sealordlawrence
Junior Member
¦^ÂÃ: Re: ¦^ÂÃ: 054 Series Frigate Thread 2
A calming glass of rather good bourbon re-instilled me with some manners.
A calming glass of rather good bourbon re-instilled me with some manners.
054/A FFG Thread II
- Thread starter tphuang
- Start date
Galrahn
New Member
Re: ¦^ÂÃ: Re: ¦^ÂÃ: 054 Series Frigate Thread 2
Did I piss in your oatmeal? Keep it classy.
I agree with what you are saying, the PLA Navy seems to have little focus on ASW in general, which may explain why they write so much about the need for fixed wing aircraft for ASW? I also noted they emphasize the use of active sonar, and your point on difficulty is spot on. We agree the Type 054A is not a ASW platform and with relatively short range, I don't see the vessel as a HVU escort - rather more of a patrol frigate. Time will tell how they use it, but I suspect it will be used much in the way the French deploy their La Fayette class frigates to project power overseas on independent patrols.
Seems to me the Type 054A frigate is well suited for South America and Africa patrols because it is heavily armed and built against the specific type of threats most likely faced in those Chinese markets - air and surface. The Type 054A appears to be a solid design for open ocean cruising, a point that has been made by the Chinese themselves in discussing the ship on pirate patrol in the Indian Ocean.
I have questions about the range though. Seems to me the recent movement of a Type 054A from Yemen to Libya at what amounted to 12 knots based on time/distance suggests the range may be higher than has previously been reported.
Finally, the Burke is a modern 2nd rate battleship. Let me know when you are ready to join the modern missile naval era sealordlawrence, because the gun era ended many decades ago. Rates are determined by the era one is in, not the eras of naval powers in the past - and this is the battle force missile era.
The Type 054A, with 32 VLS and 16 precision cruise missiles (48 battle force missiles total) is a modern fourth rate battleship/frigate. Many folks believe the 48-60 VLS/battle force missile (BFM) number of the modern fourth rates is the sweet spot for cost value/payload.
In the precision missile era of modern naval warfare, these ratings matter in analysis for purposes of measuring relative combat power between fleet forces. After all, whether one is discussing ships or salvos, naval combat remains a battle of attrition. At 4000 tons, $250 million per vessel, and with 48 battle force missiles; I believe there is a good argument that the Type 054A is right there at the sweet spot for naval combat value relative to everything else being built around the world.
Did I piss in your oatmeal? Keep it classy.
I agree with what you are saying, the PLA Navy seems to have little focus on ASW in general, which may explain why they write so much about the need for fixed wing aircraft for ASW? I also noted they emphasize the use of active sonar, and your point on difficulty is spot on. We agree the Type 054A is not a ASW platform and with relatively short range, I don't see the vessel as a HVU escort - rather more of a patrol frigate. Time will tell how they use it, but I suspect it will be used much in the way the French deploy their La Fayette class frigates to project power overseas on independent patrols.
Seems to me the Type 054A frigate is well suited for South America and Africa patrols because it is heavily armed and built against the specific type of threats most likely faced in those Chinese markets - air and surface. The Type 054A appears to be a solid design for open ocean cruising, a point that has been made by the Chinese themselves in discussing the ship on pirate patrol in the Indian Ocean.
I have questions about the range though. Seems to me the recent movement of a Type 054A from Yemen to Libya at what amounted to 12 knots based on time/distance suggests the range may be higher than has previously been reported.
Finally, the Burke is a modern 2nd rate battleship. Let me know when you are ready to join the modern missile naval era sealordlawrence, because the gun era ended many decades ago. Rates are determined by the era one is in, not the eras of naval powers in the past - and this is the battle force missile era.
The Type 054A, with 32 VLS and 16 precision cruise missiles (48 battle force missiles total) is a modern fourth rate battleship/frigate. Many folks believe the 48-60 VLS/battle force missile (BFM) number of the modern fourth rates is the sweet spot for cost value/payload.
In the precision missile era of modern naval warfare, these ratings matter in analysis for purposes of measuring relative combat power between fleet forces. After all, whether one is discussing ships or salvos, naval combat remains a battle of attrition. At 4000 tons, $250 million per vessel, and with 48 battle force missiles; I believe there is a good argument that the Type 054A is right there at the sweet spot for naval combat value relative to everything else being built around the world.
