The report must include a description of the Defense Department’s process for learning and disseminating knowledge, and identify any working groups associated with this effort. It must also include a detailed summary of recommendations, identify which Defense Department organizations have the lead on implementing these recommendations, and provide a timeline for implementation.
Some Army officers have argued that observations from the war, while useful, are not always relevant to the U.S. military, which expects to fight with multi-service operations backed by highly
soldiers funded by a military
many times Ukraine’s gross domestic
.
“If you look at the fight that's going on in Ukraine, you've got a large Soviet army fighting a small Soviet army, right? That is defensive-oriented, [artillery]-oriented.” said 101st Airborne Division commander Maj. Gen. Brett Sylvia in an August interview. “That's not our [kind of] fight," he said, contrasting the U.S. Army's multi-domain, maneuver-centric approach with the grinding trench warfare that has defined much of the war in Ukraine.
Anthony Tingle, formerly a program director at the Air Force Academy’s the Institute for Future Conflict and now an independent
who has spent time in Ukraine, said he could not say whether the Army’s four analysts were sufficient. CALL could be working with other academic institutions to analyze the war, he said.
However, any U.S. observations of the war are ultimately
by the U.S. military’s
presence in Ukraine, said Tingle.
“How many U.S. government employees have been to Donbass recording the electromagnetic spectrum or sitting down with the drone operators to say, ‘Well, okay, how do they frequency-hop? How do they try to thwart our drones?” said Tingle. “This is all stuff we're gonna have to relearn the first week of a war with anybody.”
The U.S. has repeatedly said it will not send military advisors to Ukraine, and maintains an even
presence in Kyiv than before the war. The Defense Department also maintains travel restrictions within Ukraine that prevent at least some staff from getting within a certain distance of the front line, according to a January
from the Inspector General.
The academic community is similarly limited in the analysis it can provide, Tingle added, saying the number of academics with experience on the frontline was in the single digits.
Tingle believes the military branches are at least partially writing off the conflict based on assumptions that the U.S. would not struggle with the same types of problems as Ukraine, such as establishing air dominance over Russia.
Those assumptions may be true, Tingle said, but that doesn’t mean the war has nothing to teach.
“There are lessons about modern warfare in general that we are not getting because of that attitude.”