Thanks for the well-elaborated response.
To be clear, my query stemmed more from referencing the French Navy's own PANG programme, most notably of course is that the PANG will be a significantly larger hull than the CDG with over 75% projected increase in displacement to boot (75,000 tonnes vs 42,500 tonnes), which 004 will most certainly not have such huge mark up in tonnage over 003.
And yet with that in mind the MN still opted to retain the '2 + 2' config moving forward, even though the PANG is more than capable of hosting additional ones, certainly three cats instead of two at the very least.
The only sensible rationale I could discern, other than the always present cost considerations, is that the MN has found their current approach to carrier operations as reflected in the design and layout of current and future French CVNs the most optimised and ideal for their operational needs.
So I guess my bias is that while the USN has decided upon the '4 (cats) + 3 (elevators)' as some sort of a benchmark for optimal layout on an US Navy CVN of 100,000-tonne calibre, while keeping in mind the Americans themselves have also gone from decades of having 4 elevators in various sections of the deck/hull until they settled on the current config with the Nimitz class and now the Ford class, the question then becomes - is that already the 'most optimal' layout? Is there no room for improvement still? Of course not.
Absolutely, it certainly goes without saying that the configuration and fitout of a carrier (and indeed, any warship) is a reflection of the way in which a Navy seeks to operate it, as well as the overall funding available to a given navy and where they are willing to spend more money on and where they are willing to cut down on costs in exchange for meeting a given threshold of capbability.
The PANG as a 75,000 ton carrier with two catapults and two large elevators is a reflection of the MN's own requirements and funding availability.
I suppose the question you are basically asking in relation to 003 and a future 004 CVN, is where the 004's carrier uppermost bound of carrier flight deck operational flexibility and potential might be.
My answer, is that I do not believe that the PLAN would be willing to seriously mass produce a configuration of a carrier that is inferior to that of USN supercarriers.
I'm sure the PLAN has evaluated this extensively. The likelihood remains, like you said, such allowances/compromises are outweighed by the PLAN's desire to be more 'conservative' with how they run their carriers as reflected in 003's design.
The possibility also remains, not ruling out future iterations and refinements as the Chinese carrier programme continues to mature, as the USN has done so, it could just as well be that the doctrines developed from operating 001 + 002 for a combined period of 12 years now may end up being the best course for the PLAN to follow, as evidenced by 003's design, and possibly for future hulls as well, nuclear or otherwise, not for averting the risk of 'doing too much too fast', but that 'it's already sufficient'.
Operating 001 and 002 certainly would have benefitted PLAN requirements for their future carrier designs (and likely would've already informed their ongoing or what I suspect to be recently completed design work for the 004 CVN).
But, if you're suggesting 003's design benefitted from operating 001 and 002, that probably is not the case.
Liaoning was commissioned in 2012, Shandong was commissioned in 2019.
Initial steel cutting for 003 began in 2017 or slightly earlier from memory, meaning the overall design of the carrier would've been finalized a few years prior to it. It's possible that operation of CV-16 Liaoning between 2012 and 2016-15 over the course of four years had influenced 003's configuration somewhat.... though remember in the first few years, they were simply learning how to do the basics on Liaoning, and almost certainly hadn't raised their level of flight deck expertise to one where they were able to glean sufficient first hand experience to make many nuanced flight deck changes that they wouldn't have already known from years of studying foreign/USN flight decks.
However, I suspect that the design of 003 was probably finalized some years even earlier than that and was likely more informed by PLAN analysis of USN flight deck carrier activities with only minor changes made as informed by activities on Liaoning.
All of which is to say -- I suspect the PLAN already knows what kind of supercarrier it wants and what sort of flight deck and aviation facility fit out it wants, significantly informed by the USN as the world's leading power in carrier aviation, and it would not make sense for them to not pursue a minimum threshold capability that is appropriate for mass production.
It is "possible" that the PLAN would be okay with an inferior capability if they are limited by technology, money or otherwise -- however I find it very difficult to entertain the idea that they would be satisfied with a mass produced carrier configuration, that is deliberately inferior to a competing carrier configuration whose use has already been well proven by decades of service in the USN -- if they had the technology and the money and sufficient risk mitigation completed.
The 003 gets very close to approaching the "ideal carrier flight deck" configuration that can be presently attainable with contemporary technologies, and all on the PLAN's first try.
It is limited only by a few things, namely:
- island size/placement which is dependent on ship's conventional propulsion
- catapult count which is likely limited by power generation and flight deck size
- elevator count and catapult positioning which is limited by the ship's overall and flight deck length aka the ship's overall size
Considering how much else they got right with 003's flight deck configuration, for the life of me I cannot see why they wouldn't seek to iterate on the 003's configuration and tweak it in a notional 004 CVN, especially if the 004 becomes the design intended for mass production and given the lifespan for which carriers will operate for.