I think it is prudent, if not obligatory, to assume that fortification of Guam and raising of other 2IC-ish airbases will occur.
Given how vital land based air bases at those distances are to the overall conflict (as well as enabling/force multiplying USN CSGs operating at similar distances), robust methods of engaging and degrading and reattacking them seem prudent to me as a prerequisite for how "assured" the westpac conflict is for the PLA.
Let's say that somehow there are now 6 American bases in the 2IC near Guam, with space for all 200 F-47s that are planned.
Yet that doesn't change the overall strategic balance, because the attacker has:
1. a large advantage in terms of offensive missile costs versus defensive costs
2. The initiative in concentrating overwhelming force, and in striking aircraft whilst they are still on the ground.
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So let's say a very modest number of say 60 Chinese bombers are produced, and that they have a comparable payload to the B-21.
So in a single sortie, that could be 480 JASSMs or 6000 SDBs.
Then combine that with land based missiles such as the DF-26.
Along with multiple swarms comprising up to 800 low-cost Shaheed-type cruise missiles (as seen in Ukraine) with a somewhat longer range of 3000km
At the same time, there are J-36 air superiority aircraft and naval fighters operating to the 2IC.
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So whatever air defences are placed on those American bases in the 2IC will still be destroyed or depleted, very quickly.
And that opens up all the runways and ports to attack, so aircraft are destroyed on the ground and those islands are now under blockade and unable to regenerate.
And if just 20 bombers are dedicated to reattack, that could be 2000 SDBs per day.
Plus the 800 Shaheed types per day.
That should be more than enough to keep the 2IC bases destroyed.
Given the geography and the likely force balances, I just don't see how 2IC bases can credibly operate.
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So you still have the bulk of the Chinese bombers free for missions past the 2IC.
Hence my view that the 2IC represents more of a speed bump, rather than a credible defence line.
So Chinese bomber aircraft should not be designed/optimised for 2IC operations, but for significant distances beyond (against the 3IC and the mobile aircraft carriers. Plus CONUS if feasible)
If designed for 5000km+ ranges, it means US aircraft carriers have to stay far to the rear, unable to support Guam
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