00X/004 future nuclear CATOBAR carrier thread

[ACuriousPLAFan]

I think everyone advocating for more conventional CVs versus going for CVNs, need to first review what the timelines for their proposals would be.

Everyone agrees that the PLAN will go for more carriers, but I think there is a discussion to be had as to when they would actually be comfortable and interested in procuring more carriers.
After all, building more carriers for entry into service between 2025-2030 is different to building more carriers for entry into service by 2030 or after.

Two or three years ago, the idea of more carriers in the 2025-2030 period seemed reasonable and almost a no brainer, but the westpac geostrategic environment is changing and I believe the CMC's perspective as to "likelihood of conflict" in that period is also changing.

Given the length of time and amount resources it would take to properly workup a carrier to be combat capable, I think there is an open question as to how high of a priority/opportunity-cost for the PLAN to procure more carriers for entry into service in the 2025-2030 era. It may well be that for the specific period then, then will put more focus onto other platform types instead.


However, during this time the PLAN will of course continue actually developing technologies for CVNs.

Putting it another way, I think we need to consider whether it makes more sense for the PLAN to go for "additional conventional CVs after 003" or to go for "CVNs directly after 003" in two time periods:
A) buying more carriers that will enter service the 2025+ period and onwards
B) buying more carriers that will only enter service in the circa 2030 period and onwards

Firstly, I think we could look back at the original aircraft carrier procurement plans that the PLAN has set up in 2004, i.e. Project 048 (048工程).

The project entails the following, firstly in Mandarin:
第一步，用10年建造2艘中型航母；
第二步，再用10年建造2艘大型航母；
第三步，视情况发展大型核动力航母。

Translated:
Step #1 - Use 10 years to build 2 medium-sized carriers;
Step #2 - Use another 10 years to build 2 large-sized carriers; and
Step #3 - Depending on the situation, develop nuclear-powered supercarriers.

As of now, China is at 3/10th the way for Step #2.

For Step #1, China has successfully accomplised it with the Liaoning and Shandong, both medium-sized carriers, commissioned within the 2010s.

For Step #2, China is still well underway, with a large-sized carrier i.e. Fujian currently fitting out at Jiangnan. With 7 years left before the end of the 2020s, it is entirely possible for China to build and commission at least one more large-sized carrier to fulfill the requirement of Step #2 for Project 048.

Next, there is also another source which could be indicative of how many aircraft carriers does China plan to procure in the near future - The Type 901 fast combat support ship. Note the list below:


1st 901 - Hulunhu, launched in December 2015 and commissioned in September 2017, now serving in the North Sea Fleet as part of Liaoning's CSG.
2nd 901 - Chaganhu, launched in June 2017 and commissioned in February 2019, now serving in the South Sea Fleet as part of Shandong's CSG.
3rd 901 - Poyanghu, launched sometime in 2021, expected to commission sometime in 2023 and would serve in the North Sea Fleet. I expect this ship would be attached to Fujian's CSG once she has been commissioned.

For Hulunhu, we can ignore it.

For Chaganhu, however, the ship was commissioned later that same year as Shandong. From this, I think there is a possibility in which the time of commissioning for these 901s could have been arranged such that they would be as close to - the time of commissioning of the carrier that the 901 is supposed to be attached to - as possible.

Because of this, should Poyanghu be commissioned this year, then I believe Fujian was originally planned for commissioning in 2023 as well. The mismatch of the commissioning time between Poyanghu and Fujian could have been a direct result from the construction of Fujian being paused for around 1 year in order for the redesign of the ship (i.e. switching out the steam catapults with EMALS catapults) to take place.

Then we have:
4th 901 - Hongzehu, currently under construction and is expected to launch sometime in 2024, to commission sometime in 2026, and would serve in the South Sea Fleet.

So I think we can confidently say that China definitely is going to pursue the 4th carrier (CV-19) within this decade, and the carrier is most likely still a conventionally-powered one. With that, Step #2 of the Project 048 would have been accomplished.

But what comes after is more interesting:
5th 901 - Riyuetanhu, currently planned and is expected to launch sometime in 2025, to commission sometime in 2027, and would serve in the North Sea Fleet.

What that surprises me is 1. The mention of the 5th unit of the 901-class; 2. The using of the name of a lake in Taiwan Province; and 3. The expected time of launch and commissioning for the ship itself.

I'm unsure of the credibility of the information presented about this Riyuetan fast combat support ship, mainly because I have no idea when or where did that came from.

But if the information on the Riyuetan can be relied upon (perhaps coming from some sort of leak on the Chinese internet before censorship did its thing), then the 5th carrier (CV-20) technically (a BIG) might be built (and (a HUGE) maybe commissioned into the PLAN) before the end of this decade. But of course, this also heavily depends on whether China's marine nuclear propulsion has become mature enough for usage on aircraft carriers first, as per stipulated by Step #3 of Project 048, i.e. Develop nuclear-powered supercarriers based on present situations. However, if the PLAN is not confident enough to pursue a nuclear-powered carrier after Step #2 is completed, then CV-20 will be completed only in the 2030s.

Despite this, I think that CV-20 be an experimental nuclear-powered supercarrier, and that only one ship would be built. In some ways, CV-20 would be similar to its American counterpart, CV-65 Enterprise. Perhaps CV-20 could even have a conventional-nuclear mixed propulsion system instead of a fully nuclear one.

