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NASA Awards Contract For Lunar Constellation Spacesuit



The Constellation Program mission requires two spacesuit system configurations to meet the requirements of Orion missions to the space station and to the moon. Configuration One will support dynamic events such as launch and landing operations; contingency intravehicular activity (IVA) during critical mission events; off-nominal events such as loss of pressurization of the Orion crew compartment; and microgravity EVAs for contingency operations. Image Credit: NASA.

by Staff Writers

Houston TX (SPX) Jun 13, 2008

NASA has awarded a contract to Oceaneering International, for the design, development and production of a new spacesuit system. The spacesuit will protect astronauts during Constellation Program voyages to the International Space Station and, by 2020, the surface of the moon.
The subcontractors to Oceaneering are Air-Lock Inc. of Milford, Conn., David Clark Co. of Worcester, Mass., Cimarron Software Services Inc. of Houston, Harris Corporation of Palm Bay, Fla., Honeywell International Inc. of Glendale, Ariz., Paragon Space Development Corp. of Tucson, Ariz., and United Space Alliance of Houston.

"The award of the spacesuit contract completes the spaceflight hardware requirements for the Constellation Program's first human flight in 2015," said Jeff Hanley, Constellation program manager at NASA's Johnson Space Center in Houston. Contracts for the Orion crew capsule and the Ares I rocket were awarded during the past two years.

The cost-plus-award-fee spacesuit contract includes a basic performance period from June 2008 to September 2014 that has a value of $183.8 million.

During the performance period, Oceaneering and its subcontractors will conduct design, development, test, and evaluation work culminating in the manufacture, assembly, and first flight of the suit components needed for astronauts aboard the Orion crew exploration vehicle. The basic contract also includes initial work on the suit design needed for the lunar surface.

"I am excited about the new partnership between NASA and Oceaneering," said Glenn Lutz, project manager for the spacesuit system at Johnson. "Now it is time for our spacesuit team to begin the journey together that ultimately will put new sets of boot prints on the moon."

Suits and support systems will be needed for as many as four astronauts on moon voyages and as many as six space station travelers. For short trips to the moon, the suit design will support a week's worth of moon walks.

The system also must be designed to support a significant number of moon walks during potential six-month lunar outpost expeditions. In addition, the spacesuit and support systems will provide contingency spacewalk capability and protection against the launch and landing environment, such as spacecraft cabin leaks.

Two contract options may be awarded in the future as part of this contract. Option 1 covers completion of design, development, test and evaluation for the moon surface suit components. Option 1 would begin in October 2010 and run through September 2018, under a cost-plus-award fee structure with a total value of $302.1 million.

Option 2 provides for the Orion suit production, processing and sustaining engineering under a cost-plus-award fee or a firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract structure with a maximum value of $260 million depending on hardware requirements. Option 2 would begin at the end of the basic performance period in October 2014, and would continue through September 2018.

New Danger Emerges In Anti-Submarine Warfare Part One

by Martin Sieff

Washington (UPI) Jun 12, 2008

For more than 90 years, the submarine has been the key strategic weapon of war at sea. Britain was nearly starved into submission by German submarines in both world wars, and Japan was effectively isolated, starved and defeated by U.S. submarines in World War II. So why do 21st century Western navies and their political bosses always devote so little time to anti-submarine warfare?
ASW was essential to the Allied victories in both world wars. And it was also a life-or-death issue through the long decades of the Cold War. In those years the threat was two-fold:

First, Soviet strategic nuclear submarines, or "boomers," armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles -- SLBMs -- posed the main strategic threat to the United States, just as the strategic subs of the U.S. Navy did in return to the cities of the Soviet Union.

But second, the large Soviet submarine fleet, much of it nuclear-powered, posed a far more formidable threat to America's sea communications with its main allies across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans than the old, low-tech, primitive even by 1940s standards U-boats of the Kriegsmarine ever did during the Battle of the Atlantic.

The British and U.S. navies both started World War II woefully complacent and unprepared about the threat that even the relative handful of Nazi submarines was going to represent. The only thing that saved the Allies from losing the war was that Grand Adm. Erich Raeder, the commander in chief of the German navy, was equally unprepared. He lacked the genius, strategic vision and disciplined, relentless focus of Adm. Karl Doenitz, the World War I U-boat veteran commander who commanded the German submarine force at the start of the war.

Fortunately for the Allies, Adolf Hitler only replaced Raeder with Doenitz in May 1943, so the Germans concentrated on developing their attack submarines too late to win the war.

