There are rumors F-18 was actually Yemeni shot down. Thoughts?
No the Yemeni didn't and Yes the Yemeni did.
No the Yemeni did not launch the missiles that successfully intercepted one USN F-18 and almost intercepted its tanker.
Yes the Yemeni successfully tempted the USN to send a CVN and a CG, both of which it tried to remove from service a few years ago, into the dangerously constrained Red Sea because as I said above
Throughout the USN (and other services) the military leadership continually seizes opportunities to gain combat medals no matter how inappropriate their particular weapon is to the combat situation or the readiness of their weapon and its crews for performing the combat mission.
The USN DDGs weren't putting the Yemeni in their place so Biden and his military leadership decided to send in the F-18s with their direct action bombs and missiles.
Except the Aegis AAW command ship was just recently modernized, albeit less than fully successfully as the crew dealt with continuous HME failures of various types. And as we know modernization, especially for a ship older than most of its crew, is another word for rework.
Rework sucks because, as in real life, the previous guys did a half-ass job and didn't much bother documenting it. So you have to tear out the crummy old stuff, prepare the spaces for the new stuff, and then install the new stuff. Except it isn't all new stuff. There's lots of left-behind old stuff you have to interface with. Meanwhile the cool guys are building the new software version for the DDGs and they're not much interested in your legacy interfaces nor giving you much time in LBTS to test your variant of that new version.
No test time; hardware isn't ready on the ship for software installation; no crew training time because hardware and software are late; and then it's off to the hot battlespace in the Red Sea.
VADM Aucoin (ret) wrote a USNI essay
on the USN's tendency to deploy in the face of unreadiness.
It was often the case that operational missions (more often than not of the “short-notice” variety) came down from USPaCom and ComPacFlt with warning orders or that “requests for forces” were met with a “not recommended” response from C7F. Such responses always were required to be accompanied with a by-name identified ship to be used if we were “forced to source” the mission, as well as an estimated impact statement of what cost and risks would be incurred if we were to task that ship with the mission. The impact statements routinely highlighted to higher headquarters that sourcing these missions would come at the cost of training and readiness. More often than not, we would be directed to fill and execute the mission through a follow-on task order or voice order directing the by-name identified ship to execute the mission. In a few cases, we were able to argue for changes that allowed ships to complete training or maintenance. In many other cases, our arguments and recommendations were either overruled or ignored.
People interpret China's PLAN/CCG/MM activities in the ECS/SCS as intimidation, political messaging and even deterrence. Certainly there is a large portion of that but the major part of those activities is training. And I'm sure the engineers responsible for their design and construction are aboard the participating ships for lessons-learned to incorporate into the next ship in the yard; the next weapon systems upgrade; the shore-based training facilities; and the training curricula.
The USN hasn't enjoyed that luxury for two decades.