After that, I think China would move onto serial construction of the next class of nuclear-powered supercarriers ONLY from the next decade onwards (i.e. 2030s), i.e. Step #3.

Before I end, I would like to mention that my statements WRT Hongzehu, Riyuetanhu, CV-19 and CV-20 are just assumptions and estimates, based on publically available information and my own brainstorming. If there is any inaccuracies and mistakes, I do apologize for them.

 

[VESSEL]

2025, CVN-19.
Don't expect any new conventional aircraft carriers, buddy.

 

[para80]

Next, there is also another source which could be indicative of how many aircraft carriers does China plan to procure in the near future - The Type 901 fast combat support ship. Note the list below:
View attachment 104682

1st 901 - Hulunhu, launched in December 2015 and commissioned in September 2017, now serving in the North Sea Fleet as part of Liaoning's CSG.
2nd 901 - Chaganhu, launched in June 2017 and commissioned in February 2019, now serving in the South Sea Fleet as part of Shandong's CSG.
3rd 901 - Poyanghu, launched sometime in 2021, expected to commission sometime in 2023 and would serve in the North Sea Fleet. I expect this ship would be attached to Fujian's CSG once she has been commissioned.

I've been keeping an eye on 901 and the related claims on Wiki. I note so far there is still a curious absence of visual evidence for more 901 hulls in the water or under construction. The Wiki-page keeps being edited pushing respective dates into the future, so it may be true or not, but I remain on the fence there.

 

[Deino]

They should obviously be named Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Their purpose is to assert the country's soverignity, and that can start right from their names lol

Ok guy, and now enough of political provocative suggestions on the naming issue. We should stick to pure technical discussions and for more we should wait until the first module was seen.

 

[Cloud_Nine_]

That's not really how that works. There's no reality in which we generate 40 strike sorties in a single package. Our normal package sizes are 20-22 aircraft due to a myriad of limitations. Not all of those a/c are shooters either. As for sortie generation, the more accurate number is ~120 **total** sorties per 24h at surge tempo (not strike sorties, not fixed wing sorties, **total sorties**), or closer to ~80-90 sustainably. Here's some unclass TACTRAGRUPAC graphics for easy comprehension.

View attachment 104704

View attachment 104705

also wtf:

View attachment 104708

flushed emoji!

This might be slightly off-topic but is this PPT(?) available open source?

 

[Cloud_Nine_]

On the topic of 901 AOEs, I could not even find news of the third vessel being launched somehow. Only satellite images of her in drydock being built in 2018. Also, I remember CCTV news about Fujian said that she will enter service with STC, which if it is true, should mean the 901 for her should be STC too.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

You need carriers for more than just combat with other carriers. In fact it’s probably not even the main mission profile they should be used in. For example, if China wanted to permanently take Guam or Okinawa off the table for the US, you’ll want to maintain a persistent presence and do mop up campaigns to prevent US assets from regenerating, and in order to do that you need to occupy territory, which means you need a carrier. Or perhaps you want to maintain permanent presence around the Malacca Strait to have control and initiative over the geographic chokepoint. Maintaining persistence in those kinds of scenarios is crucial, and having a nuclear powered carrier would probably help you many times more than a conventional carrier that will need much deeper and more frequently tapped supply lines, which will be far more vulnerable to having its operations disrupted, etc.

But to do anything at all the carriers have to be out of maintenance and it was shown earlier that CVs have higher readiness than CVNs. With lower construction costs you could also have more, compounding the advantage. In Desert Storm the CVs were topped off with fuel rather than allowing them to draw down reserves but even then never even expended a tiny fraction of their reserves at once despite high optemp.

In addition, total sortie rates are a function of carried air wing, not necessarily of launch and turnaround efficacy. Sorties per plane would more accurately reflect efficiency.

 

[charles18]

There won't be another Midway.

I disagree.
It will happen.

 

[Nx4eu]

China should build another conventional carrier alongside a nuclear carrier at the same time. That way we get another conventional along with a new nuclear carrier. Instead of just the next carrier being a new experimental nuclear carrier with unforeseen problems. Getting more assets should be china's priority because time well sometimes we don't always get the time we want. American interest is to not give china time so operating more conventional carriers short time is beneficial for security. Just my opinion though

 

[latenlazy]

But to do anything at all the carriers have to be out of maintenance and it was shown earlier that CVs have higher readiness than CVNs. With lower construction costs you could also have more, compounding the advantage. In Desert Storm the CVs were topped off with fuel rather than allowing them to draw down reserves but even then never even expended a tiny fraction of their reserves at once despite high optemp.

In addition, total sortie rates are a function of carried air wing, not necessarily of launch and turnaround efficacy. Sorties per plane would more accurately reflect efficienc

The point of having those reserves even if you don’t draw them down is to maintain good operational margins. You don’t conduct military operations with thin margins if you can help it if you want to maximize success of operations. Downtime factors can affect your total procurement costs by forcing you to maintain a higher fleet, but it doesn’t negate the operational advantages of having a CVN over a CV unless your force planning and management practices are terrible, and insofar as mission capabilities are concerned you want the asset that best helps you complete the mission objectives.