U.S. and NATO navy commanders and their governments didn't make the same mistake during the Cold War, when ASW and anti-submarine weapons and forces were given serious priority. But in the complacent years following the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the old importance of ASW has been largely forgotten, especially in the U.S. Navy. In the early 1990s the U.S. Navy even shut down its monitoring office to track submarine technology in other nations around the world.

Now the threat has re-emerged, but in unexpected ways and places. The great threat today doesn't come only from nuclear submarines armed with SLBMs. They are still a threat, but they are enormously expensive and technologically daunting. China has had repeated problems with both building and operating its own handful of nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines, and even Russia has had a lot of difficulty adapting the Bulava, the sea-launched version of its Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile, to be launched from the smaller launching tubes of its newer, smaller and therefore less easily detectable fourth-generation Borei 955 class of strategic nuclear submarines.

U.S. naval strategists followed these developments closely. They were far slower, however, to recognize that the really serious 21st century submarine threat was going to come from a technology they had abandoned decades earlier as obsolete.

Next: The rise of the diesel-electric subs

first SCALPEL weapon system release

Lockheed Martin successfully conducted the first SCALPEL weapon system release in a recent flight test at the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division China Lake test range in California. This was the first in a series of tests as part of the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps/Lockheed Martin demonstration flight test program. Three inert SCALPEL weapons were captive-carried and released from two AV-8B Harriers from the U.S. Navy's Air Test & Evaluation Squadron VX-31. The weapons were released from various altitudes and distances from their targets, demonstrating the range and accuracy of the system. The enhanced seeker accurately guided each SCALPEL to its target, and the advanced guidance and control system consistently demonstrated its precision. SCALPEL is a small weapon system that offers precision engagement while minimizing the potential for collateral damage in close air support and urban environments. It is a spiral development program incorporating the existing Enhanced Laser Guided Training Round airframe, minimal aircraft integration costs and development efforts, low technical and schedule risks, and affordable unit cost. SCALPEL can be employed on F-16, F/A-18, AV-8B, medium and large UAV aircraft, and other domestic and international aircraft platforms.

Artillery Rockets Gain Precision, Range and Mobility

Jun 6, 2008

Joris Janssen Lok/Defense Technology International

Armies are building up artillery rocket arsenals with weapons that combine increased range and greater accuracy with improved mobility and fast launch capabilities. Major players such as the U.S., Israel, Turkey and Russia are adding technologies for rapid firing, variable launch trajectories, advanced navigation, multiple warheads and precision targeting.

The result for commanders, says U.S. Army Col. Gary S. Kinne, capabilities manager for rocket and missile systems at Training and Doctrine Command in Ft. Sill, Okla., is access to “an immediately available, lethal, long-range asset to attack time-sensitive and high-value targets in open and constrained environments.”

Moreover, since many of the new artillery rockets will be sold in export versions, forces worldwide will gain access to the benefits of these advances.

In the U.S., Lockheed Martin recently received another $194-million production contract from the Army Aviation and Missile Command for its Army Tactical Missile System (Atacms). Completion is expected by the second quarter of 2010.


Lockheed Martin Himars launcher fires an Atacms round in a recent test.Credit: LOCKHEED MARTIN

The contract includes Quick Reaction Unitary and Block IA missiles. Atacms is a long-range round designed to destroy high-priority targets out to 300 km. (186 mi.). Able to deliver a high-explosive, fragmentation or multifunctional warhead, it operates in all conditions and remains beyond the range of most conventional artillery weapons, Lockheed Martin says.

During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, it became the first tactical surface-to-surface missile to be used in combat by the Army. The weapon tallied numerous hits in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, when 456 were launched.

The Atacms unitary missile is fired from Lockheed Martin’s Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) family of launchers, including the M270A1 and new high-mobility artillery rocket system (Himars). This last carries a single Atacms missile or six MLRS rockets, and is air-transportable in a C-130.

Each Atacms missile is approximately 13 ft. long and 2 ft. in diameter. One missile can reportedly defeat company-size targets beyond the range of conventional tube or rocket artillery.

On Mar. 20, Lockheed Martin launched an *Atacms Unitary round from a Himars launcher equipped with a universal fire-control system (UFCS) at White Sands Missile Range, N.M. The missile flew a planned trajectory and hit a target 75 km. away.


