054/A FFG Thread II

Blitzo

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With the PLAN fully committed to carriers, surface warship based ASuW is becoming increasingly irrelevant, just as the USN doesn’t even typically bother to equip any of its surface ships with AShMs in CSGs.

Carrier aircraft can delivery AShMs faster, closer and repeatedly if needed. Why put a warship in harms way when you can just spam missiles at the enemy with aircraft until they all go bye bye?

I wouldn't go that far.

We have yet to see what the long term trend of the USN's distributed lethality shift will be. We know their Constellation class frigates will be armed with 16 NSMs, and Constellations will certainly play a part in USN CSGs.

For the Burkes and Ticos, well Ticos are armed with Harpoons as standard. Burkes at present are not armed with any AShMs as standard to my knowledge (possibly Flight Is may have Harpoons).

However -- the new Block V Tomahawks will be capable of anti shipping as well as land attack, and their SM-6s also play a secondary anti ship option if needed.
Furthermore, they have the LRASM, which at this stage is currently only fielded on aircraft, but it would be quite easy to adapt them for the Mk-41 VLS (and indeed, Lockheed Martin has looked at it already in the past).
There is also the USN's new Large Surface Combatant project -- and I would not be surprised if it ends up being a large surface combatant between 055 to Zumwalt in size and having the same provisions to carry large strike and anti ship weapons as well.


In short, I would argue strongly against the notion that just because a navy orients itself more to carrier based aviation, that it is unimportant for surface ships of the CSG and the navy overall to retain a potent and widely proliferated organic anti-ship capability.

Fortunately the PLAN does not seem to be going in that direction at all.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
I wouldn't go that far.

We have yet to see what the long term trend of the USN's distributed lethality shift will be. We know their Constellation class frigates will be armed with 16 NSMs, and Constellations will certainly play a part in USN CSGs.

For the Burkes and Ticos, well Ticos are armed with Harpoons as standard. Burkes at present are not armed with any AShMs as standard to my knowledge (possibly Flight Is may have Harpoons).

However -- the new Block V Tomahawks will be capable of anti shipping as well as land attack, and their SM-6s also play a secondary anti ship option if needed.
Furthermore, they have the LRASM, which at this stage is currently only fielded on aircraft, but it would be quite easy to adapt them for the Mk-41 VLS (and indeed, Lockheed Martin has looked at it already in the past).
There is also the USN's new Large Surface Combatant project -- and I would not be surprised if it ends up being a large surface combatant between 055 to Zumwalt in size and having the same provisions to carry large strike and anti ship weapons as well.


In short, I would argue strongly against the notion that just because a navy orients itself more to carrier based aviation, that it is unimportant for surface ships of the CSG and the navy overall to retain a potent and widely proliferated organic anti-ship capability.

Fortunately the PLAN does not seem to be going in that direction at all.

Requirements are dependent on threat environment, opfor and battle space.

The USN’s refocusing on organic ship based AShM is partly a correction for prior over-adjustment away from ship based ASuW capabilities; partly an admission that the antisurface capabilities offered by AAMs are at best a gimmick and probably pretty ineffectual given the very different warheads best suited for those two respective roles; and primarily due to their primary intended opponent and battlefield being China and the first and second island chains respectively.

For the USN to fight the PLAN in the East China Sea or SCS would massively degrade their carrier air wing advantage while also significantly compressing the battle space, with massively reduced room for manoeuvre as a result of both geography and likely mission profiles.

That means that on the one hand, the USN can no longer expect its carrier air wing to be able to reliably handle enemy surface threats long before they can get anywhere like firing range of its own fleet; while on the other, the USN fleet itself is going to start any conflict right in China’s face, and with limited or no scope for the kinds of significant and prolonged manoeuvring that might deny an attacking fleet from even getting into firing position.

That means there is actually a very high likelihood that in the event of open conflict, a PLAN fleet could realistically and potentially even be highly likely to be able to get within AShM range of USN CSGs.

If that were to happen today, the USN would be thoroughly out-sticked by the PLAN, which is why the USN is now hurriedly trying to arm up so any such encounter wouldn’t end up as a total one sided disaster for the USN.

