00X/004 future nuclear CATOBAR carrier thread
- Thread starter AETHER
- Start date
This took me some time to find. So it's a part of the shipyard that's on the other side of the Dalian bay completely. Seems to have started construction in late 2000s, then built commercial ships for a decade and then had a large expansion of roofed halls around 2020, after which destroyers were often observed in the docks. Possibly for maintenance or furbishing?
Quite possible that large dock will be making a carrier. Interesting times. That'd make the 3rd separate dry dock in China where carriers have been/will be made. 4th if one counts the dry dock that had the 076 assembled.
Quite possible that large dock will be making a carrier. Interesting times. That'd make the 3rd separate dry dock in China where carriers have been/will be made. 4th if one counts the dry dock that had the 076 assembled.
Its Dagushan shipyard. We've discussed it here on and off. Dagushan has assembled the first second batch 055 in Dalian and is now in the process of building one more 055 plus apparently two 052D. "ACuriousPLAFan" also discussed this picture in page 663 of the PLAN News thread.
Bot Verification gives insight to China's proposed CVN 004, thnaks bro
Lethe
Captain
On the subject of notional carriers measurably larger than CVN-78.
At the layperson's level, there is a tendency to anchor our expectations as to what is practical, possible or desirable in the context of what the United States has or hasn't done, is or isn't pursuing. This approach has its limitations (I will discuss one in more detail below) and can often mislead as much as it informs -- I'm sure we can all think of examples -- but it nonetheless serves as a useful starting point, as it has for thinking about China's carrier program. The alternative to such reasoning by analogy is to work up from first principles, beginning with Hobbes, Clausewitz and Mahan and ending in the intricate expressions of assorted advanced engineering disciplines: in other words, the @MarKoz81 method.
I understand the frustration some have with talk of a notional Chinese carrier that is measurably larger than the benchmark established by CVN-78. In a world where PLAN has yet to commission even CV-18, such notions can seem entirely fantastical and divorced from reality. If PLAN is only now entering the "walk" phase of a crawl-walk-run cycle of doctrinal, institutional, and engineering development, it seems rather premature to speak of setting a new marathon record.
Yet I think it is both to be expected and appropriate that recent developments have prompted renewed speculation in this area. J-36 is such an exciting development in part because it lacks clear analogues amongst the current and historical inventories of other nations. J-20 broadly fits within the paradigm established by the ATF and PAK FA programs, H-20 broadly fits within the ATB paradigm, 055 fits within the Burke paradigm, etc. J-36 gestures to the prospect of China's world-class engineering expertise, increasingly well-oxygenated with robust funding, leading to unique solutions befitting unique operational requirements borne of unique geostrategic circumstances. J-36 is the kind of development I had in mind in creating thread some twelve years ago. It's only to be expected that such paradigm-shifting developments encourage folks to wonder what other paradigms might be shifted going forward, even if some of those takes are implausibly ambitious.
Yet if it is to be expected that the public debut of J-36 (and less-clearly defined SAC projects) would occasion increased speculation about a variety of matters, including the size of future aircraft carriers, I also think it is, at least to some extent, appropriate. In the American context, the case for aircraft carriers measurably larger than Nimitz/Ford appears to rest on a handful of principles and objectives. The basic principle is a further extension of the justification for the supercarrier in the first place: that the capabilities enabled by additional volume scale above the costs of providing it, such that a larger carrier is also a more efficient carrier. This is the argument that is used to sink proposals for even modestly smaller carriers in the QE/Fujian range, specifically in the context of sustained sortie rates, magazine size, fuel and other consumables. Indeed, I think one could flip the observation that the United States has apparently settled on the size of its carriers on its head, to observe that USN has fought off several successive waves of pressure (most notably in the post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, and post-GWOT periods) to consider smaller carriers while incrementally increasing the displacement of its carriers over the course of the Nimitz-class and now onto the Ford-class. Far from being settled, USN appears determined to field the largest carriers that can plausibly be fit within the funding envelope.
