00X/004 future nuclear CATOBAR carrier thread

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
Haven’t looked at these numbers in a while but are you sure that’s a problem with the CVN and not the military service?
I wrote about this before, so I'll link it. I cannot guarantee that I am right, but I did read the reports and drew what I believe to be reasonable conclusions.


If it's service related, we can cross reference to the French Navy's CDG class.

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Charles de Gaulle's first major
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began in September 2007. The highlight of this 15-month refit was the
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, a necessary step after six years in service, during which Charles de Gaulle sailed the equivalent of 12 times around the world, spent 900 days at sea, and performed 19,000 catapult launches.
CDG was launched in May 2001. Overhaul began September 2007, 6 years and 4 months later (76 months). It was completed at the 91 month mark.

So every 91 months, 30 months (900 days) are spent at sea. That's a readiness rate of 1/3, consistent with the US estimate of readiness.
 

Deino

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Guys, Really?!!! It's enough ... let's stick to the 004 carrier and not a loooong and endless back and forth discussion on US carriers in comparison and so on! If this is wanted, I'm happy to start a new thread or you create it on your own and I'll transfer all the related posts!

By the way:

Three of the largest ships under construction by the PLAN in one photo. Fujian's deck painting has progressed; the fourth 075 LHD has been moved to the pool next to Fujian. Photo taken on 03/03.

PLN CV-18 Fujian + LHD-34 + maybe 076 - 20240303.jpg

via
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Guys, Really?!!! It's enough ... let's stick to the 004 carrier and not a loooong and endless back and forth discussion on US carriers in comparison and so on! If this is wanted, I'm happy to start a new thread or you create it on your own and I'll transfer all the related posts!

By the way:



View attachment 126169

via

I think given this thread is about 00X/004, discussion about prospects of future carriers including nuclear carriers and their rationale should be in the scope of this thread for now.

=====

I wrote about this before, so I'll link it. I cannot guarantee that I am right, but I did read the reports and drew what I believe to be reasonable conclusions.


If it's service related, we can cross reference to the French Navy's CDG class.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!


CDG was launched in May 2001. Overhaul began September 2007, 6 years and 4 months later (76 months). It was completed at the 91 month mark.

So every 91 months, 30 months (900 days) are spent at sea. That's a readiness rate of 1/3, consistent with the US estimate of readiness

Nuclear ships have lower readiness and availability rates. What’s the point of having CVNs when they are not available when you need them?


In reply to both of the above, and also previous posts -- in context of the PLA Navy, it is difficult to draw generalizable, universal conclusions readiness rates, availability rates of nuclear versus non-nuclear carriers that other navies have experienced (i.e.: US Navy and Marine Nationale), because readiness and availability is far beyond only whether a carrier is nuclear or not, but also what the overall navy's infrastructure, servicing and funding priorities are as well as how hard their carrier fleet is run during operations etc.

We cannot yet speculate as to what a hypothetical PLA Navy's mature infrastructure, servicing and funding for a fleet of nuclear powered carriers would look like versus what a PLA Navy's mature infrastructure, servicing and funding would look like for an equivalent fleet of non-nuclear/conventional carriers.
The US experience and French experience in operating CVNs may well not be generalizable to the PLA Navy, and heck one could even make the argument that the US experience (having operated a large fleet of CVNs as well as a large fleet of conventional CVs) is not even a like for like generalizable experience for the USN itself as it would require careful calibration of outside factors (like service demand, overall carrier fleet size, nature of missions) between when their fleet was mostly CVs versus when it became mostly CVNs.



This entire discussion about "nuclear" versus "non-nuclear/conventional" carriers seems to be stemming from whether CV-18 Fujian will be followed up by further "003-esque" conventional powered carriers, or if they will move onto nuclear powered carriers after CV-18.

Let us be clear here -- we all know that the PLAN's goal in the long term is to pursue nuclear powered super carriers. The inherent benefits of nuclear powered carriers are undeniable (infinite endurance, ability to sustain speeds independently without refuelling the ship itself if there are no other demands on it, greater aviation fuel volume), and the inherent costs to them are also undeniable (technological demands, infrastructure and nuclear engineering demands, all of which are also related to funding).
Until we hear differently, that the PLAN has abandoned the pursuit of nuclear powered carriers, we are obliged to assume that nuclear powered carriers offer certain capabilities that the PLAN desires for its long term carrier capability.