However, if you extend the time horizon beyond the next decade, assuming China and America has not already gone to war, then the strategic balance of power at that time would necessitate the US to abandon its indefensible positions in the first and maybe even second island chains and reorient its forces for defence in depth in the western and mid pacific similar to how it did in the opening stages of WWII.

In that battle space, where both fleets are far from land based support, or even have their current positions reversed, with the USN using its pacific island territories like Guam, Midway and maybe even Hawaii to deploy land based air assets to assist the USN, and with room to roam and manoeuvre, I think the PLAN will conclude that the chances of the two fleets getting within AShM range is so remote, and the pressure from hostile air threats so great, that it would sacrifice some AShMs for SAMs.

Even today, I fully expect the PLAN to give up a proportion of its fleet AShM arsenal for SAMs and ASROCs in any large scale conflict with the USN.

It was not just the USN who has over-balanced some areas in prior years and now need to re-orient itself.

The PLAN’s traditional heavy surface based AShM capabilities was a logical continuation of similar Soviet doctrine to counter USN naval power in the absence of your own carrier fleets. With ever increasing investment and fruits from its own carrier programme taking shape, some rebalancing is also in order.

I’m not suggesting that they would or should go full naughtiest USN and abandon most ship based AShMs; but I really don’t think they will retain quite so many AShMs in its surface fleet standard armaments as more and more PLAN carriers come online. That would only be natural and logical. As such, the idea that the PLAN would now start to invest in a new ASuW oriented major surface combatant class just doesn’t make sense.
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
It will hold in almost any case, unless we're talking a ~50'000t ship, which can take such change of load amidships with a negligible change in buoyancy reserve. These ~10-20t of added load clearly don't come "free". This is impossible in 4-6000 t of displacement. Like physically impossible.
Again, the question isn't "whether it's possible" - it most certainly is. The question is (1)sacrifices and (2)whether it's worth it.
For upgraded Chinese destroyers from 2000s, which form essentially a different fighting force from the newer aegis-type destroyers, and are optimized accordingly - the answer is clearly "yes". For Pakistani frigates - which by necessity play a similar role - the answer is also "yes". But for PLAN frigates - I personally don't see the point.


Hey, I don't want to sound aggressive, but earlier you went to explain the advantages of angled surfaces. Shall I return the favor by explaining how IR stealth works and why Saddam's IRST-equipped Mig-29s couldn't find F-117s over Baghdad? ;)
"Closer ranges" is a relative term - which is fully exploited by sea skimmers. This is why they remain relevant even 50 years after their initial appearance, after all. Plume matters a whole lot - if anything, just because the sole act of engaging rocket engine will wake up all UV launch warning systems in the vicinity (if they somehow failed to detect target search before it). For sea skimmers it's pretty normal to be detected at well below 10 km during drills (and I am not talking truly stealthy ones) - and we are talking drills. No onboard EW, no true attack profile (it's bloody dangerous even with a dummy warhead, after all), typically aiming at least somewhat away from the target ship, crew and ship are at their best and actually know when the "attack" will come. And still.

This one is very agreeable: doctrine and mission (as well as simple price, availability and unification) indeed.
The way PLAN distributes its missiles amongst its platforms is actually very coherent, and is self-explanatory which weapon is where, and why.

Supersonics like Oniks has been rated as low as 10 meters, so does the last Moskit. There are claims they even go down as much as 5 meters. We can expect the YJ-12 to be in that range or lower, same goes with the HFIII and ASM3. It is not about hitting the wavetops, you can always to adaptive sea skimming for that. The difficulty for supersonics comes from excessive compression on the engine due to the high atmospheric pressure at low altitudes. However the answer to that is to close the inlets as much as possible to reduce the air coming in which these missiles do address with adjustable inlets.

The YJ-18 has no problem with this as the sprinter is a rocket and is not dependent on the atmosphere.

When it comes to turbojet or turbofan ASMs, 5 to 10 meters is also their altitude. Do realize that the "small" ASMs like Harpoons, Exocets and YJ-83s are turbojets rather than turbofans because of their slim bodies. Turbofans maybe used when the body of the missile is relatively wide enough as per with bigger antiship missiles but again only with a low bypass ratio.