The specific characteristics and objectives typically associated with proposals for carriers measurably larger than today's CVN-78 include: increased size of the air wing, improved flexibility in spotting and movement of aircraft on both flight and hangar decks, increased maintenance facilities with increased parts inventories, all contributing to enable superior sustained sortie rates. Increased magazine size, fuel and other consumables storage that collectively enable independent operations to be sustained for greater periods of time. Increased survivability in the form of particularly passive protection measures (armour, spacing, redundancy) is also cited, as with an increased ability to adapt to new technologies and requirements emerging over the lifecycle of the ship.
I think most of these arguments for the greater capability and efficiency of even larger supercarriers are offset quite persuasively by the tyranny of numbers that dominates particularly naval matters, as expressed in the rule of thumb that three ships are required to maintain even one on deployment. If a given construction/operations budget can accommodate three 140k tonne carriers or four 100k tonne carriers, even if the 140k tonne carriers are significantly more capable both individually and collectively, there are many circumstances in both peace and war where the value of having that additional smaller carrier hull outweighs the capability that was foregone. Meanwhile, those circumstances that call for greatest mass can addressed, even if somewhat inefficiently, by larger numbers of smaller carriers with extensive support assets. A hypothetical pair of 200k tonne hypercarriers deployed to the Persian Gulf for Desert Storm in 1991 might have pantsed the collection of (mostly conventional...) smaller carriers that actually participated in that campaign in terms of number of sorties, targets struck, tonnes of munitions delivered, etc. but is that actually a better fleet architecture across the full range of possible conflict scenarios? Probably not. Other credible objections include dimensional limits imposed by both construction and port facilities, and the observation that the size of the carrier air wing has actually shrunk in recent decades in a trend that shows no sign of being reversed.
Yet there is one attribute associated with notional larger carriers that I think is not so easily dispensed with, and that is the ability to operate aircraft larger than can be accommodated within the dimensional limits of the Nimitz/Ford flight deck. The size of an aircraft has a broad relationship to the combinations of range and payload that can be achieved. For an aircraft carrier, operating larger aircraft directly increases both the offensive and defensive footprint (radius of action) of the aircraft carrier, and thereby has significant implications for both the efficacy and survivability of any battle group centred on the carrier. A carrier with larger aircraft is a carrier that can engage a greater range of targets, with more flexible mission profiles and routes of approach, while simultaneously being more difficult for hostile forces to detect, track and engage. Limits to the size and weight of aircraft that can be supported are a function of many factors and implicate the design of the aircraft as much as the carrier, yet the length of the flight deck, and the performance of both catapult and arrestor systems, appear to impose fundamental limits in this regard. I refer again to 1991 study, which considered options available to support notional future aircraft larger than could be operated from Nimitz.
Of course one might reasonably observe that the United States has not actually developed any such aircraft. If the reader will forgive a slight digression: one of the issues with reasoning from the American hegemon in relation to China is that US forces as we see them today are, to a disproportionate extent, the product of decisions made in the 1990s and 2000s, reflecting the geopolitical circumstances, constraints, requirements and ideologies of those times. That is to say, US forces as we see them today are the product of circumstances highly dissimilar to those that China confronts both today and going forward. Hence my repeated contention that, while allowing for the implications of technological change, the United States' experience in the late Cold War period is often more usefully instructive than its more recent history. That the United States did not actually pursue larger aircraft operating from larger carriers in the post-Cold War period is therefore not particularly persuasive as to the merits of such notions. Rather, USN was forced to embark upon a radical diet and yet purposefully ringfenced the supercarrier from that diet, even as the air wings that operated from them dwindled. In a world where A-12, NATF and A/F-X died on cost grounds and the Common Support Aircraft program was kicked repeatedly down the road, I think it is reasonable to conclude that the prospects for both larger carriers and larger aircraft to operate from them were foreclosed by firm budgetary limitations (and the lack of a credible threat to address such efforts towards) rather than a reflecting a considered judgement as to the utility and practicality of such ships and aircraft in the context of a high-end threat that no longer existed. Indeed, among the target characteristics cited for EMALS and AAG is the ability to launch and recover aircraft heavier than those that currently exist (i.e. heavier than the F-14), which again points to a perceived utility in being able to accommodate such aircraft and maximising the potential to do so within the current dimensional footprint.