Re: ¦^ÂÃ: Re: ¦^ÂÃ: 054 Series Frigate Thread 2
May be the sweet spot is not the 4th Line frigate, but a modern equivalent to a 44-gun frigates. i.e. something > 4500 tons and carries > 48 VLS slots?
let's say a well laid out 6500 ton ship CODOG with a 60+ VLS Slots?
cost effective and packs a punch.
I know for a fact that Burkes don't usually carry a full complement of missiles anyways.
May be the sweet spot is not the 4th Line frigate, but a modern equivalent to a 44-gun frigates. i.e. something > 4500 tons and carries > 48 VLS slots?
let's say a well laid out 6500 ton ship CODOG with a 60+ VLS Slots?
cost effective and packs a punch.
I know for a fact that Burkes don't usually carry a full complement of missiles anyways.
franco-russe
Senior Member
Re: ¦^ÂÃ: Re: ¦^ÂÃ: 054 Series Frigate Thread 2
Bourbon, really? Who would have thought...
Bourbon, really? Who would have thought...
franco-russe
Senior Member
Re: ¦^ÂÃ: Re: ¦^ÂÃ: 054 Series Frigate Thread 2
It is difficult to compare China and France, and Type 054 and LA FAYETTE, though it is tempting to see a helping hand from the DCN in the design of the former, as well as in the early modern destroyers (052 and 051B), and of course 039. And air defence is not LA FAYETTE’s strongest point, since they decided not to refit it with Aster-15.
China does not maintain a world-wide naval presence and has not been operating in the Indian Ocean for 300 years, but just for three. The overriding mission of the PLA is the reconquest of Taiwan and the purpose for which Type 054A is built is the protection of the assault force against all possible threats, of which the submarine threat is not the most prominent one, in contrast to the air threat.
What China will do once Taiwan passes under the sovereignty of the PRC is anyone’s guess.
It is difficult to compare China and France, and Type 054 and LA FAYETTE, though it is tempting to see a helping hand from the DCN in the design of the former, as well as in the early modern destroyers (052 and 051B), and of course 039. And air defence is not LA FAYETTE’s strongest point, since they decided not to refit it with Aster-15.
China does not maintain a world-wide naval presence and has not been operating in the Indian Ocean for 300 years, but just for three. The overriding mission of the PLA is the reconquest of Taiwan and the purpose for which Type 054A is built is the protection of the assault force against all possible threats, of which the submarine threat is not the most prominent one, in contrast to the air threat.
What China will do once Taiwan passes under the sovereignty of the PRC is anyone’s guess.
sealordlawrence
Junior Member
Re: ¦^ÂÃ: Re: ¦^ÂÃ: 054 Series Frigate Thread 2
Galrahn, I do not eat oatmeal and I can assure you if I did I would not allow you close enough to urinate in it. And using the word 'piss' is far from classy.
You are making a fundamental mistake, you are assuming that the 054A class is defined solely by its intended role when in reality it is quite clearly a prodict of the technical limitations of China's subsystems design and manufacturing capability in just the same way the Jiangwei class were (and for that matter any warship in any nation is defined by available technical abilities, finance, politics and material resources as much as foreign policy, doctrine and tactics). China has yet to fully master marine gas turbines (Chinese naval propulsion in general being far behind what the west is doing), and yet to fully master modern active sonar, those are the elements that are missing.
Claiming that the 054A is focussed on air self defence over other operational facets is also flawed, its anti-surface capability being equivilant to what is deployed on most western surface combatants (and on most PLAN frigates), not the 16 you falsely claim it has. Its one area of deficiency is in ASW, yet even here an effort has been made to provide such a capability. The Z-9C has a dipping sonar (Thales HS-12 or Type 605 derivative, depending on source) and one assumes a data link back to the ship providing a similar capability to the MATCH system that provided the backbone of RN surface ship ASW capability for much of the cold war (effectively using the helicopter as a mobile VDS and the ship as a munitions launching platform) as well as its ability to use ET52 torpedos. It is glaringly obvious that these vessels are intended as multirole combat platforms.
Nobody in their right mind would say that "the 48-60 VLS/battle force missile (BFM) number of the modern fourth rates is the sweet spot for cost value/payload". The RN type 45 has 48 VLS cells and has a per unit cost (EXCLUDING R&D) in excess of £600,000,000- is that a sweet spot? The cost of post WW2 warships has been defined as much (arguably more) by their sensors and combat management systems than their armament. Sensors have driven up ship size, power generating requirements etc, not to mention they are incredibly expensive themselves.