I don't even know why you think plumes are a big issue as turbojets do produce enough of that. You cannot hide the plume enough because whatever you are going to add to a missile, will add weight and drag and reduce its range. You want to practice minimalism. What makes you think the plumes of a turbojet or a turbofan is less than a ramjet. Turbos actively compress air into their engines, unlike a ramjet that compresses air passively. For this reason a turbojet or turbofan is capable of producing a hotter exhaust. The turbofan can cool the exhaust using bypass however, if you use a turbofan on a missile chances are it has a low bypass ratio to begin with because of the severe limitations of the missile's diameter. So the exhaust is going to be hot still.

For supersonics radar is necessary? All missiles do not need to emit radar until their final stage. Most of their path is determined by a programmed flight path added to the missile before launch. The missile is subject to flight corrections via datalink which will have to be done by satellite as a router, aircraft, UAVs, or even other ASMs. The use of passives have a longer history with the Soviet Union than it does with the West. But once again, don't think that passives is another silver bullet. Missiles may not have the space in their tight bodies for OTH passive direction finding which by itself is weather dependent as it requires radio waves to bounce off from atmospheric layers. So in order to find its target passively, it cannot be sea skimming but flying at a height so it will have a direct line of sight with the target's radar. However, when you reach to this point, the missile itself will be detected by the target's radar. The only real way a missile can "lurk" around if it will be updated via datalink.

Furthermore, it was on the Soviet Union that also pioneered OTH passive detection and directional finding and placed that in their ships. So their ships can locate the other fleet by the other fleet's radar or even communications. The data is uploaded to the missile before launch or updated to the missile already on flight via datalink. The USN got around passive directional finding by adding that to the SLQ-32 and working on projects like COBLU. But the Soviet Union perfected this system, and probably the finest example of this system is the Mineral radar code named Bandstand of which there is no equivalent in the West. In hindsight this was a priority for the Chinese to obtain for their C802 aka YJ-82 which is their first OTH antiship missile, and they got that by purchasing the Sovremenny. Then they were able to obtain these sets directly for the Type 052B and 051C. Then finally it got copied into the now ubiquitous Type 366 radar which equips the 052C, 052D and all Type 054A. The radar does both active and passive OTH and also has a cooperative datalink; the Chinese innovation to it is to add the ability to detect flying targets at low altitude.

As for stealth, supersonics have a much angled nose, in addition to adjustable inlets that are also highly angled. So you can expect frontal (I mean frontal, not the sides) RCS to be low. But subsonics have a rounded radome, and roundness is the enemy to RCS, as it produces reflection highlights. Some subsonics also have inlets hanging out from underneath their bodies with the edges of the inlet at right angles from the missile's surface. That's another no no for stealth, as radar loves vertical surfaces and edges, along with right angles. If a missile decides to hang its turbofan outside of the body, radar can easily reflect off the blades of the turbofan. Even if radar goes into the inlet of a supersonic ramjet missile, there are no turbine, no fans, no mechanical components inside the ramjet duct engine to bounce radar.

Kh-59MK_anti_ship_missile_Russia_MAKS_2017_1.jpg


You think the Chinese adopted supersonic missiles because they were inclined to adopting a Soviet doctrine? The history of Chinese antiship missiles have been by far and large, subsonic and they have no institutional overhang or momentum for bias to favor supersonic missiles. The missile they copied from the Soviet Union to produce the Seersucker and Silkworm missiles, is subsonic. Then came the era of Western European influence, particularly from the French that brought the C-801/YJ-81 from the Exocet. The Chinese was probably never convinced of supersonics themselves until they got a hold of the Moskit and saw what it can do, so they made a spiritual copy of it as the YJ-12 though they did have their own prototype supersonic ASM projects themselves, notably with the C101. The YJ-18 can be considered as mostly subsonic, the sprinter only works around 20 to 30km from a range total that can exceed 500km. If they are made to convince in the use of supersonics, even for a sprinter, it is because they have first hand, right at the front seat, experience of seeing it, testing it, collecting data for it themselves. It will be a decision made objectively and not through institutional bias.
 
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Blitzo

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Requirements are dependent on threat environment, opfor and battle space.

