The_Zergling
Junior Member
American commanders in Iraq acknowledge that they are now funding and arming Sunni insurgents to supposedly help fight Al Qaeda in Iraq, most notably in the Al Anbar Province:
American officers who have engaged in what they call outreach to the Sunni groups say many of them have had past links to Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia but grew disillusioned with the Islamic militants’ extremist tactics, particularly suicide bombings that have killed thousands of Iraqi civilians. In exchange for American backing, these officials say, the Sunni groups have agreed to fight Al Qaeda and halt attacks on American units. Commanders who have undertaken these negotiations say that in some cases, Sunni groups have agreed to alert American troops to the location of roadside bombs and other lethal booby traps.
But critics of the strategy, including some American officers, say it could amount to the Americans’ arming both sides in a future civil war.
Certainly not the first time in history we've seen this sort of situation:
* Rome arming Germanic tribes to fight other Germanic tribes.
* United States arming the Mujahideen in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets.
* United States arming Saddam Hussein during the Iraq-Iran war.
As far as I can tell the reasoning behind this policy is the motto, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." Of course, this represents short-term reasoning. The current circumstances make this sort of alliance somewhat logical. Yet what happens when things change? What happens when the very Sunnis that we are now arming decide to fight the very Shiites, such as Nouri al-Maliki, that we installed into power?
Or even more fundamentally, if the rationale for us remaining in Iraq is based on our long-term good, then why are we implementing a short-term strategy that will end up being a net-negative in the long-run? That is a paradox if I have ever seen one.