacific has to be addressed before China can become a credible

To a large degree, whether China could maintain sea control over large parts of Indian Ocean or west Pacific, as oppose to merely having the ability to mount raids or sea denial operations there, depends on how the US Japanese alliance evolve, and whether japan becomes incorporated into a Chinese centered Asian geopolitical construct. If Japan remains outside of it and hostile to it in collaboration with the US, the center of gravity of the Chinese navy will remain in north west Pacific and sea control further abroad will remain a pipe dream.

But I don't think Japan will have other option than work together with the leadership of China in Pacific ... let say in 2030 where China GDP is predicted by PwC way higher than the US and Japan combined ... and Chinese GDP is 7x of Japan (GDP in 2030 ... $38T, $23T and $5.6T for China, US and Japan)

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[Iron Man]

But I don't think Japan will have other option than work together with the leadership of China in Pacific ... let say in 2030 where China GDP is predicted by PwC way higher than the US and Japan combined ... and Chinese GDP is 7x of Japan (GDP in 2030 ... $38T, $23T and $5.6T for China, US and Japan)

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This list uses PPP GDP, which is useful for assessing per capita living standards and such, but if you want to compare something more general and strategic like "comprehensive national power" then nominal GDP is the appropriate measure. CASS uses nominal GDP to calculate CNP, for example.

 

[latenlazy]

Everything you said had been said before by authorities greater than you right before World War One.

Rising powers always underestimate both the cowardess of those whom it thinks ought by interest to stand on the side of the rising power, and the determination of those whom it thinks ought to give way to the rise of the rising power to not give way.

In other words, rising powers are more susceptible to overplaying its own hand than established powers seeking to cling to its established previlieged.

In WWI the US ultimately got dragged in against Germany in part because it was US merchant ships German U-boats were targeting. If we’re going to lean on history the lesson here is that when the naval commerce of a major power’s trading partner is targeted, even when that country chooses to withhold direct entry into a conflict the negative political and economic effects inflicted creates immense domestic pressure to retaliate and join against the offending side. The only time this is not the case is when that major trading partner is also a major trading partner with the other side of the conflict, which can provide some measure of offset.

Truthfully speaking, the proposition you’re pushing is derived from a set of contextual conditions that don’t apply well to a hypothetical US-China conflict. During the 18th and 19th centuries most trade for any major power was trafficked between the territorial possessions of colonial empire, which meant targeted interdiction of one major power’s naval commerce had limited spillover collateral on other major powers. If you went to war with the UK that meant waging war with the whole of the British Empire anyways, which meant territories like India were automatically inducted into the conflict. WWI and WWII demonstrate that once interdiction of global trade is no longer contained to countries already involved in a conflict third parties succumb to the pressures of their economic alignments sooner or later and participation in war almost inevitably proliferates. During the Cold War, meanwhile, the major geopolitical fissure involved sides that were already more or less economically segregated from one another. I think the operative conditions which your argument rests on may not be as broadly generalizable as you seem to be suggesting.

This list uses PPP GDP, which is useful for assessing per capita living standards and such, but if you want to compare something more general and strategic like "comprehensive national power" then nominal GDP is the appropriate measure. CASS uses nominal GDP to calculate CNP, for example.

It could be argued that PPP can tell you a lot more about a country’s war making power if the factor inputs in a country’s war industry are largely self sufficient.

 

[kurutoga]

But I don't think Japan will have other option than work together with the leadership of China in Pacific ...

If you know anything about the Japanese, they will never become friendly to China until China is 10x stronger, drove US military out of Asia, and can defeat Japan very easily. Just too much pride in the Japanese to admit they are not the best. We shall see Japan being the biggest obstacle and problem in China's development in the next 20 years. In some sense, Abe is doing that now.

 

[antiterror13]

If you know anything about the Japanese, they will never become friendly to China until China is 10x stronger, drove US military out of Asia, and can defeat Japan very easily. Just too much pride in the Japanese to admit they are not the best. We shall see Japan being the biggest obstacle and problem in China's development in the next 20 years. In some sense, Abe is doing that now.

are you suggesting that you know Japan more than I do ? .. good luck with that

 

[kurutoga]

are you suggesting that you know Japan more than I do ? .. good luck with that

Honestly Japanese will never look up to China/Chinese or consider Chinese the equals/friendly to build meaningful relations. Maybe the war is not avoidable. For now, Japan is going down further in the opposite direction. Abe will lead Japan to its demise.

 

[P5678]

are you suggesting that you know Japan more than I do ? .. good luck with that

Man, that is a pretty arrogant statement

 

[Richard Santos]

Honestly Japanese will never look up to China/Chinese or consider Chinese the equals/friendly to build meaningful relations. Maybe the war is not avoidable. For now, Japan is going down further in the opposite direction. Abe will lead Japan to its demise.

One needn’t ascribe any hereditary cravenness in the Japanese culture or people. Japan’s outlook and conduct is easily understood in light of a nation that gained an advantage through effort and laudable attribute not wishing to relinquish those advantages. Despite its defeat in WWII japan nonetheless accrued huge advantages in prosperity, economic influence and soft power from being the first Asian state to modernize, advantages which it could never have attained otherwise. It does not wish to relinquish these advantages to late starters.

Compounding these Japanese concerns is Japanese perception that if china were to gain supremacy in the West Pacific, not only would China not treat japan as a peer power for having led the way in modernization, but China probably treat japan worse than other second tier states in china’s sphere of influence out of historic animosity.

 

[montyp165]

One needn’t ascribe any hereditary cravenness in the Japanese culture or people. Japan’s outlook and conduct is easily understood in light of a nation that gained an advantage through effort and laudable attribute not wishing to relinquish those advantages. Despite its defeat in WWII japan nonetheless accrued huge advantages in prosperity, economic influence and soft power from being the first Asian state to modernize, advantages which it could never have attained otherwise. It does not wish to relinquish these advantages to late starters.

Compounding these Japanese concerns is Japanese perception that if china were to gain supremacy in the West Pacific, not only would China not treat japan as a peer power for having led the way in modernization, but China probably treat japan worse than other second tier states in china’s sphere of influence out of historic animosity.

If Japanese are unable to ascribe any respect to China due to perceived superiority than by no means should China (or anyone else in a similar position) accommodate that attitude. One only needs to look at how the Russians were treated by Western Europeans for example even before the Napoleonic Wars as an example of how perceived superiority becomes an excuse for attacks and other hostile actions. That sort of perceived superiority feeds on itself, which is why overcoming it by any means necessary is a matter of importance too.