The USN’s refocusing on organic ship based AShM is partly a correction for prior over-adjustment away from ship based ASuW capabilities; partly an admission that the antisurface capabilities offered by AAMs are at best a gimmick and probably pretty ineffectual given the very different warheads best suited for those two respective roles; and primarily due to their primary intended opponent and battlefield being China and the first and second island chains respectively.

For the USN to fight the PLAN in the East China Sea or SCS would massively degrade their carrier air wing advantage while also significantly compressing the battle space, with massively reduced room for manoeuvre as a result of both geography and likely mission profiles.

That means that on the one hand, the USN can no longer expect its carrier air wing to be able to reliably handle enemy surface threats long before they can get anywhere like firing range of its own fleet; while on the other, the USN fleet itself is going to start any conflict right in China’s face, and with limited or no scope for the kinds of significant and prolonged manoeuvring that might deny an attacking fleet from even getting into firing position.

That means there is actually a very high likelihood that in the event of open conflict, a PLAN fleet could realistically and potentially even be highly likely to be able to get within AShM range of USN CSGs.

If that were to happen today, the USN would be thoroughly out-sticked by the PLAN, which is why the USN is now hurriedly trying to arm up so any such encounter wouldn’t end up as a total one sided disaster for the USN.

However, if you extend the time horizon beyond the next decade, assuming China and America has not already gone to war, then the strategic balance of power at that time would necessitate the US to abandon its indefensible positions in the first and maybe even second island chains and reorient its forces for defence in depth in the western and mid pacific similar to how it did in the opening stages of WWII.

In that battle space, where both fleets are far from land based support, or even have their current positions reversed, with the USN using its pacific island territories like Guam, Midway and maybe even Hawaii to deploy land based air assets to assist the USN, and with room to roam and manoeuvre, I think the PLAN will conclude that the chances of the two fleets getting within AShM range is so remote, and the pressure from hostile air threats so great, that it would sacrifice some AShMs for SAMs.

Even today, I fully expect the PLAN to give up a proportion of its fleet AShM arsenal for SAMs and ASROCs in any large scale conflict with the USN.

It was not just the USN who has over-balanced some areas in prior years and now need to re-orient itself.

The PLAN’s traditional heavy surface based AShM capabilities was a logical continuation of similar Soviet doctrine to counter USN naval power in the absence of your own carrier fleets. With ever increasing investment and fruits from its own carrier programme taking shape, some rebalancing is also in order.

I’m not suggesting that they would or should go full naughtiest USN and abandon most ship based AShMs; but I really don’t think they will retain quite so many AShMs in its surface fleet standard armaments as more and more PLAN carriers come online. That would only be natural and logical. As such, the idea that the PLAN would now start to invest in a new ASuW oriented major surface combatant class just doesn’t make sense.

I don't necessarily disagree with the possibilities you've raised, but I do think it is too early to speculate about how the US in the future may or may not abandon geopolitical positions that they currently occupy.

What I will say however, is that I think regardless of all that, I expect potent anti surface weapons to still be developed for PLAN surface ships -- particularly for the UVLS, which is now and will be for decades into the future, be the PLAN's primary VLS and weapons launch system.


I agree that the PLAN will not invest in a new "ASuW oriented major surface combatant class" -- but that's because by nature of modern VLS and sensors and datalinking, any modern warship can be more oriented towards ASuW or AAW or ASW depending on the loadout of their VLS. An 055 with its strike length UVLS cells fully loaded with YJ-18s could be argued to be a ASuW oriented surface combatant, while if only 8 of its cells are YJ-18s while the rest are AAW and ASW, then it could be described as a multirole AAW oriented surface combatant.
Ships designed around the placement of large anti ship weapons like the Slava class, Sovremenny class, very much are the past and I definitely don't expect anything like that from the PLAN.

However, I do expect all major PLAN surface combatants going into the future to have a minimum ASuW capability -- either in the form of 2x4 slant launched AShMs, or in the form of UVLS launched AShMs.... and I expect the escorts as part of a CSG to also retain a minimum ASuW loadout in their UVLS which would otherwise heavily be oriented for AAW and ASW.
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
Referring to @Tam stating that YJ-12 equipped 051B can deal with any ASEAN navy.
Idea was that a similar salvo of YJ-83s will do the same just as good or even better. Main value of YJ-12s is in launching strikes against opponents (ship or groups of thereof) equal or stronger than force including 051 itself.