Making comparisons to ships from the age of sail is pointless, they existed with a single dimension combat profile executed with a single type of weapon and a single type of sensor (the cannon, in various forms and the eyeball) meaning it was easy to rate their combat power on a linear scale. Compare this to the much more diverse combat profiles we see today (an Arleigh Burke can now cover 5 [surface, sub-surface, land, air, space] each covered by a multiplicity of weapons and sensor types). Not only is the analogy pointless but in this case it is wholly incorrect. Within the PLAN vessel structure the 054A is clearly a second rate vessel, second only that is to the destroyers and that is perfectly underlined by the multirole nature of its armament and systems and by the fact that its lack of ASW capability is mirrored across the PLAN fleet.
Arleigh Burke is not a second rate battleship, it is a destroyer. Rates are a construct from the age of sail that serve no purpose today. Unlike inches, fahrenheit or other units of measurement that will perpetually describe a linear scale (or as number of guns temporarily did for warships) modern warships must now be described based on the multi-dimensioned nature of their combat capabilities. As the various Aegis ships demonstrate (excluding SPY-1F which is a different beast), the post WW2 emphasis on sensors and computing power means it is possible for different ships to have very similar capabilities yet have very different numbers of VLS cells (ranging from 48 to 128, and of course, that is not to even mention torpedos, CIWS and gun armament), in short having less VLS cells has a much much smaller impact on a ships combat capability than having less guns did in the navy Pepys knew. Conversely, having a mass of missiles and torpedos may prove to be of little benefit if you have insufficient fire channels to direct them or insufficient computing power to identify and track targets. And let us not forget the role of jammers, decoys, RCS reduction, propulsion plant silencing and IR reduction. Thus trying to understand modern warship design through the prism of Pepys ratings is utterly pointless. The term destroyer, its meaning having changed, has come to describe a multi-role warship fitted with the most capable and furthest reaching systems and sensors available for surface ships. The meanings of words change, the meaning of the word destroyer has changed and it is by embracing those meanings that we best describe modern warships. When John McCain said he had never heard of a 14,000 ton destroyer it was not because the term destroyer is obsolete or inaccurate it is because its meaning has changed, and it is not the first time.
The LaFayette example holds no water either, the class has no particular capability specialisation and using ships for power-projection is hardly unique. It is the way in which virtually all western navies are now using their surface combatants. Its lack of combat systems, including TAS, was the result of post cold war budgetary decisions that left the ships fitted for but not not with TAS, VLS and ARABEL (and also cancelled the planned sixth unit), none of which have yet been funded. The class was designed from the ouset as a multi-role frigate but with an emphasis on worldwide operations.
Finally, sonar, being primarily interested in active is neither surprising (most navies now emphasise it for certain properties) nor does it provide a reason for not putting a TAS on the 054A class, modern TAS are usually active (with passive modes).
Galrahn, I do not eat oatmeal and I can assure you if I did I would not allow you close enough to urinate in it. And using the word 'piss' is far from classy.
You are making a fundamental mistake, you are assuming that the 054A class is defined solely by its intended role when in reality it is quite clearly a prodict of the technical limitations of China's subsystems design and manufacturing capability in just the same way the Jiangwei class were (and for that matter any warship in any nation is defined by available technical abilities, finance, politics and material resources as much as foreign policy, doctrine and tactics). China has yet to fully master marine gas turbines (Chinese naval propulsion in general being far behind what the west is doing), and yet to fully master modern active sonar, those are the elements that are missing.
Claiming that the 054A is focussed on air self defence over other operational facets is also flawed, its anti-surface capability being equivilant to what is deployed on most western surface combatants (and on most PLAN frigates), not the 16 you falsely claim it has. Its one area of deficiency is in ASW, yet even here an effort has been made to provide such a capability. The Z-9C has a dipping sonar (Thales HS-12 or Type 605 derivative, depending on source) and one assumes a data link back to the ship providing a similar capability to the MATCH system that provided the backbone of RN surface ship ASW capability for much of the cold war (effectively using the helicopter as a mobile VDS and the ship as a munitions launching platform) as well as its ability to use ET52 torpedos. It is glaringly obvious that these vessels are intended as multirole combat platforms.
Nobody in their right mind would say that "the 48-60 VLS/battle force missile (BFM) number of the modern fourth rates is the sweet spot for cost value/payload". The RN type 45 has 48 VLS cells and has a per unit cost (EXCLUDING R&D) in excess of £600,000,000- is that a sweet spot? The cost of post WW2 warships has been defined as much (arguably more) by their sensors and combat management systems than their armament. Sensors have driven up ship size, power generating requirements etc, not to mention they are incredibly expensive themselves.