If the PLAN buys one or more additional conventionally powered aircraft carriers after CV-18 (keeping in mind that procuring additional conventionally powered carriers after CV-18 does not equate to abandoning the pursuit of nuclear powered carriers), that does not mean conventionally powered carriers are inherently better or hold significant advantages to nuclear powered carriers.

Rather, it is a reflection that the PLAN feel like they cannot yet transition to a nuclear powered carrier at the given time period yet (whether that is a reflection of technology, infrastructure, funding, or a combination thereof).



Putting it another way, nuclear carriers are inherently superior to a conventionally powered carrier (when all characteristics and are held equal). An approximate analogy can be made in the same way that a gas turbine powered surface combatant is inherently superior to a steam turbine powered surface combatant (when all characteristics are held equal).
For example, if XYZ navy chooses to go for a steam turbine powered surface combatant rather than a gas turbine powered surface combatant, then the explanation should not be scrutinized as "why is a steam turbine powered surface combatant inherently better than a gas turbine powered surface combatant"? Instead, it should be asked as "why is XYZ navy unable to pursue a gas turbine powered surface combatant and has to compromise with a less capable a steam powered surface combatant instead"?

Similarly, if XYZ navy chooses to go for a conventionally powered carrier rather than a nuclear powered carrier, then the explanation should not be scrutinized as "why is a conventionally powered carrier inherently better than a nuclear powered carrier" -- but rather, it should be asked as "why is XYZ navy unable to pursue a nuclear powered carrier and has to compromise with a less capable conventionally powered carrier instead"?
Thus, the "problem" is not with a nuclear powered carrier, but rather the "problem" is with XYZ navy.
I.e.: is XYZ navy too poorly funded, are its supplying industries insufficiently technologically advanced or mature to supply the subsystems, are the political leadership too cautious, are there operational demands being foreseen which requires a lower risk/more known quantity to operate, or a combination of these??
 
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ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
There are still a few key advantages WRT CVN operations over CVs which I believe that people usually neglect in discussions both inside and outside this forum.

One of the advantages associated is namely the absence of need for CVNs to be refueled - Or more specifically, CVNs don't have to be refueled as frequently as their non-nuclear powered counterparts.

Of course, CVs of all propulsion types still need to replenish their jet fuel regularly, but this is beyond the scope of this discussion.

We can argue back-and-forth about how much volume do nuclear reactors and its associated systems take inside a carrier versus that of steam/gas turbine engines and fuel storage for those turbine engines - But the more important factor actually lies with how this affects the overall logistics of refueling warships in the navy.

By logic and common sense, moving a 80k-ton or a 100k-ton warship consumes much more fuel than moving a 5k, 8k or even a 10+k-ton warship. Carriers, by far and wide, are massive gas guzzlers - Meaning that significant portions of the fuel tank spaces onboard the accompanying AOEs plus those onshore storage tanks & refueling facilities will have to be dedicated towards (re)fueling non-nuclear CVs just so that they can sail.

In contrast, CVNs pretty much liberated much of the fuel allocation and fuel storage spaces on AOEs and onshore storage tanks & refueling facilities for other warships that aren't nuclear powered (which there are a lot of them). CVNs only have to be refueled once every decade or so (Charles de Gaulle), or once every couple decades (Nimitz), or even none at all (Gerald R Ford) throughout their service lifetime. This is a HUGE saving on fuel consumption in the long run, despite the costs and risks associated with operating marine nuclear reactors.

And given that there aren't many warships that are also massive gas guzzlers in any navy (namely LHDs, LPDs and AOEs), this has a significant impact on the logistical management of fuel supply not just within one CSGs, but throughout a fleet, if not the entite navy. There is also the key consideration of fuel supply fot warships to operafe during wartime, which certainly are going to be significantly limited/constrained compared to peacetime. This definitely will play into how navies arrange and manage their fuel supply and distribution networks, where CVNs contribute yet another great plus into this calculation.