Frigates have shown they can take multiple strikes for Harpoon sized antiship missiles and survive. That includes YJ-83. A YJ-12 might sink a frigate with a single hit.
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
I don't necessarily disagree with the possibilities you've raised, but I do think it is too early to speculate about how the US in the future may or may not abandon geopolitical positions that they currently occupy.

What I will say however, is that I think regardless of all that, I expect potent anti surface weapons to still be developed for PLAN surface ships -- particularly for the UVLS, which is now and will be for decades into the future, be the PLAN's primary VLS and weapons launch system.


I agree that the PLAN will not invest in a new "ASuW oriented major surface combatant class" -- but that's because by nature of modern VLS and sensors and datalinking, any modern warship can be more oriented towards ASuW or AAW or ASW depending on the loadout of their VLS. An 055 with its strike length UVLS cells fully loaded with YJ-18s could be argued to be a ASuW oriented surface combatant, while if only 8 of its cells are YJ-18s while the rest are AAW and ASW, then it could be described as a multirole AAW oriented surface combatant.
Ships designed around the placement of large anti ship weapons like the Slava class, Sovremenny class, very much are the past and I definitely don't expect anything like that from the PLAN.

However, I do expect all major PLAN surface combatants going into the future to have a minimum ASuW capability -- either in the form of 2x4 slant launched AShMs, or in the form of UVLS launched AShMs.... and I expect the escorts as part of a CSG to also retain a minimum ASuW loadout in their UVLS which would otherwise heavily be oriented for AAW and ASW.

Even Sovremennys and Slavas should be described correctly as multirole because they actually carry considerable AA armament, such as 48 missiles of Shtil for the Sovremenny and 64 S-300 missiles on the Slava which has the ability to project themselves as far as 200km, along with 40 short ranged SAMs.

Regional ASuW ships for the PLAN may not be as warranted when you have a large fleet of H-6s doing the talking.
 

Blitzo

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Even Sovremennys and Slavas should be described correctly as multirole because they actually carry considerable AA armament, such as 48 missiles of Shtil for the Sovremenny and 64 S-300 missiles on the Slava which has the ability to project themselves as far as 200km, along with 40 short ranged SAMs.

Regional ASuW ships for the PLAN may not be as warranted when you have a large fleet of H-6s doing the talking.

I never wrote that the Sovs and Slavas weren't multirole, but rather I described them as "ships designed around the placement of large anti ship weapons".
While the Sovs and Slavas had capable AAW systems (for their era), the design of their hull, topside structures, was significantly influenced by the placement of their respective AShM tubes, which I assumed is the spirit of what plawolf meant by "new ASuW oriented major surface combatant class".
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
Again, what’s your source for this? And why would this imply CW instead of pulsed radar waveforms?

In TVM, the tracking beam the ground radar uses to track

Let’s get this straight.

1. You claimed that Fire Dome is a FMCW track and illuminate radar. I demonstrated that was false. This has serious ramifications on our original discussion about Front Dome, which is probably a Fire Dome derivative.
2. You claimed that MPQ-53 and Flap Lid are another examples of FMCW radar. You furthermore claimed that because MPQ-53 is TVM it needs to keep “a continuous beam on target”.

When I asked you for evidence for 2., you produced posts after posts of handwaving arguments, but no actual evidence. Zero.

In conclusion, it is clear that you were simply speculating.

In TVM, the tracking radar also provides the illumination at the target, which the echoes are picked up by the missile's seeker, and the data is sent back to the tracking station which the tracking station analyzes and gives course corrections to the missile via datalink. So yeah, TVM works exactly like SARH except the part that SARH no longer needs to send data from its missile seeker back to the station and get instructions back. That's why it is referred to as "Semi-Active". Because of the similarity, so yes, its a good bet TVM uses a CW for the tracking lock within the missile. If the missile has evolved to an active radar variant like later Patriot, the radar station only needs to be pulse doppler. If the previous variant of the missile is command guided, like early 5V55 for the S-300, the radar station can also be only pulse doppler.