Extra artillery rocket from IMI undergoes live-firing test during IDF qualification.Credit: ISRAEL MILITARY INDUSTRIES

This was the second follow-on production test of the unitary configuration, which allows the missile to be used in a vertical-attack trajectory. Lockheed Martin says this is an essential capability for urban areas where low collateral damage is desired. It was also the first *Atacms munition to be fired from a Himars launcher equipped with a UFCS.

The UFCS is an evolutionary block upgrade and technology refresh of the MLRS fire-control system. UFCS recently completed a development and qualification program, and is being delivered under the Himars full-rate production program.

Jim Gribschaw, director of precision fires at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, says Atacms is the “weapon of choice against time-sensitive and pre-planned targets in the war on terror. Its precision allows commanders to engage a target with little or no collateral damage.”

The Mar. 20 flight test provided a wealth of data to support the quality of the improved unitary configuration, Lockheed Martin says. It also demonstrated the missile-to-launcher interface of the UFCS, missile performance and accuracy from launch to impact, and performance of the system software.

Atacms “adds to the concept of joint fires interdependence by offering the right munition to achieve the right effect at the right time,” says Kinne. “It will continue to provide a joint complementary option by its inclusion in the air-tasking order for attack and defeat of high-value targets, or in a support role to provide joint suppression or destruction of enemy air defenses.

“Its precision provides responsive, long-range lateral supporting fires as well as shaping fires that set the conditions for victory,” he adds. “This flexibility enables the support of non-standard and direct-support missions in addition to the more traditional role of general support to a corps or joint task force. Evolving tactics and techniques will enhance its utility well into the future.”

Another nation keen on long-range rocket artillery is Israel. A notable achievement by Israel Aerospace Industries was development of the Long Range Artillery rocket (Lora). Lora offers pinpoint attack with a 10-meter CEP (circular error probable) at ranges of 150-300 km., placing it in the same category as Atacms and Russia’s Iskander-E rocket. Test launches have been made to gain operational approval from the military.


Russia’s Iskander missile from KBM is highly accurate. It can deliver a 480-kg. payload 280 km., with CEP of 5-7 meters.Credit: ALEXANDER KOSCHAVTSEV

A Lora round weighs about 1,230 kg. (2,700 lb.), and carries warheads of 400-600 kg. Warhead size and missile performance are probably limited to comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a group of 34 nations that voluntarily restricts the export of missile technology capable of delivering 500-kg. payloads beyond 300 km. Israel is not a member, but maintains export controls consistent with the regime.

Lora has a three-element design: unitary warhead; propulsion unit, including solid-fuel tank and rocket nozzle; and a navigation, flight-control and guidance unit that includes an integrated avionics guidance and flight-control section, four control surfaces, actuators, antennas and connectors. The modular design improves reliability, logistics and upgrading. Critical functions are performed within the avionics unit, which can be detached. Lora rounds are stored in sealed canisters with a shelf life of seven years.

With a CEP comparable to that of many air-delivered, precision-guided munitions, Lora eliminates targets without warning. The missile can be equipped with a 400-kg. high-explosive warhead, or a 600-kg. penetration warhead for hardened targets. It can be programmed to hit a target from a 70-deg. angle of attack to maximize penetration.

Targets can be attacked less than 10 min. from a launch command. Missiles in silos offer an even faster response—less than 10 sec. to initiate a firing sequence.

Lora is deployed in three configurations—fixed, transportable or naval. Each has advantages, especially the last two.


Turkey’s Roketsan developed this 122-mm. multiple-launch rocket system.Credit: ANDY NATIVI/DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

The transportable version has minimal visual and electromagnetic signatures and a small footprint. It is easily moved and hidden.

Maritime missiles can be launched from international waters beyond the reach of coastal defenses. Using a shaped-trajectory flight, Lora does not require pre-launch preparations. This contributes to its immunity by evading most defenses, including electronic warfare. The ship-borne version includes multiple missiles stored in sealed launchers and a missile-control terminal in the combat information center. Missiles are launched in an oblique trajectory which directs hot gases to the side of the ship, preventing damage to deck systems.

Another Israeli development extends the accuracy of artillery rockets. The Trajectory Correction System (TCS), developed by Israel Military Industries (IMI), adjusts ballistic trajectory to compensate for wind drift and other meteorological effects. This can extend range to 43.5 km. from 32 km. for a free-flight rocket without TCS, and substantially reduce the number of rounds required to destroy a target. The TCS is also claimed to increase accuracy to 50 meters CEP, a major improvement over the average of 100 meters CEP for artillery rockets like the Lockheed Martin M26, Russian GRAD (122 mm.) or the LAR (160 mm.) from IMI.