Making comparisons to ships from the age of sail is pointless, they existed with a single dimension combat profile executed with a single type of weapon and a single type of sensor (the cannon, in various forms and the eyeball) meaning it was easy to rate their combat power on a linear scale. Compare this to the much more diverse combat profiles we see today (an Arleigh Burke can now cover 5 [surface, sub-surface, land, air, space] each covered by a multiplicity of weapons and sensor types). Not only is the analogy pointless but in this case it is wholly incorrect. Within the PLAN vessel structure the 054A is clearly a second rate vessel, second only that is to the destroyers and that is perfectly underlined by the multirole nature of its armament and systems and by the fact that its lack of ASW capability is mirrored across the PLAN fleet.
Arleigh Burke is not a second rate battleship, it is a destroyer. Rates are a construct from the age of sail that serve no purpose today. Unlike inches, fahrenheit or other units of measurement that will perpetually describe a linear scale (or as number of guns temporarily did for warships) modern warships must now be described based on the multi-dimensioned nature of their combat capabilities. As the various Aegis ships demonstrate (excluding SPY-1F which is a different beast), the post WW2 emphasis on sensors and computing power means it is possible for different ships to have very similar capabilities yet have very different numbers of VLS cells (ranging from 48 to 128, and of course, that is not to even mention torpedos, CIWS and gun armament), in short having less VLS cells has a much much smaller impact on a ships combat capability than having less guns did in the navy Pepys knew. Conversely, having a mass of missiles and torpedos may prove to be of little benefit if you have insufficient fire channels to direct them or insufficient computing power to identify and track targets. And let us not forget the role of jammers, decoys, RCS reduction, propulsion plant silencing and IR reduction. Thus trying to understand modern warship design through the prism of Pepys ratings is utterly pointless. The term destroyer, its meaning having changed, has come to describe a multi-role warship fitted with the most capable and furthest reaching systems and sensors available for surface ships. The meanings of words change, the meaning of the word destroyer has changed and it is by embracing those meanings that we best describe modern warships. When John McCain said he had never heard of a 14,000 ton destroyer it was not because the term destroyer is obsolete or inaccurate it is because its meaning has changed, and it is not the first time.
The LaFayette example holds no water either, the class has no particular capability specialisation and using ships for power-projection is hardly unique. It is the way in which virtually all western navies are now using their surface combatants. Its lack of combat systems, including TAS, was the result of post cold war budgetary decisions that left the ships fitted for but not not with TAS, VLS and ARABEL (and also cancelled the planned sixth unit), none of which have yet been funded. The class was designed from the ouset as a multi-role frigate but with an emphasis on worldwide operations.
Finally, sonar, being primarily interested in active is neither surprising (most navies now emphasise it for certain properties) nor does it provide a reason for not putting a TAS on the 054A class, modern TAS are usually active (with passive modes).
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asif iqbal
Lieutenant General
China made 3 F22P frigates for Pakistan and 4th is going to be made at Karachi dockyard by PN through ToT from China
I agree that TAS is very important to have for a modern ASW oriented ship. But your argument that PLAN not have TAS will make it a laughing stock is not complete, because if it does not have hull sonar or helicopter equipped with dipping sonar, it will also be a laughing stock. My point all along (and you can point out where I didn't say this if you can find it) was that TAS is just one important part of ASW package. There are clearly limitations in both TAS and different types of hull mounted sonar. It's great that 054A is equipped with TAS, but it's also essential for it to be equipped with other forms of ASW sensors. Now, I find a lot of people on Chinese bbs comparing having TAS to having AESA radar for fighter jet and I find that tone in what I replied to be in that direction. The various other types of sonar are important too, you can't disregard them.
I will get to the rest later since this actually requires some real thought on my part.
sealordlawrence
Junior Member
No you can not disregard other types of sonar or ASW sensor (hence my point about submarines), but the people on Chinese bbs are actually quite close to the truth. A TAS offers far more than a hull mounted sonar alone. Adding a high quality TAS to a ship will result in a dramatic capability increase, especially in ASW sensor range. Ideally an ASW orientated ship will have a large hull sonar, a large TAS and a pair of dipping sonar equipped helicopters. All both active and passive. The point is that China has a very long way to go in ASW systems, much further than they do in AAW. I have no doubt this will change though.
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