China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[Hendrik_2000]

BTW here is the right Chinese enrichment plant it is not 1 As Art said

Enrichment and enriched uranium imports
In 2010 China needed 3600 tU and 2.5 million SWU of enrichment. The WNA Nuclear Fuel Report has demand in 2020 at 15,000 tU (natural) and about 8 million SWU. Enrichment requirements rise to about 13 million SWU in 2025 and 19.6 million SWU in 2030. All enrichment capacity is inland, in Shaanxi and Gansu provinces. China aims for a fully independent enrichment capability including R&D, engineering, manufacturing and operating.

A Russian centrifuge enrichment plant at Hanzhun/Hanzhong, SE Shaanxi province, was set up under 1992, 1993 and 1996 agreements between Minatom/Tenex and CNEIC covering a total 1.5 million SWU/yr capacity in China at two sites. The first two modules at Hanzhun came into operation in 1997-2000, giving 0.5 million SWU/yr as phases 1 & 2 of the agreements. In November 2007, Tenex undertook to build a further 0.5 million SWU/yr of capacity at Hanzhun, completing the 1990s agreements in relation to the Hanzhun plant. This was commissioned ahead of schedule in mid-2011 and has operated reliably since.

A north expansion project at Hanzhun was then built over 2012-14, with 1.2 million SWU/yr capacity using indigenous technology.

The full agreement for the main $1 billion Hanzhun plant was signed in May 2008 between Tenex (Techsnabexport) and China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation. The site, or at least two phases of it, is under IAEA safeguards. Up to 2001 China was a major customer for Russian 6th generation centrifuges, and more of these were supplied in 2009-10 for Hanzhun, under phase 4 of the agreement.

The Lanzhou enrichment plant in Gansu province to the west started in 1964 for military use and operated commercially 1980 to 1997 using Soviet-era diffusion technology. A Russian centrifuge plant of 500,000 SWU/yr started operation there in 2001 as phase 3 of the above agreements and it replaced the diffusion capacity. Subsequent expansion is based on indigenous centrifuge technology, about 2.5 million SWU of which was operating in mid-2015. Two 0.5 million SWU units (CEP 2&3) and one 1.2 million SWU unit (CEP 4) comprise the indigenous additional capacity. CEP 4 is due to start full commercial operation in 2016.

Another and larger diffusion enrichment plant, Plant 814, operated at Heping, Sichuan province, from 1975 to 1987 for military purposes. It was indigenously built, about 200-250,000 SWU/yr capacity, but its continued operational status and purpose is uncertain, possibly including fuel for naval reactors. It appears to have been upgraded about 2006. A new 0.8 million SWU/yr centrifuge plant was then built at Emeishan nearby, operating from about 2013. A second 0.8 million SWU/yr plant is under construction there.

China Uranium Enrichment Capacity


Sources: World Nuclear Association Nuclear Fuel Report, September 2015;

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UxC estimates 2015 capacity at 4.5 million SWU.

China has developed its own centrifuge technology at Lanzhou, and the first domestically-produced centrifuge was commissioned there in February 2013.

Further enrichment capacity was planned with the new China Nuclear Fuel Element Co (CNFEC) plant at Daying Industrial Park in Heshan city, Guangdong province. It was quoted at 7 million SWU/yr by 2020. However plans for this location were cancelled in July 2013. The new location of the complex is Cangzhou in Hebei province in the north. It is due to commence production in 2018 and ramp up to full capacity after 2020. The Guangdong government wants to revive the original project, and a southern site is being sought.

CGN-URC contracts fuel fabrication services from CNEIC on behalf of its operational power generation companies. There has been some minor export of enrichment services, and in April 2014 a new initiative was reported, and export delivery of 1 million SWU was estimated for 2014 (unconfirmed).

Enriched uranium
Much of the enriched uranium for China's reactors has come from outside the country, and some still does so in connection with early fuel loads for foreign-sourced reactors.

A contract with Urenco supplied 30% of the enrichment for Daya Bay from Europe.

Under the May 2008 enrichment agreement Tenex is to supply (from Russia) 6 million SWU as low-enriched uranium product from 2010 to 2021 for the first four AP1000 reactors, this apparently being related to completion of the Hanzhun enrichment plant. It is expected to involve $5 to 7 billion of LEU and possibly more. Enriched uranium for the first four AP1000 reactors is being supplied by Tenex from Russia, under the 2008 agreement.

