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1-2-3-4, Oh, 4 054A's In Huangpu
not the way I look at itBy the way, TAS is VDS, they are the same thing.
PLAN and the Russians have all expanded submarine despite the fact that USN has the most competent ASW capability. Let's face it, it's easier to sink a ship putting a hole in the bottom rather than trying to hit its midsection.Ideally a submarine takes multiple types of sonar, the UK Trafalgar class has 5 different sets, as different types offer different things in different conditions and you can theoretically run them at different frequencies. A submarine is also a giant VDS.
The point though is this, TAS (VDS) is vital for a credible surface ship ASW capability and without it PLAN ships will be a laughing stock. They will be left with ships with very small sonar ranges effectively rendering them useless as ASW platforms, and fundamentally undermine any effort they may make at challenging even regional fleets. One suspects that the distinct lack of PLAN ASW capability (not just in surface ships), combined with the decisive use of submarines against surface vessels in the Falklands war is why Australia, Japan and South Korea are all looking at expanding their submarine fleets beyond any expansions being made in their surface fleets.
It is not useful.
A cursory glance at the full spectrum of PLAN ASW platforms reveals a glaring deficiency across all potential facets of ASW warfare. Very limited TAS (which can be active) very small hull sonars (either active or passive), a distinct lack of credible fixed wing ASW assets, no heavy ASW helicopters thus limiting the potential use for large active dipping sonars etc. Whichever way you look at it the PLAN has a severe deficiency in ASW sensors which looks even more odd given the growth of submarine threats within the APAC region and the near capital ship status of modern SSN's.
Fixed wing ASW assets: China, up until very recently has lacked a suitable homegrown platform to perform such a role and has been unable to acquire one on the export market
Heavy ASW helicopter: We all know the issues with the Chinese helicopter industry
Modern active sonar: Contrary to popular belief this is probably the hardest element of modern naval warfare to master, ASW sonar having proven extremely difficult to make adequately (Russia got a lot of its early tech from blue prints of the RN Type 2001) and the units provided by France, designed in 80s or earlier for the relatively simple ASW environment of the Med may well have proven wholly inadequate for the pacific environment and may go some way to explaining why it seems to be slowly disappearing. We may simply be seeing the Chinese struggling to develop their own high quality sonars.
I do think that 054A is a general purpose ship that represents the best of what China could mass produce at this point. However, 054A does give an impression of a surface ship more focused on AAW, because it clearly provides that medium range AAW umbrella for a possible future Chinese carrier group. Whereas it's ASuW brings really nothing new except more missiles. And it does bring some ASW capability although I'd think that a future Chinese carrier group would be relying more on SSNs or aerial assets.Claiming that the 054A is focussed on air self defence over other operational facets is also flawed, its anti-surface capability being equivilant to what is deployed on most western surface combatants (and on most PLAN frigates), not the 16 you falsely claim it has. Its one area of deficiency is in ASW, yet even here an effort has been made to provide such a capability. The Z-9C has a dipping sonar (Thales HS-12 or Type 605 derivative, depending on source) and one assumes a data link back to the ship providing a similar capability to the MATCH system that provided the backbone of RN surface ship ASW capability for much of the cold war (effectively using the helicopter as a mobile VDS and the ship as a munitions launching platform) as well as its ability to use ET52 torpedos. It is glaringly obvious that these vessels are intended as multirole combat platforms.
We will just going to have to disagree on this one. I will even concede that TAS is more important in certain scenarios at detecting targets than other types of sonar suite, but it's just as vital to have those other sonar suite. For example, you have to move at a certain speed and certain pattern to really make good use of a TAS.No you can not disregard other types of sonar or ASW sensor (hence my point about submarines), but the people on Chinese bbs are actually quite close to the truth. A TAS offers far more than a hull mounted sonar alone. Adding a high quality TAS to a ship will result in a dramatic capability increase, especially in ASW sensor range. Ideally an ASW orientated ship will have a large hull sonar, a large TAS and a pair of dipping sonar equipped helicopters. All both active and passive. The point is that China has a very long way to go in ASW systems, much further than they do in AAW. I have no doubt this will change though.