Furthermore, you even have the vulnerabilities associated with movements of warships (including carriers) to and from their home bases for refueling to consider. Given that the enemies already knew where the bases of CSGs are located (and hence, the expected routes where warships are expected to take to and from their bases), the enemies definitely will be aiming for some hits on them, if not the AOEs that would have to transit to and fro bases more frequently in order to fetch more fuel and supplies for their assigned fleets out at sea. Keeping warships in the open ocean for longer periods of time (which means the enemy will be forced to spend more time and effort looking for you than fighting you) is certainly safer than having to go back and from their bases frequently.

In fact, if anything - Given the existing chokepoints on the typical sea routes of how fuel gets from West Asia to China - China actually has a much more acute need for nuclear-powered warships than their US counterparts (albeit perhaps not as severe as the Koreans and Japanese).

Therefore, it is pretty understandable why the US and French navies opted for nuclear propulsion instead of conventional ones. The British would've gone with nuclear propulsion for their Queen Elizabeth-class carriers as well, if not for their shallow pockets and deficient marine nuclear expertise workforce. This is also why the PLA Navy is working towards eventually procuring CVNs.
 
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FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
There is still one key advantage WRT CVN operations over CVs which I believe that people usually neglect in discussions both inside and outside this forum - Namely, the absence of need for CVNs to be refueled - Or more specifically, CVNs don't have to be refueled as frequently as their non-nuclear powered counterparts.

Of course, CVs of all propulsion types still need to replenish their jet fuel regularly, but this is beyond the scope of this discussion.

We can argue back-and-forth about how much volume do nuclear reactors and its associated systems take inside a carrier versus that of steam/gas turbine engines and fuel storage for those turbine engines - But the more important factor actually lies with how this affects the overall logistics of refueling warships in the navy.

By logic and common sense, moving a 80k-ton or a 100k-ton warship consumes much more fuel than moving a 7k, 9k or even 10+k-ton warship. Carriers, by far and wide, are massive gas guzzlers - Meaning that significant portions of the fuel tank spaces onboard the AOEs plus those onshore storage tanks & refueling facilities will have to be dedicated towards (re)fueling non-nuclear CVs just so that they can sail.

In contrast, CVNs pretty much liberated much of the fuel allocation and fuel storage spaces on AOEs and onshore storage tanks & refueling facilities for other warships that aren't nuclear powered (which there are a lot of them). CVNs only have to be refueled once every decade or so (Charles de Gaulle), or once every couple decades (Nimitz), or even none at all (Gerald R Ford). This is a HUGE saving on fuel in the long run, despite the costs and risks associated with operating marine nuclear reactors.

And given that there aren't many warships that are also massive gas guzzlers in any navy (namely LHDs, LPDs and AOEs), this has a significant impact on the logistical management of fuel supply not just within one CSGs, but throughout a fleet, if not the entite navy. There is also the key consideration of fuel supply fot warships to operafe during wartime, which certainly are going to be significantly limited/constrained compared to peacetime. This definitely will play into how navies arrange and manage their fuel supply and distribution networks, where CVNs contribute yet another great plus into this calculation.

In fact, if anything - Given the existing chokepoints on the typical sea routes of how fuel gets from West Asia to China - China actually has a much more acute need for nuclear-powered warships than their US counterparts, albeit perhaps not as severe as the Koreans and Japanese.

Therefore, it is pretty understandable why the US and French navies opted for nuclear propulsion instead of conventional ones. The British would've gone with nuclear propulsion for their Queen Elizabeth-class carriers as well, if not for their shallow pockets and deficient marine nuclear expertise workforce. This is also why the PLA Navy is working towards eventually procuring CVNs.

I must point out that fossil fuel CVs with same compliment and sorting rate ie Kitty Hawk historically had 10-20% lower displacement than CVNs.

UK went with fossil fuel carriers because they wanted 2 instead of 1, not because of having lower budget than France. Their budget is higher.

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They also wanted their carriers built quickly, because they wanted to renew their global presence fast rather than being like France and spending 14 years from lay down to commissioning.

France had terrible project management and 14 years is a very long time that can snowball.

UK isn't known for great project management but they managed to launch 2 carriers laid down in 2009 in 2014.

We will see. If Fujian is commissioned and no more CVs are built then I'm wrong due to the considerations you said.

