South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

[Blackstone]

As expected, Obama and Abe failed to strong-arm the rest of the G-7 to take sides against China in ECS and SCS disputes. Where's Senator "bomb everyone" McCain when you need him? Frankly, I was expecting more backbone from the Europeans, but I guess after China gave Britain the deep freeze treatment for hosting the Dali Lama, no one else want any of that.

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Group of Seven leaders will express their concern over any unilateral action to change the status quo in the East and South

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Seas amid tensions between China and a number of Asian countries, Japan's Yomiuri newspaper said on Saturday.

At the end of the summit in Germany, which starts on Sunday, members will release a declaration calling for maintaining an international order of seas based on international law, the report said, without citing sources. No country will be singled out.

G7 leaders a year ago expressed their concern about tensions between China and a number of other Asian countries over resources in the East and South China Seas, and warned against any use of force.

China claims most of the South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year. The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam also have overlapping claims.

All but Brunei have fortified bases in the disputed waters, which are roughly 1,300 km (800 miles) from the Chinese mainland but much closer to the Southeast Asian claimants.

Japan also has a territorial row with China over islands in the East China Sea.

China has been criticized for extensive reclamation work and moves to turn submerged rocks into man-made structures. The United States last week said Beijing had placed mobile artillery systems in contested territory.

 

[Blackstone]

So, who knifed Medeiros and why?

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President Obama's top adviser on Asia policy is leaving his post at a time of growing uncertainty over China's assertive behavior in the region, raising questions over the administration's strategy ahead of a high-stakes visit from President Xi Jinping in the fall.

Evan Medeiros, a China expert who has worked at the National Security Council during all of Obama's tenure, will step down as the agency's Asia director on Thursday, officials said. He will be replaced by Daniel Kritenbrink, the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.

White House officials said the personnel change did not portend any shift in U.S. policy toward China. Foreign policy experts in Washington who know Medeiros described his departure as a personal decision after a long run at the NSC, where officials work long hours under high-pressure situations.

"Among the allies, Evan got high marks for his strategic approach," said Michael Green, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who served as Asia director under President George W. Bush. "There's a logic to him leaving on his own terms."

In a statement, NSC spokesman Alistair Baskey called Medeiros "a key architect of the president's Asia rebalance strategy, and especially toward China. He helped restructure the content and operation of our China policy in ways that shaped China's choices as a rising power."

Mederios has described the administration's strategy in dealing with Beijing as one of managing differences and accentuating areas of mutual interest. Last fall, Obama and Xi struck a major climate accord to reduce carbon admissions, which Obama has called an important step toward a larger, global climate deal that could be reached by the end of the year.

But since then, relations between China and the United States have grown increasingly strained. China has ramped up maritime operations in the South China Sea, a crucial shipping lane for many Asian nations, angering its neighbors and U.S. military leaders. Two weeks ago, the Chinese navy repeatedly warned a U.S. surveillance plane to leave airspace near a series of disputed islands.

Meanwhile, anti-China rhetoric has increased on Capitol Hill, as lawmakers weigh Obama's push for the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership, a sweeping free trade and regulatory pact. Obama has described the TPP, which does not include China, as a way to ensure the United States crafts economic rules in fast-growing markets in Asia.

Foreign policy experts in Washington have begun calling on the Obama administration to adopt a tougher security stance on Beijing. Secretary of State John F. Kerry and Defense Secretary Ashton Carter have both warned Beijing in recent weeks to back off its military operations in the South China Sea.

The Obama administration had attempted to curry a better relationship with Xi after a rocky start with his predecessor, Hu Jintao, during Obama's first term. Xi will arrive in Washington for his first state visit in September, and some analysts said Medeiros's departure means there is unlikely to be a major diplomatic breakthrough.

Others described National Security Adviser Susan Rice as being too consumed by problems in other parts in the world--including a pending nuclear deal with Iran, Israeli-Palestinian relations, the U.S. effort to combat the Islamic State militant group, and the security situation in Ukraine--to focus on China.

Medeiros served as the NSC's China director before taking over as Asia director when Danny Russel moved from the White House to become the assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs in 2013.

Kritenbrink, who has been at the embassy since 2013, also has a deep background in China at the State Department and he has also served in Japan. He speaks Mandarin and Japanese. His first big test will be the visit to the White House of South Korean President Park Geun-hye in two weeks.

 

[Equation]

So, who knifed Medeiros and why?

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Because the administration "Asia Pivot" thing is not working as plan of course.

 

[PanAsian]

Because the administration "Asia Pivot" thing is not working as plan of course.

Sounds like the new guy knows what he is doing. Job #1 is to align S Korea against China even if it cannot be aligned with Japan, or vice versa.

 

[Blackstone]

Sounds like the new guy knows what he is doing. Job #1 is to align S Korea against China even if it cannot be aligned with Japan, or vice versa.

I saw a lecture by John Mearshermer

Sounds like the new guy knows what he is doing. Job #1 is to align S Korea against China even if it cannot be aligned with Japan, or vice versa.