TCS components include a ground-based system that tracks each rocket and simultaneously transmits corrections to as many as 12 airborne rounds. Using this capability with the Extra (Extended-Range) rocket developed by IMI, along with IAI and its MLM Systems Div., achieves accuracy of less than 20 meters CEP at twice the range of a standard MLRS missile (up to 120 km.). It also permits the use of a warhead that’s more than twice the weight of one on an MLRS missile (150 kg. versus 60 kg.).

The Extra rocket has an aft section fitted with stabilizing fins and a large solid-rocket motor; a warhead, and a control section with guidance and avionics that drive four flight-control surfaces for trajectory shaping. Three Extra rockets can be carried on an MLRS with a launcher and canisters designed for the weapon.

Turkey, meanwhile, is developing its own artillery rocket systems or upgrading existing models. There has been an internal competition in heavy rockets between the Toros, in 230- and 260-mm. configurations, which was developed by the military and offered by Tubitak and MHE, and the 302-mm. T-300 proposed by Roketsan, which may be derived from China’s CPMIEC WS-1 munition. Roketsan also developed the T-122 Sakarya, which is in service in Turkey and sold to the United Arab Emirates, and is proposing a multicaliber system for 107- and 122-mm. rockets.

The 2007 MAKS international aviation and space exhibition in Moscow displayed what may be Russia’s answer to the U.S. Himars rocket system: A highly mobile six-pack launcher for the Smerch 300-mm. heavy artillery rocket. The launcher, installed on a four-axle Kamaz 6350 truck, formed the CV 9A52-4 system from Motovilikha Plants.

Smerch rockets are about 25 ft. long, weigh 800 kg., and have a range of 70 km. Its new light configuration combines strategic and tactical mobility, albeit at the cost of reduced firepower, off-road mobility and protection. The fully loaded Motovilikha vehicle has a combat weight of 24.5 metric tons and a crew of two that can prepare and fire the rocket from a fire-control system in the cabin. The ramp can be elevated 55 deg., but if all rockets are loaded the limit is 30 deg. Time to prepare the system for firing is 3 min.

The most significant Russian rocket artillery system, however, is the Iskander, which appeared prominently on May 9 in the first Victory Day military parade on Moscow’s Red Square since 1990. The first battalion equipped with the missiles was deployed on Russia’s Northern Caucasus in 2007 (placing countries like Georgia in range of the weapon). The army expects to have five such battalions by 2015.

Iskander is a successor to the Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) and Oka (SS-23 Spider) short-range tactical ballistic missiles of the Soviet Union. First revealed in 1999, the Iskander-M modification was adopted by the army in 2005. The military doesn’t disclose technical details of this version. More is known about the Iskander-E (export) variant developed by KB Mashynostroyeniya (KBM).

Iskander’s self-propelled wheeled launcher is equipped with two single-stage, solid-fuel missiles. The major advantage of the 3,800-kg. missile is accuracy—it can deliver a 480-kg. payload with submunitions, high-explosive fragmentation or penetrating charge 280 km., with a CEP of 5-7 meters. Dynamic gas thrusters and aerodynamic fins control the missile in flight. Inertial and electro-optical guidance systems bring the missile into the target area, where the electro-optical seeker scans terrain around a target and compares it to the image downloaded into the onboard computer before launch. This makes the missile independent of satellite navigation and resistant to jamming.

The system doesn’t need a special launch position. According to KBM, the three-man crew takes up to 20 min. to prepare the first missile for launch. A second missile can be ready a minute after the first is fired.

Iskanders are ballistic missiles but the system may soon include cruise missiles. Dubbed the R-500, a cruise missile was first tested at the Kapustin Yar range in May 2007. During a test flight at an average 230-240 meters/sec., it reportedly maneuvered on a pre-programmed trajectory while changing altitude and speed. According to unofficial reports, the Iskander cruise missile can, unlike the ballistic version, be guided to the target by reconnaissance satellites or unmanned aircraft.

After the successful test launch, First Vice Premier Sergey Ivanov, who supervises the defense industry, said Russia’s military-industrial commission would approve series production of the missile, and promised that it will be taken into service with Iskander-M in 2009.

Ivanov refused to disclose the range of the new missile, saying it was more than the baseline version but conformed to international obligations. “We can sell such systems [abroad] with a range of no more than 300 km. But what we do for our own army is a different story.”


—With David Eshel in Tel Aviv, Andy *Nativi in Genoa and Maxim Pyadushkin in Moscow.