 

[SinoSoldier]

Are you questioning the utility of a second-strike capability? Why should the US have the ability to retaliate in the event of a first strike but not China?

I wasn't questioning the utility of having second-strike capability. In my post, I made it clear that the entire purpose of nuclear weapons was to prevent its use. For that, you would need to let the world know and believe that you have the capacity and will to carry out a retaliatory strike.

However, whether a country actually does so in the eventuality of a decapitating first strike may not reflect her peacetime rhetoric.

It does not matter whether they want to gain territory or not "INTEGRITY" mean in violation of country border
If some one attack you they violate you border that is a simple as abc
As Xi said recently in our culture when some one hit me I will hit him back as simple as that you don't need to over analyzed it 5 years old will understand! Whether it bring Gotterdammerung or not beside the point The right to retaliate is socrosant

Of course he will say that. No sane leader would publicly announce that his/her country would sit back and idly watch as it is being overrun or destroyed. This does not mean that China's nuclear forces will follow suit with a retaliatory plan once the proverbial crap actually hits the fan.

 

[Anlsvrthng]

There have been numerous assessments and reports from authoritative sources that place the figure at around 200-300 nuclear weapons. For the purpose of nuclear deterrence there is no point in downplaying the size of your arsenal unless you wish to use it as a bargaining chip for a future conflict.

There is no "authoritative reports", rather than amateur / NGO estimates.

Even the US/Russian stockpile has only a lowest number of warheads, no one know ( outside few person in key position of the given governments) the real volume of nuclear materials.

I have a feeling about that possibly even the government has no one single tally about the actual volume : P

Now, back to the postulate. If the US/USSR/Godzilla launches an all-out decapitation nuclear strike against China, in which virtually all of China's military and urban infrastructure is destroyed, what would China gain from retaliating? Does the outbreak of a nuclear war not negate the purpose of having a nuclear arsenal?

Ask the inverse : what China would GAIN by not retaliating?

And actually the possibility, or even public/ interceptable or guessable discussion/thinking/chance about the possibility to NOT of not retaliating in the event of Armageddon would negate ALL benefit of the nuclear stockpile.

Simple basic game theory.


Russia has practically an automated way to strike back in the event of full Apocalypse.

The US has a manual way, but you can bet your life they will do it practically by an automated way.
And I am sure about that China would do the same as well.

 

[Anlsvrthng]

Of course he will say that. No sane leader would publicly announce that his/her country would sit back and idly watch as it is being overrun or destroyed. This does not mean that China's nuclear forces will follow suit with a retaliatory plan once the proverbial crap actually hits the fan.

You are the soldier seeing the evaporation of everyone that you loved in your life.

Will you press the button ?

 

[Hendrik_2000]

I wasn't questioning the utility of having second-strike capability. In my post, I made it clear that the entire purpose of nuclear weapons was to prevent its use. For that, you would need to let the world know and believe that you have the capacity and will to carry out a retaliatory strike.

However, whether a country actually does so in the eventuality of a decapitating first strike may not reflect her peacetime rhetoric.



Of course he will say that. No sane leader would publicly announce that his/her country would sit back and idly watch as it is being overrun or destroyed. This does not mean that China's nuclear forces will follow suit with a retaliatory plan once the proverbial crap actually hits the fan.

Of course they will retaliate why won't they ? And why should China lay down and say amen when the enemy hit them with nuke. Because they like Hollywood ? Are you out of your mind ?
I don't understand what is your logic here? Because you like the west?

IS Korea rhetoric?. Is Trade war rhetoric?

 

[Hyperwarp]

***

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Based on this China has 90 delivery vehicle.
If all of the mirved then it would require the whole nuclear stockpile that China poses.

Means there is no way to increase the number of warheads.

And 90 missile can be intercepted by the US with the korean radars/ABMs.
And if USA attack first then the remaining 10-30 ICBM is not a issue to intercept for the ABM systems.

While I agree the stated number of warheads of 260 is inadequate, I disagree with the whole US 1st strike scenario.

Estimated mobile ICBMs China have are 25 DF-31A, 12 to 24 DF-41 and 16 to 24+ DF-31AG. In addition, there are up to 4x 094/094A with 12 JL-2 each. The JL-2 range is limited to 7400 km but the range can be increased to over 8000 km with smaller warheads (Up to 9300 km IIRC). This is in addition to the 20 silo-based DF-5A/5B/5C.

If we are to take the low estimates for mobile ICBMs (DF-31A/31AG/41) the number of launchers will be around 50. The high estimate would put it around 70 - 80 since the DF-31AG numbers are likely to be much higher.

