Iran-Israel war: What China won’t do for Iran
Yet Iran should harbour no illusions. China’s potential support would be calculated, not altruistic. Beijing views Iran as a strategic asset: a gateway to energy and mineral resources, a market for expansion, a client in need, a node among many in its wider Eurasian strategy, an entry point into Middle East’s geoeconomics and broader Asia-Europe connectivity, and as a tool to distract and dilute US focus from the Indo-Pacific. China is unlikely to offer mutual defence commitments, seek entanglement in the Middle East’s sectarian, political or military conflicts, or endorse Iran’s crossing of the nuclear weapon threshold.
China would be wary of triggering secondary sanctions or endangering ties with Gulf Arab states, Israel, or the US. Its primary goal is not to make Iran a nuclear power per se, what it seeks is leverage — over Iran, over Washington and over a crumbling US-dominated order. Tehran may think it is gaining a partner; in truth, it is entering a complex dependency with a power that plays the long game. What Tehran can gain from this pivot is time, leverage and a degree of economic breathing room.