USNS-Powhatan transferred to Turkish navy
Published: June 13, 2008 at 3:08 PM

ALEXANDRIA, Va., June 13 (UPI) -- VSE Corp. announced it has completed the transfer process for the ex-U.S. Naval Ship Powhatan (ATF 166) to be deployed with the Turkish navy.

Decommissioned by the U.S. Navy in 1999, the Powhatan, which had been in commercial lease since its decommissioning, will be a Fleet Ocean Tug class ship for the Turkish navy.

VSE completed the overhaul work and transfer through its Bav Division as part of the Navy's Foreign Military Sales program. The preparation for continued towing and salvage operations in the Turkish navy required more than a year of working days at VSE's facilities in Charleston, S.C.

"One of the primary purposes of the FMS program is the Navy's long-range vision and ongoing efforts towards a global maritime partnership," Mo Gauthier, VSE chief executive officer, president and chief operations officer, said in a statement. "VSE is proud to play a key role in implementing this vision."

ASW dangers -- Part 2

By MARTIN SIEFF, UPI Senior News Analyst
Published: June 13, 2008 at 6:45 PM

WASHINGTON, June 13 (UPI) -- The U.S. Navy and major American defense contractors aren't blind to the renewed dangers of submarine warfare in the 21st century: They are working on new high-tech systems to defeat the threat both below the waves and above them.

Remote Multi Mission Vehicles operating below the surface of the sea and MH-60R helicopters operating above them are two of the Navy's high-tech, front-line weapons in the fight against the new submarine threat.

In September 2007, Lockheed Martin handed over its second production Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle to the U.S. Navy.

The RMMV is designed to boost mine countermeasure capabilities for DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers and the Littoral Combat Ship -- LCS, UPI reported at the time. Lockheed Martin said it handed over its first RMMV to the Navy in April 2007.

Lockheed Martin described the RMMV as "a semi-submersible, semi-autonomous, unmanned vehicle that tows a variable-depth sensor to detect, localize, classify and identify undersea threats at a safe distance from friendly ships."

The RMMV functions as a mobile subsystem for the Navy's AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System -- RMS. The RMMV pulls behind it a sonar sensor, advanced communications equipment and software to integrates the RMS into the host warship's combat system.

Lockheed Martin said RMMV sends real-time mine sonar images to its host ship by data link. The U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command has ordered three RMMVs from the company to be manufactured at Lockheed Martin's Riviera Beach, Fla., plant.

"Delivery of the second production unit, just four months after the initial production unit delivery, clearly demonstrates the RMMV production team's commitment to 'mission success' and ability to deliver results," John Bowen, Lockheed Martin's senior program manager of the Remote Minehunting System Program, said in September.

Lockheed Martin is also building new MH-60R helicopters to increase the U.S. Navy's ASW capabilities. The company says new high-tech integrated systems allow a single MH-60R to operate as effectively as two previous-generation Navy ASW copters.

The MH-60R carries an acoustic sonar suite to give greater range for locating submarines, and a multi-mode, long-range search radar to locate and monitor surface vessels. The equipment is designed to be fitted far more quickly to the helicopters.

The U.S. Navy has signed a $955 million contract with Lockheed Martin for the MH-60R, which the company now describes as "the U.S. Navy's most advanced submarine hunting and surface warfare helicopter."

The MH-60R was designed as a successor for the Navy's current force of SH-60B and SH-60F Seahawk helicopters in ASW and anti-surface warfare operations. They also double for use in search and rescue, vertical replenishment, naval surface fire support, logistics support, personnel transport, medical evacuation and communications and data relay, the company said.

The first MH-60R operational squadron has been designated to be the HSM-71 "Raptors,'" which is scheduled to go on operational duty with an aircraft carrier strike group in 2009.

The RMMVs and MH-60Rs represent a traditionally American approach to new threats at sea: When in doubt, advance the technology and come up with a new generation of weapons or ASW systems utilizing state-of-the-art equipment.

But as the British and Canadian navies discovered during World War II fighting the Nazi U-boat threat, new weapons have to be deployed insufficient numbers, and they have to be integrated with lots of old fashioned, relatively low-tech warships and systems as well, to prove effective against submarine threats.

US Navy may get more nuclear powered -

Research and development work on adapting the design of the Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier nuclear power plant for use in a new Navy cruisers CG(X) and could be extended to amphibious assault vessels.