If Fujian is commissioned and we see 3 CVs being laid down at once then I'm right because of the build speed, unit cost, technological maturity and high readiness of conventional platforms is more important than range and fuel logistics.
 

kwaigonegin

Colonel
There are still a few key advantages WRT CVN operations over CVs which I believe that people usually neglect in discussions both inside and outside this forum.

One of the advantages associated is namely the absence of need for CVNs to be refueled - Or more specifically, CVNs don't have to be refueled as frequently as their non-nuclear powered counterparts.

Of course, CVs of all propulsion types still need to replenish their jet fuel regularly, but this is beyond the scope of this discussion.

We can argue back-and-forth about how much volume do nuclear reactors and its associated systems take inside a carrier versus that of steam/gas turbine engines and fuel storage for those turbine engines - But the more important factor actually lies with how this affects the overall logistics of refueling warships in the navy.

By logic and common sense, moving a 80k-ton or a 100k-ton warship consumes much more fuel than moving a 5k, 8k or even a 10+k-ton warship. Carriers, by far and wide, are massive gas guzzlers - Meaning that significant portions of the fuel tank spaces onboard the accompanying AOEs plus those onshore storage tanks & refueling facilities will have to be dedicated towards (re)fueling non-nuclear CVs just so that they can sail.

In contrast, CVNs pretty much liberated much of the fuel allocation and fuel storage spaces on AOEs and onshore storage tanks & refueling facilities for other warships that aren't nuclear powered (which there are a lot of them). CVNs only have to be refueled once every decade or so (Charles de Gaulle), or once every couple decades (Nimitz), or even none at all (Gerald R Ford) throughout their service lifetime. This is a HUGE saving on fuel consumption in the long run, despite the costs and risks associated with operating marine nuclear reactors.

And given that there aren't many warships that are also massive gas guzzlers in any navy (namely LHDs, LPDs and AOEs), this has a significant impact on the logistical management of fuel supply not just within one CSGs, but throughout a fleet, if not the entite navy. There is also the key consideration of fuel supply fot warships to operafe during wartime, which certainly are going to be significantly limited/constrained compared to peacetime. This definitely will play into how navies arrange and manage their fuel supply and distribution networks, where CVNs contribute yet another great plus into this calculation.

Furthermore, you even have the vulnerabilities associated with movements of warships (including carriers) to and from their home bases for refueling to consider. Given that the enemies already knew where the bases of CSGs are located (and hence, the expected routes where warships are expected to take to and from their bases), the enemies definitely will be aiming for some hits on them, if not the AOEs that would have to transit to and fro bases more frequently in order to fetch more fuel and supplies for their assigned fleets out at sea. Keeping warships in the open ocean for longer periods of time (which means the enemy will be forced to spend more time and effort looking for you than fighting you) is certainly safer than having to go back and from their bases frequently.

In fact, if anything - Given the existing chokepoints on the typical sea routes of how fuel gets from West Asia to China - China actually has a much more acute need for nuclear-powered warships than their US counterparts (albeit perhaps not as severe as the Koreans and Japanese).

Therefore, it is pretty understandable why the US and French navies opted for nuclear propulsion instead of conventional ones. The British would've gone with nuclear propulsion for their Queen Elizabeth-class carriers as well, if not for their shallow pockets and deficient marine nuclear expertise workforce. This is also why the PLA Navy is working towards eventually procuring CVNs.
Admittedly my opinions are biased of course knowing my history, however CVNs should be the goto.
There are really only 2 reasons why one should not go that route.
$$ and expertise/skill both initial and operating.
PLAN has $$ but may lack the experience in naval nuclear engineering on such a scale.
But they will get there soon. If 004 is conventional, I'm going to bet my measly paycheck that 005 will be a nuke.
 

kentchang

Junior Member
Registered Member
I must point out that fossil fuel CVs with same compliment and sorting rate ie Kitty Hawk historically had 10-20% lower displacement than CVNs.

UK went with fossil fuel carriers because they wanted 2 instead of 1, not because of having lower budget than France. Their budget is higher.

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They also wanted their carriers built quickly, because they wanted to renew their global presence fast rather than being like France and spending 14 years from lay down to commissioning.

France had terrible project management and 14 years is a very long time that can snowball.

UK isn't known for great project management but they managed to launch 2 carriers laid down in 2009 in 2014.

We will see. If Fujian is commissioned and no more CVs are built then I'm wrong due to the considerations you said.

