Nah, you’re just not worth my time.
Are you done editing? LOL
Let me rephrase this for you: "I have no legitimate answers to give you so I will tell you that 'you're not worth my time' even though I have subsequently spent PLENTY of time typing inane responses meant to try and obfuscate the fact that I don't have actual legitimate responses."
Btw still waiting for you to answer “how many salvos can the USN field around China”? This will be the third time you’re running away from the *most obvious question you should be answering first*. You’re a lot of empty talk but that ain’t news for anyone here.
ROFLMAO
How many "salvoes" of WHAT??? LRASMs? Tomahawks? LGBs? Fighter sorties? WTF are you even yapping about here? Your very question betrays such inane, rank, amateurism that it strains credulity to think that you can actually have the mentality about our interactions the way you've been fronting. I can tell you that I don't know how many "salvoes" the USN could "field" "around" China. Can you tell me how many "salvoes" the PLAN could "field" "around" Okinawa? Or Yokosuka? Or Guam? Or Hawaii? Or Diego Garcia? How many, how many, how many? If you don't know the answer, then by your own poo butt 3rd grade insinuations, you have automatically and forever lost the argument. Hahahahahahaha
Lmao who do you think you’re fooling? Get some self awareness please.
Clearly in your estimation I am not self-aware. Please, enlighten me, grand poo butt wizard of enlightenment.
Nah you are.
Clearly you're still salty from getting a verbal tongue-lashing over the last few pages. Or is the Masochism strong with you?
@Iron Man So a few of the most outstanding times I feel you've made assumptions that are biased towards the US:
1. The USN will have all their assets ready for conflict when the conflict starts. That's only true if the US orchestrated the conflict and even then, it will mean that China is put on full notice of the conflict when it sees the entire USN concentrating in Asia. China's missile forces of the PLARF with its ASBMs will be as ready as they can be. But this very well might not be true. Conflicts can arise unexpectedly and the US can be very much caught off guard. If an incident such as maritime patrolling spirals out of control, or if China has selected a time that it sees the US being unprepared so start and quickly escalates some issue leading to an attack on the ROC, the US could be caught in a very awkward and helpless position. And if they try to surge forces to the conflict zone, they could face the very large uncertainty of getting hypersonic missiles rained on them from above long before they are in range to do anything. So essentially, it's a risk and numbers game. America's risking its its entire navy against China's missile stockpile just trying to get them into the theater. Given that, would they dare even try, or would they simply select to curse at China in the UN and raise economic sanctions?
There will no doubt be SOME element of surprise when it comes to a Taiwan scenario, but honestly there will not be much. Preparations for invasion need to start weeks if not months prior to an actual attack. I have no doubt for example that Chinese civilian ro-ros are tracked non-stop by US naval intelligence, and if they ever starting heading back to Chinese shores in droves from wherever they currently are, or even start turning off their transponders, that's a definitive early warning clue; even if they were to try and sneakily just traffic closer to Chinese shores than normal just prior to an invasion start date, that could potentially also be detected as a deviation from the norm. Chinese troop/tank/IFV deployments are also tracked on the mainland. If they start redeploying en masse to provinces opposite Taiwan, that's a definitive early warning clue. Same thing for fighters and bombers. Same thing for ships. ELINT will be able to detect an uptick in Chinese military communications activity. Also, ideal invasion times are around April and October; any other time carries much more significant risks for the PLAN.
My guess is that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan will try to shorten the time interval as much as possible between the time US/Taiwan detects their intent to invade, and their actual invasion. They would not try to be sneaky about it. It would involve shutting down most or all of the country's railroad system in favor of military transport, and many highways as well, as the bulk of the PLA, PLAAF, and PLAN invasion forces around the country makes a mad dash to the coastal provinces. The ro-ros and other civilian transport ships will also make a mad dash to the coastal provinces from wherever they are. These two are the rate-limiting steps for an invasion, and they will take weeks to perhaps even months to complete. All this time is what Taiwan, the US, and Japan have to prepare for their own military interventions, if they so decide.
2. You assumed that the US interceptors developed in a time where there are no HGVs would be as effective in defending against HGVs as China's HGVs are at reaching their ship targets. This is why you put everything as, "You don't know; I don't know; nobody knows," effectively cancelling them out. But China's hypersonic ASBMs were developed specifically to strike US ships while American interceptors were not designed to target HGVs, though they may have some carry-over effect that would basically be a numbers game. So that puts the advantage to China's missiles. Then, the nature of it gives China further advantages because it is inherently much more difficult to hit a missile-sized object travelling at hypersonic speeds than to hit a ship-sized target travelling at like 35mph.
Not sure I understand your reasoning here. American missiles were not designed to target HGVs, yes, but as I said the same guidance systems used to target fast-moving ICBM warheads would be the ones used to target maneuvering warheads. The fact that they are maneuvering is what gives HGVs greater survivability vs ballistic fight profile warheads, but "greater" is both relative and a completely unknown quantity. How much easier is it to hit a warhead traveling a straight path at Mach 25 vs a maneuvering warhead traveling at Mach 9? How much "maneuverability" does an HGV at Mach 9 (or whatever) actually even have? As I said, I don't know, you don't know, nobody knows.
3. China's VLS are either slated for larger, longer range missiles, or they can be quad-packed, as far as I know. So if we were to assume that China didn't have any missiles large and powerful enough to fully fill the potential of their VLS, we'd have to quadruple their numbers for smaller known missiles. And I also think that it's quite odd to think that China built their cells to dimensions without missiles in mind. Missiles, unlike ships or airplanes are one of the most easily hidden and secretive weapons and China is known for making some of the best missiles out there, missiles that the US does not have equivalents to.
I'm a geneticist. Naval systems are not my forte, but this is what I have gathered from reading this forum for years.
Wait, what? Do you have any evidence that "smaller known missiles" can even be quad-packed in a UVLS cell? We only have evidence of one missile type that can be quad-packed in a UVLS, the "FM-3000N", and we don't actually even know if this missile is in PLAN service right now.
Second, you have to remember that the UVLS does not have a common exhaust system like the Mk 41, which means for hot-launched missiles like the YJ-18 you will need extra volume around the missile to vent its exhaust. For cold-launched missiles you need to devote extra vertical space to house a gas ejection mechanism. So for a UVLS that does away with single-point failure issues like common exhaust mechanisms, there is still a tradeoff to be made. Now, I have no doubt that the PLAN intends to utilize the greater volume offered by the UVLS compared to the Mk 41 to advantage at some point, but we do not have evidence it has actually done so. OP wanted to insinuate that a straight up VLS comparison between countries is illegitimate (despite the fact that militaries clearly use this as a tool for comparison) because the UVLS has a larger internal volume, but he failed to recognize also that for most missile types the extra space is wasted. Have you ever seen a quad-packed HHQ-9, or even a dual-packed HHQ-9? How about a dual-packed YJ-18? Or CY-5 (or whatever ASW missile is used nowadays)? Or whatever LACM the PLAN is using?