Congress in 2007 passed the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008, an annual piece of legislation that tells the Pentagon how it should spend its budget. Under the act all future aircraft carriers, submarines and battle cruisers have to be built with a nuclear power system at their heart.

The National Defense Authorization Bill for 2009, which the Senate has still to pass, aims to shift the process up a gear by adding various types of amphibious assault ships to the list of those that must be powered by nuclear reactors in the future. Amphibious ships come in various forms, from those that incorporate a dock for landing craft, to undersized aircraft carriers for helicopters and vertical take-off aircraft - or a mixture of both. The vessels' position in combat can also vary - from a "stand-off" over-the-horizon location to being moored to a pier in a combat zone.

Equipping such ships with nuclear reactors would have another advantage in military operations, says Wright. "Assault ships are carrier escort vehicles and will no longer be holding up a carrier task force's progress by having to be refuelled every three to five days," she says.

There was a 2007 study on the use of more nuclear power in the United States Navy

A potential advantage of nuclear power postulated by some observers is

that a nuclear-powered ship can use its reactor to provide electrical power for use

ashore for extended periods of time, particularly to help localities that are

experiencing brownouts during peak use periods or whose access to electrical power

from the grid has been disrupted by a significant natural disaster or terrorist attack. The Navy has stated that the CG(X) is to have a total power-generating capacity of about 80 megawatts (MW). Some portion of that would be needed to operate the reactor plant itself and other essential equipment aboard the ship. Much of the rest might be available for transfer off the ship. For purposes of comparison, a typical U.S. commercial power plant might have a capacity of 300 MW to 1000 MW. A

single megawatt can be enough to meet the needs of several hundred U.S. homes,

depending on the region of the country and other factors.

The Navy is looking to install radar requiring 30 or 31 megawatts of power onto its new Cruiser.

A nuclear-powered CG(X) could cost roughly 32% to 37% more than a conventionally powered CG(X). The Navy estimates that building the CG(X) or other future Navy surface ships with nuclear power could reduce the production cost of nuclear-propulsion components for submarines and aircraft carriers by 5% to 9%, depending on the number of nuclear-powered surface ships that are built.20 Building one nuclear-powered cruiser every two years, the Navy has testified, might reduce nuclear-propulsion component costs by about 7%.

At a crude oil cost of $74.15 per barrel (which was a market price at certain points in 2006), the life-cycle cost premium of nuclear power is:

— 17% to 37% for a small surface combatant;

— 0% to 10% for a medium sized surface combatant; and

— 7% to 8% for an amphibious ship.

Newly calculated life-cycle cost break-even cost-ranges, which supercede the break-even cost figures from the 2005 NR quick look analysis, are as follows:

— $210 per barrel to $670 per barrel for a small surface combatant;

— $70 per barrel to $225 per barrel for a medium-size surface combatant; and

— $210 per barrel to $290 per barrel for an amphibious ship. In each case, the lower dollar figure is for a high ship operating tempo, and the higher dollar figure is

for a low ship operating tempo.

A 2006 Navy study states that for a medium-size surface combatant that is larger than the DDG-1000, an additional cost of about $600 million to $700 million would equate to a procurement cost increase of about 22%. If building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional power would add roughly $600 million to $700 million to its procurement cost., then procuring one or two nuclear-powered CG(X)s per year, as called for in the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan, would cost roughly $600 million to $1,400 million more per year than procuring one or two conventionally powered CG(X)s per year, and procuring a force of 19 nuclear-powered CG(X)s would cost roughly $11.4 billion to $13.3 billion more than procuring a force of 19 conventionally powered CG(X)s. For purposes of comparison,the Navy has requested a total of $13.7 billion for the SCN account for FY2008.

Will piracy never be sunk?
15:30 | 11/ 06/ 2008

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) - The ongoing hijacking of ships off the Somalia coast long ago became a routine part of maritime life in the Arabian Sea. One of the most recent incidents was the seizure of the tanker Amiya Scan, which is owned by Dutch company Reider Shipping.

Pirates are still holding the crew consisting of four Russian officers (including the captain) and five Filipino sailors hostage. But the Amiya Scan incident could also prove to be a turning point. One of the major consequences of the hijacking incident was a UN Security Council resolution urging countries to pool their efforts in the struggle against piracy, and allowing foreign warships to enter Somalia's territorial waters in order to combat piracy.

Piracy is as old as seafaring and even ancient states suffered from this evil. Julius Caesar was probably one its most famous victims. Captured in the Aegean Sea in 75 BC, he was released for the princely ransom of 50 talents (the pirates had only asked for twenty, but Caesar insisted he was worth more), and promised his captors to come back and execute them, which he promptly did.