If Fujian is commissioned and we see 3 CVs being laid down at once then I'm right because of the build speed, unit cost, technological maturity and high readiness of conventional platforms is more important than range and fuel logistics.

I am with the 004-will-be-CV camp. Arguments for CVN are all very valid for high-intensity and far-way (say Indian Ocean) conflicts BUT for at least the next two decades (say 2049), China must focus on deterrence and cementing its hegemon position in Asia and also give US some breathing space in the much less consequential Atlantic Ocean (and San Diego-Hawaii backyard). No reason to provoke an over-the-hill bully while the bully can still muster a last-gasp desperation move. There is nothing for China to gain politically and economically for any far-flung military adventures. To establish a new and credible world order, the last thing you want to do is to slavishly mimic the declining power especially when it was never in China's DNA as China practiced Suzerainty throughout its entire history and why give the rest of the world the perception that China will be just another America? CVN's convey exactly the wrong message. How much soft power do you lose in the world for a small bit of bragging rights?

USN's CVN specs must take Panamax requirements into consideration. China does not. For force projection purposes, larger or more numerous CVs or both achieve more effective propaganda value in the social media at far lower costs.

Carriers are very threatening to small defenseless countries because carriers can deliver lots of munitions very quickly and cheaply. Carriers are also at risk with peer opponents that can target carriers from long distances. China won't be the only country with optical/SAR satellites in GEO. China won't be the only country with HGVs. The question whether CVNs are dinosaurs in the latter half of 21st Century is actively debated. Global/Conventional Prompt Strike technologies will only get better and cheaper especially with reusable boosters right around the corner. How many DF-17-sized HGVs can you fit on top of a CZ-9 first stage (or a future TBCC HTHL aero-bomber)? Russia is already using the MiG-31+Kinzhal combination today. Once such long-reach threats are taken for granted and viewed as routine as GPS-guided munitions are today, CVNs will be viewed as useful as rail-based siege guns of yester-year? Is this scenario realistic in the next 50 years? I think so.

So I am looking forward to a couple more 003's followed by a larger (120,000 displacement) 004 CV class when 001/002 replacements are needed.
 
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MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
I must point out that fossil fuel CVs with same compliment and sorting rate ie Kitty Hawk historically had 10-20% lower displacement than CVNs.

Displacement is weight of a ship, so greater displacement indicates greater storage mass. CVNs can dedicate all storage space taken up by fuel in CVs to aircraft fuel, fuel for escort ships and other resources.

CVNs also do not suffer from decrease in fuel efficiency at higher speeds. Conventional propulsion operates at marginal efficiency of fuel mass i.e. the faster ship travels the more fuel mass it must consume. This is why conventional ships have longer ranges at lower speeds. In contrast nuclear-powered ships have no such restriction due to the high energy density of their fuel. CVNs can therefore consistently travel at much greater speeds than CVs which requires only refueling of escort ships, which can be done with fast supply ships or directly from the CVN.

The ability to travel constantly at 20+ or 30+ knots may not be relevant if you are an Italian CVL/LHD in the Mediterranean but it does matter in WestPac. A single carrier may maneuever in theater more aggressively and any deficiency of maneuver of the escort may be mitigated by greater number of avaialble escort ships. With sufficient number of DDGs and FFGs PLAN CVNs may "jump CSGs" rather than drag the necessary supplies along. Such tactical is viable for a small number of CVNs and large number of large surface combatants but is impossible with a conventional carrier which is the primary resource/fuel sink in any task force.

They also wanted their carriers built quickly, because they wanted to renew their global presence fast rather than being like France and spending 14 years from lay down to commissioning.
France had terrible project management and 14 years is a very long time that can snowball.

Time of construction was not an issue with QE class. The primary factor was the cost of reactors required for necessary power output and cost of catapults, which is why QE is a STOBAR carrier. During the development phase, and even later during the construction there were suggestions to scrap the second ship and build a single conventional CATOBAR but there was pressure on retaining two ships.

