That is pretty much the only real consequence there is. The other one which we discussed does not seem to be a major concern to the Filipino crew (given that they were in control of their situation), even though it may be a concern to you.
Well in that case by your definition, there is no "real consequence" because no PLAN ship is ever going to be cleared to use lethal force in this situation.
You say here that you aren't pinning the blame entirely on the destroyer's CO, then immediately try to pin the blame on the destroyer's CO. Somehow you see the CO being at fault for doing X (without evidences to boot) but also for doing opposite of X. I am simply writing what I observed.
Incorrect.
I said that I cannot rule out the possibility that the CO was at fault -- i.e.: it could be the fault of the CO, but it could be the fault of other factors (for example, as I subsequently have written it is possible that the ROEs themselves are at fault).
In other words, what I wrote is that people should not rule out the possibility that the CO is at fault.
We both agree that the destroyer staying as an observer should be an ideal situation, however the ideal situation didn't happen. Lamenting about what should have happened is not going to move this discussion forward, neither is coming up with ever more ridiculous expectation for the destroyer's crew to meet.
Actually I think it is quite productive to have a discussion about how this unique event came to pass.
Certainly one would expect the PLAN itself is doing an after action analysis, so for us it is quite reasonable to try and make some educated speculation about where the plausible breakdowns in either command, ROE or decision making occurred.
No. Quit putting words in my mouth.
My position is simply following the Occam's Razor — assume the crew involved have been following their respective SOPs unless there are actual evidences showing otherwise. In this instance, since PCG is the one trying to breach the perimeter, that would make them the more aggressive party by default, and that means they have a higher likelihood of resorting to creative tactics. Thus my argument is that it was more likely for the PCG to have brought the situation to the destroyer than it was for the destroyer to actively seek the situation.
Well to use your phrase -- "I am simply writing what I observed".
As for what you've then written -- I'm not sure what the PCG has to do with this. We are talking about the PLAN and CCG's decision making which led the destroyer to be in this situation and which led the event to occur. The actions of the PCG is irrelevant, because the PLAN should have had rules of engagement to manage such situations and contingencies in a manner which does not result in a destroyer literally being in the face of physical collission.
Putting this more simply -- someone on the PLAN side made a mistake. Either it's politicians for setting unrealistic objectives, or high level officers for setting poor ROEs, or breakdowns in understanding of ROEs or orders, or the CO of the ship being gung-ho, there is going to be at least one element on the PLAN/PRC side who made a mistake.
Thus, circling back to the "we cannot rule out the possibility that the CO was at fault" -- it is another way of saying that we cannot rule out any of the other elements aforementioned on the PLAN/PRC side are at fault, including the CO.