All of which is to say that I don't think the prospect of a future Chinese carrier larger than Nimitz/Ford is an absurdity to be dismissed out of hand, which is not to say that there is much we can actually do with the idea at this point.
At the layperson's level, there is a tendency to anchor our expectations as to what is practical, possible or desirable in the context of what the United States has or hasn't done, is or isn't pursuing. This approach has its limitations (I will discuss one in more detail below) and can often mislead as much as it informs -- I'm sure we can all think of examples -- but it nonetheless serves as a useful starting point, as it has for thinking about China's carrier program. The alternative to such reasoning by analogy is to work up from first principles, beginning with Hobbes, Clausewitz and Mahan and ending in the intricate expressions of assorted advanced engineering disciplines: in other words, the @MarKoz81 method.
I understand the frustration some have with talk of a notional Chinese carrier that is measurably larger than the benchmark established by CVN-78. In a world where PLAN has yet to commission even CV-18, such notions can seem entirely fantastical and divorced from reality. If PLAN is only now entering the "walk" phase of a crawl-walk-run cycle of doctrinal, institutional, and engineering development, it seems rather premature to speak of setting a new marathon record.
Yet I think it is both to be expected and appropriate that recent developments have prompted renewed speculation in this area. J-36 is such an exciting development in part because it lacks clear analogues amongst the current and historical inventories of other nations. J-20 broadly fits within the paradigm established by the ATF and PAK FA programs, H-20 broadly fits within the ATB paradigm, 055 fits within the Burke paradigm, etc. J-36 gestures to the prospect of China's world-class engineering expertise, increasingly well-oxygenated with robust funding, leading to unique solutions befitting unique operational requirements borne of unique geostrategic circumstances. J-36 is the kind of development I had in mind in creating thread some twelve years ago. It's only to be expected that such paradigm-shifting developments encourage folks to wonder what other paradigms might be shifted going forward, even if some of those takes are implausibly ambitious.
Yet if it is to be expected that the public debut of J-36 (and less-clearly defined SAC projects) would occasion increased speculation about a variety of matters, including the size of future aircraft carriers, I also think it is, at least to some extent, appropriate. In the American context, the case for aircraft carriers measurably larger than Nimitz/Ford appears to rest on a handful of principles and objectives. The basic principle is a further extension of the justification for the supercarrier in the first place: that the capabilities enabled by additional volume scale above the costs of providing it, such that a larger carrier is also a more efficient carrier. This is the argument that is used to sink proposals for even modestly smaller carriers in the QE/Fujian range, specifically in the context of sustained sortie rates, magazine size, fuel and other consumables. Indeed, I think one could flip the observation that the United States has apparently settled on the size of its carriers on its head, to observe that USN has fought off several successive waves of pressure (most notably in the post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, and post-GWOT periods) to consider smaller carriers while incrementally increasing the displacement of its carriers over the course of the Nimitz-class and now onto the Ford-class. Far from being settled, USN appears determined to field the largest carriers that can plausibly be fit within the funding envelope.
The specific characteristics and objectives typically associated with proposals for carriers measurably larger than today's CVN-78 include: increased size of the air wing, improved flexibility in spotting and movement of aircraft on both flight and hangar decks, increased maintenance facilities with increased parts inventories, all contributing to enable superior sustained sortie rates. Increased magazine size, fuel and other consumables storage that collectively enable independent operations to be sustained for greater periods of time. Increased survivability in the form of particularly passive protection measures (armour, spacing, redundancy) is also cited, as with an increased ability to adapt to new technologies and requirements emerging over the lifecycle of the ship.