The reasons for building two CVs were simple:
  • the number of jobs sustained by two ships which were built 2009-2017 and 2011-2019, at a time when economic situation was very difficult. The public debate around QE was very widely reported in British media, so it shouldn't be difficult to learn about it if one only makes the effort do so.
  • the intended role of QE as not only a CV but also an LPH to complement HMS Ocean which ended up being sold to Brazil in 2018. Britain has the largest expeditionary capability of all the European navies as part of Royal Fleet Auxiliary, and QE was meant to complement that, as it fit the more active foreign policy under Blair.
Charles de Gaulle was not an issue of project management but of funding shortages due economic circumstances and political factors as well as technological constraints forced by France's use of LEU reactors.

We will see. If Fujian is commissioned and no more CVs are built then I'm wrong due to the considerations you said.
If Fujian is commissioned and we see 3 CVs being laid down at once then I'm right because of the build speed, unit cost, technological maturity and high readiness of conventional platforms is more important than range and fuel logistics.

To correct:
  • Unit cost is the only valid reason for choosing a conventional carrier over a nuclear one.
  • Build speed is not a problem, as demonstrated in two of my previous posts. You're deliberately misleading.
  • Technological maturity is not something you choose against but a factor objectively preventing the construction of nuclear carrier.
  • High readiness of conventional platforms is a vague, arbitrary and completely unsubstantiated statement that means nothing out of context and which you will struggle to back with data.
Cost of selected aircraft carriers - reported by Wikipedia and adjusted for inflation
  • Kitty Hawk - $264m (1957-1961) / $353m (1970)
  • Enterprise - $451m (1958-1961) / $604m (1970)
  • Dwight D. Eisenhower - $502m (1958) / $679m (1970)
After adjustment Eisenhower is only 11% more expensive than Enterprise which in turn is 71% more expensive than Kitty Hawk.

However the cost of the aircraft carrier is only one of four main cost factors beside:
  • maintenance and operations,
  • personnel (ship crew + air wing)
  • air wing (aircraft)
6000 crew (ship + air wing) at 24k annual pay for lowest enlisted rank cost $144m in salaries without cost of housing, food, medical care etc. I didn't look for the actual complement so we can assume that the actual salary cost is 2-3x and closer to or higher than ~$0,5b annually.

64 fighter aircraft (24 F-35C + 30 F/A-18E/F + 10 EA-18G, not including other aircraft in the CAW) at $85m per airframe cost $5,45b to procure without cost of O&M such as fuel, munitions, servicing etc.

If we assume cost of Gerald Ford ($13b) or George HW Bush ($6.2b) then cost of procuring the air wing (fighters only) constitutes 42% or 88% of ship construction. I will assume that China builds a CVN at an efficiency of CVN-77 because Ford is a prototype with several major improvements.

Cost of CVN at 170% per Enterprise/Kitty Hawk but without considering the entirety of additional cost or O&M is then:

CVN + CAW + salary = $6,2b + $5,4b + $0,5b = $12,1b
CV + CAW + salary
= $3,6b + $5,4b + $0,5b = $9,5b

CVN / CV = 127%
CV / CVN = 78%

At that rate building 3 CVs will cost as much as 2,25 CVNs but the time of construction will be the same (see my previous two posts). Since the cost of sustainment is calculated over a ~50y lifecycle the savings are not nearly as significant as you imply. Another matter is the actual cost distribution for shipbuilding in China as opposed to US or otherwise. We don't have concrete information about which specific elements of the CVN increase cost and at what rate.

Therefore we can assume that the only factor which matters is technology maturity, which is what @Blitzo suggested above, and not any other factor.

Carriers are very threatening to small defenseless countries because carriers can deliver lots of munitions very quickly and cheaply.

Supercarriers were specifically designed in response to peer threats from the Soviet Navy posed to Atlantic convoys.

USN supercarriers were defensive in nature because the entire maritime posture of NATO was fundamentally defensive until the 1970s. In the 1970s Soviets also took a defensive posture but that wasn't recognised by US intelligence until the 1980s. The shift to more aggressive thinking only emerged in the 1980s as means of forcing USSR to disperse their resources over the entire area of the Soviet Union to address WarPact's numerical superiority in Europe.

The notion that supercarriers, and CVNs in particular, are intended for the type of operations that we've seen after 1991 is hilariously ignorant. They were literally designed to counter the emerging Soviet submarine and naval aviation threats very much like the AEGIS cruisers which only later were narratively re-purposed for defending against Iran or North Korea.