I saw a lecture by John Mearsheimer (International Relations expert, Univ. of Chicago) on international relations, and rule number one was set achieve goals, because pursuing unobtainable ones often do more harm than good. Aligning ROK against China for any sin other than encouraging DPRK to attack South Korea is probably one of those unobtainable goals, because ROK has much more to gain from friendly relations with Beijing.

 

[Blackstone]

Once in a while Forbes has some reasonable pieces.

You wouldn't know it with Gordon Chang's hatchet job in Forbes today.

 

[PanAsian]

I saw a lecture by John Mearshermer

I saw a lecture by John Mearsheimer (International Relations expert, Univ. of Chicago) on international relations, and rule number one was set achieve goals, because pursuing unobtainable ones often do more harm than good. Aligning ROK against China for any sin other than encouraging DPRK to attack South Korea is probably one of those unobtainable goals, because ROK has much more to gain from friendly relations with Beijing.

Then perhaps the ROK should be more vocal and proactive a la Singapore encouraging all parties to figure out a more co-operative way to do things. While Abe's Japan eggs on the US and China towards conflict perhaps the ROK can egg on those two towards co-operation.

 

[Blackstone]

Looks like Australia is having national debates on its position in the G-Zero world, and the notion it might have to make some unpalatable choices in the near future.

For Australia, era of tough choices dawns

On 15 May, the day I arrived in Australia to begin work at the Lowy Institute, Prime Minister Tony Abbott was

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. The spark was the apparent revelation by US Assistant Secretary of Defense David Shear that US B-1 bombers and surveillance aircraft were to be based on Australian soil; Shear had apparently framed this decision around China's behaviour in the South China Sea.

Mr Shear's 'mis-spoken' testimony to a Senate Committee was quickly retracted and the

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contains no reference to specific US aircraft in Australia, only to 'enhanced access for US forces'.

That the Prime Minister felt compelled to intervene on such a detail struck me then as an interesting straw in the wind. Yet, delivered from the incongruous surrounds of a pre-school sandpit in Sydney, it hardly felt like an inflection point in the ANZUS alliance. Now I'm beginning to wonder, at least when it comes to the public debate.

Within three short weeks of that fleeting controversy, as Australian policymakers have mulled over whether to support the US in asserting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, a veritable sceptics chorus (eg.

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,

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and

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) has cautioned from the sidelines against active Australian involvement there.

This 'heated' public discourse has

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and reveals how quickly polarised the debate has become here as the US-China strategic dynamic weighs more specifically over the defence and security policy choices confronting Canberra.

I still think that framing the US-China relationship as an exclusive choice, while a useful proposition for stirring debate within Australia, presents a false binary. In regard to the South China Sea, I've

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that Canberra can and should aim to chart a course between avoiding tokenism within the alliance without being unduly provocative to China.

Cleaving a distinctively Australian middle road through these tricky Southeast Asian shoals could be enabled by the Five Power Defence Arrangements, a useful sub-treaty multilateral framework, though one so low-key and testosterone-lite that it is sometimes

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.

Nonetheless, both the B-1 bomber media furore and the ongoing 'freedom of navigation' debate in the South China Sea have between them demonstrated that Australia is now entering an era of more difficult choices, buffeted by the increasingly inclement Sino-US strategic weather. Opinion on the alliance with the US is arguably starting to divide more significantly than at any time since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

If first impressions are anything to go by, beyond the threats posed by terrorism and radicalisation, Australia's debate on defence and security is still mainly an elite affair. However, that is likely to change as the challenges of US-China strategic competition become less abstract and more concrete. As this happens, establishing a viable centre ground in the debate around alliance issues will become more important, politically. In the dawning era of more awkward alliance choices, that middle ground is beginning to look a little uncertain.

 

[Blackstone]

Here's the G-7 Mutual Admiration Society's fluff on maritime security. Read it if you have insomnia.

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[Brumby]

Looks like Australia is having national debates on its position in the G-Zero world, and the notion it might have to make some unpalatable choices in the near future.

In a democratic society like Australia, there are always competing ideas where voices from different side of the spectrum will surface. Having the appropriate debate is in my view healthy. The converse would be dereliction.

Australia has always maintained a rather neutral view and purposely avoided having to take sides. This in my view had been predicated upon a narrative of a peaceful rise of China. Unfortunately events in the SCS in recent years had undermined that narrative and consequently the implications of a changing narrative as it drives security policies will need to be re-examined. This is simply reality that every nation will undertake in light of a changing environment. Australia is in certain alliance because of shared values within that alliance and that includes freedom and respect for the rule of law. When those principles are being challenged then the issues are simply more than economic choices even though it is a very important component of that consideration. Should the situation continues to deteriorate than hard choices will have to be made. I don't think that is avoidable no matter how unpalatable it may be. In a democratic society, the people will have to decide and the government on the wrong side of the equation will be voted out.

In the interim, the first observable evidence of any shift in security policies would in my view be incorporated in the White paper which is due sometime in August.