In
, the first clash of arms will be a clash of electrons. If you don’t win
, you can’t win the visible
.
Before warships can concentrate their fire on the enemy, they first must
. Before they can fire at long range at all, they have to communicate with forward scouts — other ships,
,
,
— who can transmit detailed targeting data on enemies beyond the reach of a warship’s onboard radar, typically just 10 nautical miles. (That’s against other ships, which can hide below the horizon: High-flying aircraft and ballistic missiles are detectable hundreds of miles away).
To make the most of all their warships, leaders of the surface Navy have been pushing a concept called “
,” summed up as, “
.” Instead of tying surface combatants — cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and
— to escort duties for aircraft carriers, amphibious warships, and support ships, distributed lethality would send them forward in small Surface Action Groups. The warships would disperse to avoid detection but concentrate their long-range missile barrages on a single target.
Instead of just tracking
, the adversary would have to worry about every missile-armed warship in the fleet. The director of surface warfare,
, told the
that the goal is to “make them wonder where that next missile’s coming from. Make them wonder where those damn Americans are today and how many of them are going to hit us from how many different directions.”
The problem is there’s no guarantee the “distributed” forces can communicate when they need to share targeting data or coordinate attacks. No less a figure than the Pentagon’s then-chief of research and engineering,
, said in 2014 that “
.” It’s the spectrum where radio communications and radar detection both operate — as do the myriad
that detect, deceive, and disrupt them.
“It’s a huge priority,”
told me. “It’s not just the Pentagon that’s concerned about losing our advantage [in electronic warfare],” the House seapower subcommittee chairman continued. “If you talk to some of the top CEOs at some of our defense contractors, they would take it a step further and say we’ve lost our advantage and now we’re playing catch-up.”
Telltale Emissions
So naval leaders and experts are increasingly concerned that
will be able to detect US forces and then strike them blind and deaf before striking them dead.
“Ships emitting very high-power, unique RF (radio frequency) waveforms that also have significant visual, infrared, and radar signatures — both the ships themselves and their wakes — will be increasingly susceptible to being located, tracked, and attacked from extended range,” former Navy undersecretary
told me. “Over the long run, at a minimum, this suggests a need to move toward less detectable means of sensing and communication.” One model is the “
” concept advocated by his colleagues at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Bryan Clark and Robert Gunzinger. (More on that below.)
Today, we transmit at high power all the time. Since the Cold War ended, US forces have grown accustomed to communicating, sensing, and transmitting at will, unhindered, without regard for who might be listening. But
,
, and other potential adversaries are exploiting rapid advances in processing power, sometimes more quickly than the
can. Meanwhile, the Navy is only now reviving its electronic warfare expertise (and the other services are much further behind), a revival embodied in a 2014 document on
.
“Distributed lethality depends on electromagnetic maneuver warfare,” says Jonathan Solomon, senior systems and technology analyst at
, where he works on Navy surface warfare systems. “The initial phases of a distributed lethality operation will heavily leverage cyber/electronic warfare.”
The two concepts are definitely linked, according to
, head of Fleet Forces Command. The Navy’s great advantage is its ability to network information from satellites, manned reconnaissance aircraft, drones, and ships to create improved situational awareness (SA), he told the Surface Navy Association: “We’ve got to be able to distribute that tactical SA. We’ve got to be able to defend the networks that distribute that.”
But can we defend the networks? “You raise a very good point about potential C3 [command, control, and communications] network vulnerability with the distributed lethality concept,” Martinage told me. “Adversaries are clearly developing and fielding jammers designed to target key datalinks relied upon by the fleet, as well as anti-radiation homing weapons that target the emitters themselves.” There’s also the possibility of
, using the fleets’ own radio transmissions as cover for a cyber attack.
Navy leaders know they have a problem. The goal of distributed lethality is to “deceive, target, and destroy” the enemy,
, commander of naval surface forces, said at the Surface Navy Association conference. Note the emphasis on deception, which means especially electronic deception: decoys that emit all the telltale signals of a full-size warship, for example, while the actual warships turn off all unnecessary electronics and operate under strict “emissions control,” or EMCON. And, said Rowden, the Navy is looking to find ways to transmit targeting data from ship to ship even when under EMCON.
We have capability gaps — shortfalls — in all those areas, I noted during the Q&A.
“Absolutely, we have gaps,” Rowden agreed.
...