Piracy has accompanied the human race through its entire history. Its intensity has differed at different times, but it has never disappeared completely. Probably the most has been written about piracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but we are interested in today's situation - in the causes of piracy, and ways of combating it.

It is important to establish the causes of piracy if we are to eliminate it. The number one reason is poverty. Many residents of coastal countries do not have a legal income. The main pirate-ridden regions - West Africa, Somalia, and South-East Asia - do not have high living standards, and in Somalia poverty is aggravated by a seemingly endless civil war and economic collapse. This is why residents of these areas become pirates.

But the different conditions in these regions affect the kind of piracy pursued there. In South-East Asia, for instance, pirates are usually after a precious cargo that they can sell at a profit. In war-torn Somalia, selling anything is too risky, and pirates prefer to take hostages and receive cash for their release there and then.

This second, hostage-taking form of piracy is also fuelled by an accepted ideology of non-resistance amongst the victims. This ideology considers human life an absolute value, and makes friends and relatives of hostages more willing to pay a ransom than risk their lives in a rescue operation.

A third reason is that the world's leading nations do not have a common strategy and tactics to deal with the scourge, which would prevent piracy in key regions. As a result, the pirates almost always go unpunished.

To lift Somalia out of its war and consequent poverty would take many years of work, enormous spending and almost definite loss of life in the peacemaking. Even then there would be no guarantee of success.

The second reason can be eliminated if negotiations with the pirates (who should be equated with terrorists) are held only to gain time and prepare a rescue operation. Deterrent measures deserve special mention. The prospect of landing in a European prison and an opportunity to ask for an asylum upon release is not likely to scare any pirate. Compared to this punishment, hanging from the yardarm or walking the plank, which were once wide spread in European navies, seem much more effective. But, once again, we should not forget that tougher punishment of pirates is not an option because it contradicts the principles of humanism preached by the leading Western countries.

The most realistic way of combating piracy is cooperation between militarily strong countries in protecting navigation in problem areas. A united squadron of ships set up on the basis of a broad coalition (NATO countries, Russia, and the Gulf states) could effectively counter piracy off Somalia, or in any other trouble spot.

Legal measures are also important. The UN Security Council's mandate for the invasion of Somalia's territorial waters, use of arms against the pirates, and allocation of the required forces and equipment (reconnaissance aviation, deck helicopters, radars, and Marines and Special Forces trained in boarding and releasing hostages) will eventually make piracy too dangerous an occupation.

It would be enough to set up a squadron of five to six warships and one light helicopter carrier as a flagship. Warships from different navies could rotate patrol duty with shifts lasting for several months. In the most dangerous areas, merchant vessels could be escorted by ships, helicopters, or armed motor-boats.

Importantly, patrols will be effective only if struggle against piracy overrides the inviolability of territorial waters. Otherwise, the pirates will always be able to escape punishment.

It goes without saying that piracy will not be eliminated even if an operation off Somalia's coast is successful. The oceans are huge and "gentlemen of fortune" will always find a place for their activities.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

New Danger Emerges In Anti-Submarine Warfare Part One

by Martin Sieff

Washington (UPI) Jun 12, 2008

For more than 90 years, the submarine has been the key strategic weapon of war at sea. Britain was nearly starved into submission by German submarines in both world wars, and Japan was effectively isolated, starved and defeated by U.S. submarines in World War II. So why do 21st century Western navies and their political bosses always devote so little time to anti-submarine warfare?
ASW was essential to the Allied victories in both world wars. And it was also a life-or-death issue through the long decades of the Cold War. In those years the threat was two-fold:

First, Soviet strategic nuclear submarines, or "boomers," armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles -- SLBMs -- posed the main strategic threat to the United States, just as the strategic subs of the U.S. Navy did in return to the cities of the Soviet Union.

But second, the large Soviet submarine fleet, much of it nuclear-powered, posed a far more formidable threat to America's sea communications with its main allies across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans than the old, low-tech, primitive even by 1940s standards U-boats of the Kriegsmarine ever did during the Battle of the Atlantic.

The British and U.S. navies both started World War II woefully complacent and unprepared about the threat that even the relative handful of Nazi submarines was going to represent. The only thing that saved the Allies from losing the war was that Grand Adm. Erich Raeder, the commander in chief of the German navy, was equally unprepared. He lacked the genius, strategic vision and disciplined, relentless focus of Adm. Karl Doenitz, the World War I U-boat veteran commander who commanded the German submarine force at the start of the war.