In a 1st strike the US can take out some or many of the of the DF-5 silos but there are a lot of dummy silos. At least a few would survive. The US will also have to sink all 094 subs at once. 094 maybe loud but if traveling at very slow speeds it is going to be hard get them all at once. By the way, the act of sinking the 094 can be seen as a first strike.

Even at a low estimate of 50, targetting all those mobile ICBM in a 1st strike by the US is going to be very very difficult. That is whole point of having mobile ICBMs. Right now, the only ABM in the US that can potentially intercept Chinese ICBMs are the 44 ground-based interceptors. The ABM in Korea and in the Aegis destroyers at the moment cannot intercept ICBMs. Plus, the Koreans are not going allow that because they'll get wiped out in return.

And yes, intercepting ICBMs are a HUGE headache. Even with a single warhead, there is no guarantee the KKV will actually intercept the warheads. From the all the GBI tests conducted from 1999 to 2017 the success rate is 53 percent. The GBI is targetted more towards North Korean ICBMs than anyone else. Again this is assuming a single warhead with some decoys. By the way, not all GBI tests included decoys.

China DOES NOT have a 1st strike policy like the US. Even in a worst-case scenario where all the 094 have been sunk and all the DF-5 have been destroyed and China only has single-warhead mobile ICBMs left, for a second strike, China only needs to get a few ICBMs hit major US economic hubs to cause a severe impact.

US will deploy multiple KKV in a single interceptor and the Aegis ABM will eventually be capable of intercepting ICBMs however, that exactly why China is investing so much on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles which can be launched from mobile platforms like the DF-41. HGV will quite literally render most ABM systems useless.

 

[Anlsvrthng]

BTW here is the right Chinese enrichment plant it is not 1 As Art said
.

I

BTW here is the right Chinese enrichment plant it is not 1 As Art said

Enrichment and enriched uranium imports
In 2010 China needed 3600 tU and 2.5 million SWU of enrichment. The WNA Nuclear Fuel Report has demand in 2020 at 15,000 tU (natural) and about 8 million SWU. Enrichment requirements rise to about 13 million SWU in 2025 and 19.6 million SWU in 2030. All enrichment capacity is inland, in Shaanxi and Gansu provinces. China aims for a fully independent enrichment capability including R&D, engineering, manufacturing and operating.

This is mainly civilians stuff,and this is NOT the key element f the bomb making.

With graphite you can use low enrichment fir plutonium breeding, and with heavy water it is possible to use natural uranium for this purpose

(it will be way more complicated by other ways)

 

[Anlsvrthng]

While I agree the stated number of warheads of 260 is inadequate, I disagree with the whole US 1st strike scenario.

It is not about "sane calculation".
It is about psychopaths keeping themselves in power.

It is better to be leader of the country during the Armageddon than to be a no one in a peaceful country.

They need to convince themselves about the usability of the ABM shield, it doesn't needs to be really usable.

 

[Hendrik_2000]

I



This is mainly civilians stuff,and this is NOT the key element f the bomb making.

With graphite you can use low enrichment fir plutonium breeding, and with heavy water it is possible to use natural uranium for this purpose

(it will be way more complicated by other ways)

Can you read
Another and larger diffusion enrichment plant, Plant 814, operated at Heping, Sichuan province, from 1975 to 1987 for military purposes. It was indigenously built, about 200-250,000 SWU/yr capacity, but its continued operational status and purpose is uncertain, possibly including fuel for naval reactors. It appears to have been upgraded about 2006. A new 0.8 million SWU/yr centrifuge plant was then built at Emeishan nearby, operating from about 2013. A second 0.8 million SWU/yr plant is under construction there.

 

[Anlsvrthng]

Can you read
Another and larger diffusion enrichment plant, Plant 814, operated at Heping, Sichuan province, from 1975 to 1987 for military purposes. It was indigenously built, about 200-250,000 SWU/yr capacity, but its continued operational status and purpose is uncertain, possibly including fuel for naval reactors. It appears to have been upgraded about 2006. A new 0.8 million SWU/yr centrifuge plant was then built at Emeishan nearby, operating from about 2013. A second 0.8 million SWU/yr plant is under construction there.

The military reactors needs uranium as well, and practical the to keep the HE stream separated from the civilian stuff,, but this is NOT the key element of the bomb making.

Any civilian enrichment plant can be used to make HE uranium.

The critical in the chain us the Pu making, and that needs REACTOR.