Iran's defensive posturing
By Neda Bolourchi
Last week, Iran ended its third major military exercise of 2006. The stated purpose of the Great Prophet II exercises, held November 2-12, was to enhance the military's unified action capabilities.
The exercises involved air, land and naval maneuvers spread over 14 of the country's 30 provinces, but Major-General Yahya Rahim Safavi said they simultaneously focused "on the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea". While the rhetoric surrounding the spring's Great Prophet I games aimed to boost national prestige and buoy Iran's populace, the Islamic Republic engaged in the Force of Zolfaqar and Great Prophet II games primarily to deliver an external deterrence message.
The military drills
Highly publicized in the Islamic Republic, the Great Prophet I maneuvers merely served as a show of force in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf's only gateway and vital supply route for 20% of the world's oil supply. As analysts dismissed Tehran's claims of highly developed technology equal to or surpassing that in the West, wide consensus arose that the demonstrated weapons systems were antiquated designs of Chinese, North Korean and Russian origin that pose no serious threat.
In contrast to the exaggerated claims made in the spring to boost Iranian morale during a crisis over its nuclear program, the Zolfaqar exercises underlined the Islamic Republic's defense capabilities. As such, many exercises focused on Iran's Persian Gulf coastline. However, with the increased rhetoric from the administration of US President George W Bush since spring, the Zolfaqar exercises not only used forces from traditional units, but tested new equipment.
For example, the operational appearance of the Sa'eqeh ("Thunderbolt"), an aging F-5 Freedom Fighter enhanced with a new dual vertical stabilizer, made bombing runs. While some of Tehran's claims were undercut, the demonstrations served to convey an indigenous industrial ability to alter major control surfaces on a supersonic aircraft. Analysts note that such a native industry arose in response to imposed sanctions and may result in unknown capabilities.
In addition, Defense Minister Mostafa Najjar stated that Iran successfully test-fired a bunker-buster, the Qassem ("Messenger"). Air Force General Amir Amini followed up by stating that the Qassem is "a flying bomb and can be used as a guided long-range air-to-surface missile". While reports regarding the bunker-buster remain unconfirmed, Iran added to its defensive stable by deploying transporter erector launchers with capabilities to pose a ready-fueled missile capable of rapid-reaction power.
Although some perceived Iran's growing capabilities as aggressive in nature, Major-General Ataollah Salehi declared that the Zolfaqar exercises served to implement a "new defensive doctrine". In emphasizing "Iran's friendly approach to the neighboring states, [Iranian leaders] believe that such war games are not considered a threat to the region". Salehi went on to say what has been repeated for decades: "Any threat facing the region is caused by extra-regional enemies."
With the increasing rhetoric against the Islamic Republic and the polyvocality of such discourse, Tehran moved from Zolfaqar's perimeter defense and coordination exercises to the Great Prophet II games. This has been an attempt to solidify such defensive coordination in rapid-response fashion so as to deliver messages to domestic and international audiences.
Over the course of the games, Tehran claimed it was deploying dozens of live rockets and missiles. Included was a Shahab-2 that for the first time used a cluster-munition warhead with up to 1,400 bomblets. In addition, the first firing of the medium-range (about 1,0001,200 kilometers) Shahab-3 in a live training exercise was announced. Other ballistic and artillery rockets used were the Zolfaqar-73, the Scud B, the Fath-110, and the Zelzal.
While noting that the exercises served as a response to US exercises in the Persian Gulf, the Israelis focused on the threat potential of Iranian missiles. Uzi Rubin, former head of Israel's anti-ballistic missile program, noted to journalists that "the intensity of the military exercises was unprecedented. It was meant to make an impression - and it made an impression ... [because the Iranians] were able to launch so many missiles."
Two days later, Safavi agreed. With the Shahab-3 capable of reaching Israel, Rubin pointed out that Israel's Arrow system successfully intercepted a simulated Shahab-3 missile in a test last December and that such a system had to be taken into account.
Tehran's motivations
Safavi announced the Great Prophet II exercises on November 1, a day after the completion of the US Navy-led "Leading Edge" joint exercise that included personnel from Australia, Bahrain, France, Italy, Qatar and the United Kingdom. The US 5th Fleet defines Leading Edge as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative in "response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials worldwide". The exercise in the Persian Gulf was the 25th since 2003 and the third in the region.
Despite claims by the US Navy that nations "are working absolutely together as a team", Iran saw the exercise as an additional tool of "propaganda and political maneuver without military value". In contrast, and given the lopsided number of participating versus observer countries in the exercises, Iran saw Leading Edge as part of the escalating dispute between the Bush administration and Iran over its nuclear program. In addition to seeking international sanctions, the US is seen as simultaneously applying pressure on Iran's trading partners, the populace, and the government.
In turn, Iranian leaders feel compelled to engage in brinkmanship with the US to avoid the appearance of weakness in domestic and international arenas. While psychological affirmation requires Tehran to counter US moves with those of its own, the Islamic Republic did conduct the Great Prophet II exercises with practical defense measures in mind.
Tehran's preparations
Iranian leaders did not expect n US frontal invasion even before the Democrats re-gained control of the US Congress and most certainly do not expect an air campaign after US citizens have demanded a course change for Iraq. Rather, the Iranians remain convinced that the United States will seek regime change through incrementally tougher sanctions imposed by the international community, fomenting ethnic and urban unrest, drawing Tehran concretely into Iraq, and possibly then conducting limited air strikes against military and/or nuclear facilities afterwards. The nomination of former Central Intelligence Agency director Robert Gates as defense secretary cements Iranian convictions regarding US tactics.
Responding to concerns regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of a military beset by divisions, the Iranians have moved to emphasize rapid deployment of various units simultaneously as a way to counter attempts at regime change.
Two factors have likely contributed to such an assessment: (1) the failure of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's army to stage a coup during the last days of prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar's government in 1979 because divisions could not enter major cities quickly and (2) Samuel P Huntington's political order theory, which is believed to be the cornerstone of US action and has caused riots in the minority provinces of Balochistan, Azerbaijan and Khuzestan over the past two years. In such a strategy, Tehran sees the US government operating from neighboring countries and either crossing the Iranian border or having co-opted Iranian dissidents in these peripheral provinces to set off bombs or cause riots.
In short, the chaos engulfing the periphery would cause the movement of millions to internal cities that would be infrastructurally unable to meet their needs. Chaos would ensue. Without order, mass mobilization would occur and thereby provide a mechanism for regime change. Despite the limited application and success of the theory, the Great Prophet II exercises convey that Tehran is not taking its control of the country for granted.