Fortunately for the Allies, Adolf Hitler only replaced Raeder with Doenitz in May 1943, so the Germans concentrated on developing their attack submarines too late to win the war.

U.S. and NATO navy commanders and their governments didn't make the same mistake during the Cold War, when ASW and anti-submarine weapons and forces were given serious priority. But in the complacent years following the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the old importance of ASW has been largely forgotten, especially in the U.S. Navy. In the early 1990s the U.S. Navy even shut down its monitoring office to track submarine technology in other nations around the world.

Now the threat has re-emerged, but in unexpected ways and places. The great threat today doesn't come only from nuclear submarines armed with SLBMs. They are still a threat, but they are enormously expensive and technologically daunting. China has had repeated problems with both building and operating its own handful of nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines, and even Russia has had a lot of difficulty adapting the Bulava, the sea-launched version of its Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile, to be launched from the smaller launching tubes of its newer, smaller and therefore less easily detectable fourth-generation Borei 955 class of strategic nuclear submarines.

U.S. naval strategists followed these developments closely. They were far slower, however, to recognize that the really serious 21st century submarine threat was going to come from a technology they had abandoned decades earlier as obsolete.

Next: The rise of the diesel-electric subs

The Rise Of The Diesel-Electric Subs

by Martin Sieff

Washington (UPI) Jun 13, 2008

The U.S. Navy and major American defense contractors aren't blind to the renewed dangers of submarine warfare in the 21st century: They are working on new high-tech systems to defeat the threat both below the waves and above them.
Remote Multi Mission Vehicles operating below the surface of the sea and MH-60R helicopters operating above them are two of the Navy's high-tech, front-line weapons in the fight against the new submarine threat.

In September 2007, Lockheed Martin handed over its second production Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle to the U.S. Navy.

The RMMV is designed to boost mine countermeasure capabilities for DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers and the Littoral Combat Ship -- LCS, UPI reported at the time. Lockheed Martin said it handed over its first RMMV to the Navy in April 2007.

Lockheed Martin described the RMMV as "a semi-submersible, semi-autonomous, unmanned vehicle that tows a variable-depth sensor to detect, localize, classify and identify undersea threats at a safe distance from friendly ships."

The RMMV functions as a mobile subsystem for the Navy's AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System -- RMS. The RMMV pulls behind it a sonar sensor, advanced communications equipment and software to integrates the RMS into the host warship's combat system.

Lockheed Martin said RMMV sends real-time mine sonar images to its host ship by data link. The U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command has ordered three RMMVs from the company to be manufactured at Lockheed Martin's Riviera Beach, Fla., plant.

"Delivery of the second production unit, just four months after the initial production unit delivery, clearly demonstrates the RMMV production team's commitment to 'mission success' and ability to deliver results," John Bowen, Lockheed Martin's senior program manager of the Remote Minehunting System Program, said in September.

Lockheed Martin is also building new MH-60R helicopters to increase the U.S. Navy's ASW capabilities. The company says new high-tech integrated systems allow a single MH-60R to operate as effectively as two previous-generation Navy ASW copters.

The MH-60R carries an acoustic sonar suite to give greater range for locating submarines, and a multi-mode, long-range search radar to locate and monitor surface vessels. The equipment is designed to be fitted far more quickly to the helicopters.

The U.S. Navy has signed a $955 million contract with Lockheed Martin for the MH-60R, which the company now describes as "the U.S. Navy's most advanced submarine hunting and surface warfare helicopter."

The MH-60R was designed as a successor for the Navy's current force of SH-60B and SH-60F Seahawk helicopters in ASW and anti-surface warfare operations. They also double for use in search and rescue, vertical replenishment, naval surface fire support, logistics support, personnel transport, medical evacuation and communications and data relay, the company said.

The first MH-60R operational squadron has been designated to be the HSM-71 "Raptors,'" which is scheduled to go on operational duty with an aircraft carrier strike group in 2009.

The RMMVs and MH-60Rs represent a traditionally American approach to new threats at sea: When in doubt, advance the technology and come up with a new generation of weapons or ASW systems utilizing state-of-the-art equipment.

But as the British and Canadian navies discovered during World War II fighting the Nazi U-boat threat, new weapons have to be deployed insufficient numbers, and they have to be integrated with lots of old fashioned, relatively low-tech warships and systems as well, to prove effective against submarine threats.

Next: New lessons from Britain's Royal Navy