Nimitz and Ticonderoga are anti-Soviet defensive designs. Seawolf was on the other hand an anti-Soviet offensive design.

Look at the map of the world 1945-1991. USN carriers have no access to within striking range of WarPact territory unless it's in the Pacific or past GIUK which is an area infested by Soviet submarines and naval aviation. How can anyone claim that such situation validates an "offensive" carrier is just beyond me.

No trends that inform the future can be deduced from an imaginary past.
 
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FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
Displacement is weight of a ship, so greater displacement indicates greater storage mass. CVNs can dedicate all storage space taken up by fuel in CVs to aircraft fuel, fuel for escort ships and other resources.

CVNs also do not suffer from decrease in fuel efficiency at higher speeds. Conventional propulsion operates at marginal efficiency of fuel mass i.e. the faster ship travels the more fuel mass it must consume. This is why conventional ships have longer ranges at lower speeds. In contrast nuclear-powered ships have no such restriction due to the high energy density of their fuel. CVNs can therefore consistently travel at much greater speeds than CVs which requires only refueling of escort ships, which can be done with fast supply ships or directly from the CVN.

The ability to travel constantly at 20+ or 30+ knots may not be relevant if you are an Italian CVL/LHD in the Mediterranean but it does matter in WestPac. A single carrier may maneuever in theater more aggressively and any deficiency of maneuver of the escort may be mitigated by greater number of avaialble escort ships. With sufficient number of DDGs and FFGs PLAN CVNs may "jump CSGs" rather than drag the necessary supplies along. Such tactical is viable for a small number of CVNs and large number of large surface combatants but is impossible with a conventional carrier which is the primary resource/fuel sink in any task force.

Time of construction was not an issue with QE class. The primary factor was the cost of reactors required for necessary power output and cost of catapults, which is why QE is a STOBAR carrier. During the development phase, and even later during the construction there were suggestions to scrap the second ship and build a single conventional CATOBAR but there was pressure on retaining two ships.

The reasons for building two CVs were simple:
  • the number of jobs sustained by two ships which were built 2009-2017 and 2011-2019, at a time when economic situation was very difficult. The public debate around QE was very widely reported in British media, so it shouldn't be difficult to learn about it if one only makes the effort do so.
  • the intended role of QE as not only a CV but also an LPH to complement HMS Ocean which ended up being sold to Brazil in 2018. Britain has the largest expeditionary capability of all the European navies as part of Royal Fleet Auxiliary, and QE was meant to complement that, as it fit the more active foreign policy under Blair.
Charles de Gaulle was not an issue of project management but of funding shortages due economic circumstances and political factors as well as technological constraints forced by France's use of LEU reactors.

To correct:
  • Unit cost is the only valid reason for choosing a conventional carrier over a nuclear one.
  • Build speed is not a problem, as demonstrated in two of my previous posts. You're deliberately misleading.
  • Technological maturity is not something you choose against but a factor objectively preventing the construction of nuclear carrier.
  • High readiness of conventional platforms is a vague, arbitrary and completely unsubstantiated statement that means nothing out of context and which you will struggle to back with data.
Cost of selected aircraft carriers - reported by Wikipedia and adjusted for inflation
  • Kitty Hawk - $264m (1957-1961) / $353m (1970)
  • Enterprise - $451m (1958-1961) / $604m (1970)
  • Dwight D. Eisenhower - $502m (1958) / $679m (1970)
After adjustment Eisenhower is only 11% more expensive than Enterprise which in turn is 71% more expensive than Kitty Hawk.

However the cost of the aircraft carrier is only one of four main cost factors beside:
  • maintenance and operations,
  • personnel (ship crew + air wing)
  • air wing (aircraft)
6000 crew (ship + air wing) at 24k annual pay for lowest enlisted rank cost $144m in salaries without cost of housing, food, medical care etc. I didn't look for the actual complement so we can assume that the actual salary cost is 2-3x and closer to or higher than ~$0,5b annually.

64 fighter aircraft (24 F-35C + 30 F/A-18E/F + 10 EA-18G, not including other aircraft in the CAW) at $85m per airframe cost $5,45b to procure without cost of O&M such as fuel, munitions, servicing etc.

