Firstly, I think we could look back at the original aircraft carrier procurement plans that the PLAN has set up in 2004, i.e.
Project 048 (048工程).
The project entails the following, firstly in Mandarin:
第一步,用10年建造2艘中型航母;
第二步,再用10年建造2艘大型航母;
第三步,视情况发展大型核动力航母。
Translated:
Step #1 - Use
10 years to build
2 medium-sized carriers;
Step #2 - Use
another 10 years to build
2 large-sized carriers; and
Step #3 -
Depending on the situation, develop
nuclear-powered supercarriers.
As of now, China is at
3/10th the way for Step #2.
For Step #1, China has successfully accomplised it with the Liaoning and Shandong, both medium-sized carriers, commissioned within the 2010s.
For Step #2, China is still well underway, with a large-sized carrier i.e. Fujian currently fitting out at Jiangnan. With 7 years left before the end of the 2020s, it is entirely possible for China to build and commission at least one more large-sized carrier to fulfill the requirement of Step #2 for Project 048.
Next, there is also another source which could be indicative of how many aircraft carriers does China plan to procure in the near future - The
Type 901 fast combat support ship. Note the list below:
View attachment 104682
1st 901 -
Hulunhu, launched in December 2015 and commissioned in September 2017, now serving in the North Sea Fleet as part of Liaoning's CSG.
2nd 901 -
Chaganhu, launched in June 2017 and commissioned in February 2019, now serving in the South Sea Fleet as part of Shandong's CSG.
3rd 901 -
Poyanghu, launched sometime in 2021, expected to commission sometime in 2023 and would serve in the North Sea Fleet. I expect this ship would be attached to Fujian's CSG once she has been commissioned.
For Hulunhu, we can ignore it.
For Chaganhu, however, the ship was commissioned later that same year as Shandong. From this, I think there is a possibility in which
the time of commissioning for these 901s could have been
arranged such that they would be
as close to - the time of commissioning of the carrier that the 901 is supposed to be attached to - as possible.
Because of this, should Poyanghu be commissioned this year, then I believe Fujian was originally planned for commissioning in 2023 as well. The mismatch of the commissioning time between Poyanghu and Fujian could have been a direct result from the construction of Fujian being paused for around 1 year in order for the redesign of the ship (i.e. switching out the steam catapults with EMALS catapults) to take place.
Then we have:
4th 901 -
Hongzehu, currently under construction and is expected to launch sometime in 2024, to commission sometime in 2026, and would serve in the South Sea Fleet.
So I think we can confidently say that China
definitely is going to pursue the 4th carrier (CV-19) within this decade, and the carrier is most likely still a
conventionally-powered one. With that, Step #2 of the Project 048 would have been accomplished.
But what comes after is more interesting:
5th 901 - Riyuetanhu, currently planned and is expected to launch sometime in 2025, to commission sometime in 2027, and would serve in the North Sea Fleet.
What that surprises me is 1. The
mention of the 5th unit of the 901-class; 2. The
using of the name of a lake in Taiwan Province; and 3. The
expected time of launch and commissioning for the ship itself.
I'm unsure of the credibility of the information presented about this Riyuetan fast combat support ship, mainly because I have no idea when or where did that came from.
But if the information on the Riyuetan can be relied upon (perhaps coming from some sort of leak on the Chinese internet before censorship did its thing), then the
5th carrier (CV-20) technically (a BIG)
might be built (and (a HUGE)
maybe commissioned into the PLAN)
before the end of this decade. But of course, this also heavily depends on whether China's marine nuclear propulsion has become mature enough for usage on aircraft carriers first, as per stipulated by Step #3 of Project 048, i.e.
Develop nuclear-powered supercarriers based on present situations. However, if the PLAN is not confident enough to pursue a nuclear-powered carrier after Step #2 is completed, then CV-20 will be completed only in the 2030s.
Despite this, I think that CV-20 be an experimental nuclear-powered supercarrier, and that only one ship would be built. In some ways, CV-20 would be similar to its American counterpart, CV-65 Enterprise. Perhaps CV-20 could even have a conventional-nuclear mixed propulsion system instead of a fully nuclear one.
After that, I think China would
move onto serial construction of the next class of nuclear-powered supercarriers ONLY
from the next decade onwards (i.e.
2030s), i.e. Step #3.
Before I end, I would like to mention that my statements WRT Hongzehu, Riyuetanhu, CV-19 and CV-20 are just assumptions and estimates, based on publically available information and my own brainstorming. If there is any inaccuracies and mistakes, I do apologize for them.