AUKUS News, Views, Analysis.

[Lethe]

Maybe Aussies should first answer the question who you consider to be your enemies, why they are your enemies and how you plan to fight them.

It's not that these questions don't have answers, but that different folks have different perspectives. AUKUS is the product of a specific worldview that entails a particular set of commitments. Most critics of AUKUS, including myself, tend to hold at least incrementally and often significantly different worldviews that entail rather different commitments. AUKUS was a particularly bold venture from one faction of Australia's political establishment. In all likelihood, a Labor government would not have come to the idea of AUKUS by itself. Nor would a more moderate Liberal government have pursued it. But having been presented with AUKUS as a fait accompli, that same Labor ambivalence now works to ensure its continuation, because the costs of change are so great and hearts so timid. In the absence of political vision, we are now firmly in the hands of practical delivery. Having been failed by Albanese, Marles, Trump, Colby, et al. critics of AUKUS are left to hope that it simply proves unviable on its own terms and collapses under its own weight, preferably without destroying our force structure and national sovereignty in the process. Hence my attention to the details of Virginia-class production schedules.

The aforementioned divergence in perspectives is captured by the following two quotes:

"The only way we can remain strategically relevant in highly contested circumstances is if we have the ability to launch cruise missiles over long distances." --

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"... like throwing toothpicks at a mountain." --

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[vincent]

It's not that these questions don't have answers, but that different folks have different perspectives. AUKUS is the product of a specific worldview that entails a particular set of commitments.

“Different perspectives”. Are you sure those perspectives are correct?

What are you trying to achieve with those SSNs? Interfere with China’s civil war? Why would you want to do that? How will that benefits you?

 

[Blitzo]

“Different perspectives”. Are you sure those perspectives are correct?

What are you trying to achieve with those SSNs? Interfere with China’s civil war? Why would you want to do that? How will that benefits you?

I'm not sure why you're asking these questions to Lethe as if he is the one making the decisions.

Also, I'm not sure why you're asking the questions to begin with when it's so obvious what the thinking behind AUKUS and having SSNs are from the people who support their procurement. The obvious thinking includes (not exhaustive):

- ability to allow basing of US and UK SSNs in Australia, thus tying them more to Australia overall's status as a "continent sized base" that could be utilized during a war involving China

- following from the above, it achieves a "fait accompli" of making Australia a party to any conflict that the US fights with the PRC by acting as a de-facto US air and naval base, thus automatically integrating Australia's fate to that of the outcome of a US-PRC conflict

- the SSNs themselves is part of Australia's preference to contribute to an "expeditionary fight" where they prefer to contribute to a battle (alongside the US, Japan, UK maybe etc) where PRC/PLA forces are bottled up and contained within the first island chain, which requires a relatively long distance/long endurance asset that can conduct not only conventional anti-shipping missions but also contribute to a degree of strike missions (even if it would only be a fraction of the fires that the US can bring to bear)

- underlying all of this, is an unspoken but so neon-blazingly obvious belief from Australia that they do not think they can exist as a nation where China is the predominant geopolitical power in the western pacific, and wants the terms of peace to be such that Australia's security is essentially dependent on the US being able to contain and subdue PRC military power during times of peace ---- or that Australia must contribute as much as possible to a US-PRC war on the US side because they cannot visualize a state of being where the US loses a conflict. That is to say, Australia would rather bet all of its geopolitical future on the US balancing against the PRC (in peacetime) or prevailing against the PRC (in wartime), than accept the idea of any sort of existence where the PRC has the most power in the region.



Given Australia's history (as a colonial entity, then during WWI-WWII, then post WWII/cold war, then post cold war), it should not be a surprise that Australia is absolutely terrified of existing in a region where they are subject to the geopolitical influence of a "foreign" and "non-familiar" nation, and would be willing to chance its fate to avoid such an outcome.
In fact, one could say that the immediate post-Cold War environment was a geopolitical paradise for Australia, that brief decade or so where there was no credible challenger to US military power in the region, where Australia itself had military capabilities that exceeded most other nations in the region (the F-111s were potent regional strike aircraft, and the RAN was of moderate size but comprehensive). It is no surprise Australia would want to reverse the clock as much as possible to that sort of geopolitical state.

Whether it is "correct" doesn't really matter.
All that matters is whether it is understandable from their perspective -- and in this case it is absolutely understandable.

 

[Lethe]

“Different perspectives”. Are you sure those perspectives are correct?

What are you trying to achieve with those SSNs? Interfere with China’s civil war? Why would you want to do that? How will that benefits you?