If we assume cost of Gerald Ford ($13b) or George HW Bush ($6.2b) then cost of procuring the air wing (fighters only) constitutes 42% or 88% of ship construction. I will assume that China builds a CVN at an efficiency of CVN-77 because Ford is a prototype with several major improvements.

Cost of CVN at 170% per Enterprise/Kitty Hawk but without considering the entirety of additional cost or O&M is then:

CVN + CAW + salary = $6,2b + $5,4b + $0,5b = $12,1b
CV + CAW + salary
= $3,6b + $5,4b + $0,5b = $9,5b

CVN / CV = 127%
CV / CVN = 78%

At that rate building 3 CVs will cost as much as 2,25 CVNs but the time of construction will be the same (see my previous two posts). Since the cost of sustainment is calculated over a ~50y lifecycle the savings are not nearly as significant as you imply. Another matter is the actual cost distribution for shipbuilding in China as opposed to US or otherwise. We don't have concrete information about which specific elements of the CVN increase cost and at what rate.

Therefore we can assume that the only factor which matters is technology maturity, which is what @Blitzo suggested above, and not any other factor.
Readiness is not vague lol. This is not my assertion that CVs have higher readiness than CVNs, this directly taken from a post-war report written by the US Government Accountability Office. I suggest you read the actual US government documents like I have, which are very in-depth and have extensive citations of actual combat experience using both CVs and CVNs in Desert Storm.

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(1) its analysis shows that conventional and nuclear carriers both have been effective in fulfilling U.S. forward presence, crisis response, and war-fighting requirements and share many characteristics and capabilities; (2) conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers both have the same standard air wing and train to the same mission requirements; (3) each type of carrier offers certain advantages; (4) for example, conventionally powered carriers spend less time in extended maintenance, and as a result, they can provide more forward presence coverage; (5) by the same token, nuclear carriers can store larger quantities of aviation fuel and munitions and, as a result, are less dependent upon at-sea replenishment; (6) there was little difference in the operational effectiveness of nuclear and conventional carriers in the Persian Gulf War; (7) investment, operating and support, and inactivation and disposal costs are greater for nuclear-powered carriers than conventionally powered carriers; (8) GAO's analysis, based on an analysis of historical and projected costs, shows that life-cycle costs for conventionally powered and nuclear-powered carriers (for a notional 50-year service life) are estimated at $14.1 billion and $22.2 billion (in fiscal year 1997 dollars), respectively; (9) the United States maintains a continuous presence in the Pacific region by homeporting a conventionally powered carrier in Japan; (10) if the U.S. Navy transitions to an all nuclear carrier force, it would need to homeport a nuclear-powered carrier there to maintain the current level of worldwide overseas presence with a 12-carrier force; (11) the homeporting of a nuclear-powered carrier in Japan could face several difficult challenges, and be a costly undertaking, because of the need for nuclear-capable maintenance and other support facilities, infrastructure improvements, and additional personnel; and (12) the United States would need a larger carrier force if it wanted to maintain a similar level of presence in the Pacific region with nuclear-carriers homeported in the United States.
Conventionally powered carriers can be available sooner for large scale crises because it is easier to accelerate or compress their
maintenance.
Carrier maintenance periods can be shortened by varying degrees, depending on the stage of the maintenance being performed. The degree a depot maintenance period can be shortened--or surged--depends on when the decision is made to deploy the carrier.
Due to the complexity of its maintenance, a nuclear carrier's maintenance period cannot be surged to the same degree as that of a conventional carrier. In addition, the crews for both carrier types train to the same standards, except for the power-plant crew, and spend comparable time in predeployment training.
Conventional carriers replenished aviation fuel about every 2.7 to 3.1 days and the nuclear carrier every 3.3 days--after only a fraction of their fuel and supplies were exhausted.

In table 2, they go over the life cycle costs. CV is 1/2 the price of a CVN to buy per unit and 1/2 the maintenance cost. The major cost is in operations, which is similar, $11 billion USD for CV vs. $14 billion USD for CVN. End result is $14 billion for CV, $22 billion for CVN. However, we must also note that US CV operation is global, so I assume the costs are going to be lower, and fixed costs are a higher % of total cost. China's immediate theater is not the entirety of WestPac. It is the SCS, ECS and the waters immediately between the 1st and 2nd island chains, within range of air cover.
 
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