I think most of these arguments for the greater capability and efficiency of even larger supercarriers are offset quite persuasively by the tyranny of numbers that dominates particularly naval matters, as expressed in the rule of thumb that three ships are required to maintain even one on deployment. If a given construction/operations budget can accommodate three 140k tonne carriers or four 100k tonne carriers, even if the 140k tonne carriers are significantly more capable both individually and collectively, there are many circumstances in both peace and war where the value of having that additional smaller carrier hull outweighs the capability that was foregone. Meanwhile, those circumstances that call for greatest mass can addressed, even if somewhat inefficiently, by larger numbers of smaller carriers with extensive support assets. A hypothetical pair of 200k tonne hypercarriers deployed to the Persian Gulf for Desert Storm in 1991 might have pantsed the collection of (mostly conventional...) smaller carriers that actually participated in that campaign in terms of number of sorties, targets struck, tonnes of munitions delivered, etc. but is that actually a better fleet architecture across the full range of possible conflict scenarios? Probably not. Other credible objections include dimensional limits imposed by both construction and port facilities, and the observation that the size of the carrier air wing has actually shrunk in recent decades in a trend that shows no sign of being reversed.
Yet there is one attribute associated with notional larger carriers that I think is not so easily dispensed with, and that is the ability to operate aircraft larger than can be accommodated within the dimensional limits of the Nimitz/Ford flight deck. The size of an aircraft has a broad relationship to the combinations of range and payload that can be achieved. For an aircraft carrier, operating larger aircraft directly increases both the offensive and defensive footprint (radius of action) of the aircraft carrier, and thereby has significant implications for both the efficacy and survivability of any battle group centred on the carrier. A carrier with larger aircraft is a carrier that can engage a greater range of targets, with more flexible mission profiles and routes of approach, while simultaneously being more difficult for hostile forces to detect, track and engage. Limits to the size and weight of aircraft that can be supported are a function of many factors and implicate the design of the aircraft as much as the carrier, yet the length of the flight deck, and the performance of both catapult and arrestor systems, appear to impose fundamental limits in this regard. I refer again to 1991 study, which considered options available to support notional future aircraft larger than could be operated from Nimitz.
Of course one might reasonably observe that the United States has not actually developed any such aircraft. If the reader will forgive a slight digression: one of the issues with reasoning from the American hegemon in relation to China is that US forces as we see them today are, to a disproportionate extent, the product of decisions made in the 1990s and 2000s, reflecting the geopolitical circumstances, constraints, requirements and ideologies of those times. That is to say, US forces as we see them today are the product of circumstances highly dissimilar to those that China confronts both today and going forward. Hence my repeated contention that, while allowing for the implications of technological change, the United States' experience in the late Cold War period is often more usefully instructive than its more recent history. That the United States did not actually pursue larger aircraft operating from larger carriers in the post-Cold War period is therefore not particularly persuasive as to the merits of such notions. Rather, USN was forced to embark upon a radical diet and yet purposefully ringfenced the supercarrier from that diet, even as the air wings that operated from them dwindled. In a world where A-12, NATF and A/F-X died on cost grounds and the Common Support Aircraft program was kicked repeatedly down the road, I think it is reasonable to conclude that the prospects for both larger carriers and larger aircraft to operate from them were foreclosed by firm budgetary limitations (and the lack of a credible threat to address such efforts towards) rather than a reflecting a considered judgement as to the utility and practicality of such ships and aircraft in the context of a high-end threat that no longer existed. Indeed, among the target characteristics cited for EMALS and AAG is the ability to launch and recover aircraft heavier than those that currently exist (i.e. heavier than the F-14), which again points to a perceived utility in being able to accommodate such aircraft and maximising the potential to do so within the current dimensional footprint.
All of which is to say that I don't think the prospect of a future Chinese carrier larger than Nimitz/Ford is an absurdity to be dismissed out of hand, which is not to say that there is much we can actually do with the idea at this point.