I don't understand what you're driving at by asking these questions that have readily apparent answers. AUKUS is the product of a perspective that is widely held within the political and security establishments that believes Australia needs to prepare its forces and position itself to deter and, if necessary, go to war against the People's Republic of China, most plausibly in support of the United States choosing to do so in response to various regional contingencies, including Taiwan scenarios.

The primary strategic impetus is to ensure that the United States remains deeply engaged so that it continues to serve as the major bulwark against the potentially limitless predations of the PRC. For those who hold this perspective, the outcome to be avoided at all costs is not war with China, but the withdrawal of America's strategic commitment to the region, or at least to Australia. Accordingly, Australia must demonstrate its value as an ally for Washington by providing supporting infrastructure for the operation of American bombers, submarines and soldiers, integrating our training and operations concepts with those of America's armed forces, and by acquiring platforms that support American warfighting doctrines. In the context of AUKUS, the perceived requirement is to have submarines that can range north into the South China Sea and hold Chinese assets at risk, including on the mainland. This perspective is also where Paterson's recent suggestion of B-21 Raider as a hedge against difficulties with AUKUS comes from.

I happen to regard this perspective as misguided in most of its fundamentals and profoundly dangerous and potentially catastrophic for my nation. I think one can plausibly argue that this perspective, at least in its more fundamentalist varieties, emerges from a racially charged worldview that is incapable of regarding the decline of western hegemony with equanimity and adapting accordingly. But that doesn't relieve one of the obligation of engaging with the world as it is, and not as we would like it to be. AUKUS exists and so must be addressed at least in part on its own practical merits, not least of all because it is by those that it will succeed or fail. There are many who are not "true believers" in the perspective I have outlined above, but most of them do not possess the kind of political vision and commitment to row against inertia and institutional opposition to articulate and pursue an alternative. I believe this describes much of the Labor party. Nonetheless, true believers like former Opposition Leader Peter Dutton clearly do not perceive that there is bipartisan unity on AUKUS, which is why he previously accused Labor of "crab-walking" away from it. I only wish that were true, because it is about the best one can reasonably hope for.

In retrospect, Malcolm Turnbull's term of office and fate was Australia's "sliding doors" moment. It was his selection of a French submarine that raised the vague prospect of Australia seeking a strategic future outside the US-China dichotomy and, as Andrew Fowler describes in Nuked, reactionary forces mobilised against it from Day 1. Regrettably, they were successful.

 

[vincent]

I'm not sure why you're asking these questions to Lethe as if he is the one making the decisions.

Also, I'm not sure why you're asking the questions to begin with when it's so obvious what the thinking behind AUKUS and having SSNs are from the people who support their procurement. The obvious thinking includes (not exhaustive):

- ability to allow basing of US and UK SSNs in Australia, thus tying them more to Australia overall's status as a "continent sized base" that could be utilized during a war involving China

- following from the above, it achieves a "fait accompli" of making Australia a party to any conflict that the US fights with the PRC by acting as a de-facto US air and naval base, thus automatically integrating Australia's fate to that of the outcome of a US-PRC conflict

- the SSNs themselves is part of Australia's preference to contribute to an "expeditionary fight" where they prefer to contribute to a battle (alongside the US, Japan, UK maybe etc) where PRC/PLA forces are bottled up and contained within the first island chain, which requires a relatively long distance/long endurance asset that can conduct not only conventional anti-shipping missions but also contribute to a degree of strike missions (even if it would only be a fraction of the fires that the US can bring to bear)

- underlying all of this, is an unspoken but so neon-blazingly obvious belief from Australia that they do not think they can exist as a nation where China is the predominant geopolitical power in the western pacific, and wants the terms of peace to be such that Australia's security is essentially dependent on the US being able to contain and subdue PRC military power during times of peace ---- or that Australia must contribute as much as possible to a US-PRC war on the US side because they cannot visualize a state of being where the US loses a conflict. That is to say, Australia would rather bet all of its geopolitical future on the US balancing against the PRC (in peacetime) or prevailing against the PRC (in wartime), than accept the idea of any sort of existence where the PRC has the most power in the region.



Given Australia's history (as a colonial entity, then during WWI-WWII, then post WWII/cold war, then post cold war), it should not be a surprise that Australia is absolutely terrified of existing in a region where they are subject to the geopolitical influence of a "foreign" and "non-familiar" nation, and would be willing to chance its fate to avoid such an outcome.
In fact, one could say that the immediate post-Cold War environment was a geopolitical paradise! for Australia, that brief decade or so where there was no credible challenger to US military power in the region, where Australia itself had military capabilities that exceeded most other nations in the region (the F-111s were potent regional strike aircraft, and the RAN was of moderate size but comprehensive). It is no surprise Australia would want to reverse the clock as much as possible to that sort of geopolitical state.