Because of monopulse feeds, a radar with a pulse radar for TWS and a CWI for missile illumination makes it difficult to use both modes simultaneously. A monopulse feed is complex enough by itself as it requires four horns. Do you think its just one horn for the pulse radar and one horn for the CWI illuminator emitting together on the same antenna? That may work on older radars but once monopulse comes in your feed becomes too complex. Not only will this result in having 8 feeds but the feeds have to be centered in the array which is difficult to do with eight feeds. The pulse radar and the CWI illuminator will have to take turns using the monopulse feed via mode switching between TWS and the engagement mode, lets say STT or Single Target Tracking. So even if the Firedome has a pulse radar TWS, it does not change anything for the CW which still has to track and lock on to the target on its own, and has to do it continuously after the CW has taken over the feed as the pulse radar is no longer working at this point. That's also true too of the Flap Lid as it also has a pulsed radar TWS that tracks hundreds of targets. And that's true of fighter radars that uses SARH missiles. Front Dome looks to be every bit of a monopulse radar with a completely symmetrical shape.
 
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Kich

Junior Member
Registered Member
I don't necessarily disagree with the possibilities you've raised, but I do think it is too early to speculate about how the US in the future may or may not abandon geopolitical positions that they currently occupy.

What I will say however, is that I think regardless of all that, I expect potent anti surface weapons to still be developed for PLAN surface ships -- particularly for the UVLS, which is now and will be for decades into the future, be the PLAN's primary VLS and weapons launch system.


I agree that the PLAN will not invest in a new "ASuW oriented major surface combatant class" -- but that's because by nature of modern VLS and sensors and datalinking, any modern warship can be more oriented towards ASuW or AAW or ASW depending on the loadout of their VLS. An 055 with its strike length UVLS cells fully loaded with YJ-18s could be argued to be a ASuW oriented surface combatant, while if only 8 of its cells are YJ-18s while the rest are AAW and ASW, then it could be described as a multirole AAW oriented surface combatant.
Ships designed around the placement of large anti ship weapons like the Slava class, Sovremenny class, very much are the past and I definitely don't expect anything like that from the PLAN.

However, I do expect all major PLAN surface combatants going into the future to have a minimum ASuW capability -- either in the form of 2x4 slant launched AShMs, or in the form of UVLS launched AShMs.... and I expect the escorts as part of a CSG to also retain a minimum ASuW loadout in their UVLS which would otherwise heavily be oriented for AAW and ASW.

I agree with your comment. And I would add that the benefits of having a large surface vessel carrying enough ashm is those missiles can be used on land targets as well.

There a lots of islands are 1st and 2nd island chains. For a ship, having the ability to conduct counter-strike after defending against ashm that came from land is important as well since you will mostly have info on where it came from.

Regardless, I think future PLAN vessels should retain a large number VLS cells than the current 052D and 054A numbers so at least planners are giving more options on the load-out of missiles.
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
I never wrote that the Sovs and Slavas weren't multirole, but rather I described them as "ships designed around the placement of large anti ship weapons".
While the Sovs and Slavas had capable AAW systems (for their era), the design of their hull, topside structures, was significantly influenced by the placement of their respective AShM tubes, which I assumed is the spirit of what plawolf meant by "new ASuW oriented major surface combatant class".

I think what plawolf meant is a ship that has most of its missiles as antiship missiles, e.g. arsenal ship.

Sovs and Slavas might look intimidating with their antiship launchers but at a large part of their ship architecture, particularly internal and at the superstructure, is for AAW, which we can also notice with their unusually large and numerous radars. We don't really see the 64 VLS for the S-300 on the Slava because its a VLS, while the antiship missiles are on the deck, which actually is not part of the ship architecture. This makes it easy and feasible to remove the deck mounted ASMs and replace them with a bunch of Urans. Slavas, like Kirovs, has a Tico like mission, meant to protect the Soviet carrier force.

Once you have carriers and planes, you expect planes to do the ASuW work mostly and you protect the carriers. It can be said that the ASuW on the Sov and Slava is to protect the carriers from other surface ships, instead of trying to go out, looking for trouble, and sink ships on their own.

Soviet to Putin's Russia naval doctrines have evolved. The ashms now turned to optional ashms and land targeting cruise missiles, which the Kalibr can both do with the appropriate versions for each. That honestly makes both Slava and Sov ship architectures difficult to upgrade for.
 
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