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One of the limitations for a larger carrier is the draft. The Nimitz class has a draft of 11m which will barely pass through the port of New Port News at 12 m. On the other hand, the Chinese have many ports that are 20 m deep, which could easily accommodate larger carriers. If the Chinese need to use ports outside China, it would also matter where these carriers can dock worldwide. I agree that given the J-50 seems as big as the J-20 and is likely the sixth gen carrier borne aircraft, it makes a lot of sense for them to plan a much bigger carrier in the same timeframe where J-50 will be inducted. Assume that time is 2032, we should see the start of this type of carrier at 2028 timeframe.
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Draft again is an issue primarily for naval ports, not commercial ones, when it comes to operating aircraft carriers. Commercial ports always meet and exceed any naval combatant requirements for size, same as drydocks do, because compared to commercial ships even supercarriers remain modestly sized incl draft.
So if China is going to build a massively larger new carrier, they either need to dredge all the relevant ports (and keep dredging them) or limit it to certain infrastructure.
Despite suggestions to the contrary none of this is as straightforward as sometimes made out in online discussions. But as we now I think noted repeatedly, its all guesses and personal preferences. We'll find out "soon enough".
So if China is going to build a massively larger new carrier, they either need to dredge all the relevant ports (and keep dredging them) or limit it to certain infrastructure.
Despite suggestions to the contrary none of this is as straightforward as sometimes made out in online discussions. But as we now I think noted repeatedly, its all guesses and personal preferences. We'll find out "soon enough".
That was the issue. The U.S. did not have any commercial shipyards, only a couple of naval ones that could make carriers. The Chinese do have a thriving civilian ship building industry. The Jiangnan shipyard, for example, can build ships as big as 33 meters of draft. They also are tasked with building military ships. Since they are dual use, they don't need to dredge the port.
Honestly, with all the talks on the prospect of China's future CVNs being larger than the Ford CVNs (let's stick to by 10000-20000 tons to stay on the reasonable and realistic side of things) - That's going to make even less sense to power them with only conventional propulsion system. Think about the number of massive-size gas turbine engines and amount of fuel storage spaces required to propel such a 100+ thousand-ton behemoth through what is essentially liquid concrete. This hasn't yet include how the exhaust systems would eat into the flight deck and hangar deck spaces, which directly impacts the number of warplanes that can be carried onboard (which leads to affecting the combat capabilities of said supercarrier as a whole) - Alongside how this affects the replenishment and resupply of ship and aviation fuel across not just the supercarrier itself, but across the entire carrier strike/battle group and the navy as a whole.
The PLAN obviously disagrees with the notion of procuring a majority-conventionally-powered carrier fleet into the future, given the ongoing developments on large-power nuclear propulsion systems. If they're just going to put more focus on conventional-powered supercarriers after CVN-20, then why bother with building all those land-based nuclear propulsion testing, validation and training facilities?
In the meantime, what the Americans and French have been doing and are currently doing with their CVNs shouldn't be directly copy-and-pasted onto what China would be doing with her future CVNs, either. Comparing and contrasting between the two extremes, China could very well formulate her own path in the CVN domain that is laid along the middle ground between the CVNs of the USN and French Navy, whilst getting the best possible out of said middle ground.
(As a side note: I do support having conventionally-powered carriers in the PLAN as well. However, the positions and roles that these carriers hold in the PLAN should be very different than their larger supercarrier counterparts.)
The PLAN obviously disagrees with the notion of procuring a majority-conventionally-powered carrier fleet into the future, given the ongoing developments on large-power nuclear propulsion systems. If they're just going to put more focus on conventional-powered supercarriers after CVN-20, then why bother with building all those land-based nuclear propulsion testing, validation and training facilities?
In the meantime, what the Americans and French have been doing and are currently doing with their CVNs shouldn't be directly copy-and-pasted onto what China would be doing with her future CVNs, either. Comparing and contrasting between the two extremes, China could very well formulate her own path in the CVN domain that is laid along the middle ground between the CVNs of the USN and French Navy, whilst getting the best possible out of said middle ground.
(As a side note: I do support having conventionally-powered carriers in the PLAN as well. However, the positions and roles that these carriers hold in the PLAN should be very different than their larger supercarrier counterparts.)
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