Whether it is "correct" doesn't really matter.
All that matters is whether it is understandable from their perspective -- and in this case it is absolutely understandable.

I’m just asking for an Aussie’s opinion on this, not expected to change anything Downunder. It is his tax dollars at work.

 

[Halcyon66]

Australians have little control over the govt spending (doesn't matter which party is in), as above the US is just using us and every other country that has allowed then to operate a forward base in those countries.

Our military procurement after WW2 has been one disaster after another. Add to that a revolving door of imbecilic defence ministers that get shown something shiny and want it has not helped the situation.

Australia is in Asia, not The Americas. And the only time we have issues with China is when the US pushes their interests in the region and we have to follow. I find it quite intriguing that our largest trading partner is somehow our biggest enemy?

As I have said previously, we need to break away from the US, the current mess they are in, both military and economic could be the catalyst.

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Regards,

 

[Halcyon66]

The 2026 budget papers confirm that the government has already wasted over $8 billion on the AUKUS submarines and wants to waste another $2.8 billion next year alone.

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Nothing like our tax dollars at work...................................

Regards,

 

[Halcyon66]

Australian taxpayers to pay $11bn to extend lifespan of ageing Collins-class submarines amid Aukus delay

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8 bill with Aukus and here is another 11 bill..............................of course that will blow out to ??????

Regards,

 

[plawolf]

So, if Virginias are delayed and it’s years after all the Colins have died of old age and still no Virginia hair or hide in sight, does that finally prove that submarines are not such an indispensable capability for Australia after all and the whole idiot mess can be cancelled and the hundreds of billions spent chalked off as one giant national therapy bill?

All I hear from everyone is how submarines are indispensable for Australia, yet I have not seen any convincing justification as to how or why.

If China was hell bent on Red Dawning Australia, a few Virginias will not make any meaningful difference.

But China isn’t the least interested in Australian territory, and the only realistic way Red Dawn might actually come about is if Australia goes out of its way to make itself a threat China cannot afford for ignore, which successive Australian governments seemed hell bend on doing precisely that. A few hundred billion is a small price to pay to cure Australia of this fatal mental disorder.

 

[Lethe]

Australian taxpayers to pay $11bn to extend lifespan of ageing Collins-class submarines amid Aukus delay

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8 bill with Aukus and here is another 11 bill..............................of course that will blow out to ??????

Regards,

The Collins LOTE has been pencilled in for a decade now.

I think the major takeaways from this announcement are:

1. HMAS Farncombe enters LOTE by the end of this month, which fits with previously articulated schedule.
2. LOTE will no longer entail wholesale replacement of diesel engines and generators as previously mooted but will instead be a condition-based process.

Fair to say that the LOTE is being descoped to maintain schedule and cost. It has

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by Marcus Hellyer and others (indeed, now explicitly asserted by Marles) that the "full LOTE" package was an artefact of the previous Attack-class acquisition program.

The fundamental requirement is to adhere to schedule to avoid reduction in submarine capability from late-2020s through 2030s. The notion that ASC could perform all the work that is entailed in a standard 2-year "Full Cycle Docking" plus a bunch of other major interventions such as replacing the engines and generators, within that same timeframe, always seemed rather dubious.

Of course there is no guarantee that even a de-scoped LOTE will hold to schedule or budget or deliver anticipated returns. Indeed, the odds would seem to be against it. The question is just how great the shortfall will be. Implicit in the commitment to condition-based interventions is the possibility that some boats may be found to be in unexpectedly poor condition -- a tale that has been repeated again and again with these kinds of life-extension programs.

Marles'

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at the Lowy Institute in which these changes were announced was highly politically charged, making the case for Labor's credentials as stewards of the nation's defence portfolio over the generations, while excoriating the record of previous Coalition governments. The point is not that he is right or wrong -- clearly folks will have their own views on these matters -- but it is curious that he stressed the arguments that he did: Labor as having historically pursued a vision of Australia as an independent sovereign nation, the Liberal party as prioritizing the links with Britain. It's curious because these lines of argument have clear and obvious application to the question of our current strategic relationship with the United States and how AUKUS enshrines that.

The other interesting point is that

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article on this subject refers to a four-year delivery cadence of Virginia-class submarines to Australia: "The first Virginia-class is due to arrive in Australia in 2032, with another arriving every four years, before the bespoke Australian-built model starts coming online in 2042." This is clearly at variance with official commentary to date which describes a three-year cadence, with boats notionally penciled in to be delivered in 2032, 2035 and 2038. The most obvious explanation is that this is an error from the author, except the

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makes the same claim (on the same day): "the first two Virginia-class nuclear submarines are not expected to arrive until around 2032 and 2036, respectively. A third Virginia-class boat is due around 2040." Curious...