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Sinnavuuty

Senior Member
Registered Member
As for the strawman - "members claiming space based kill chain is all you need etc" I don't see anyone here claiming the absolute resilience of ASBM kill chains. Space based systems appear to be (at least speculated here in the past) one way to get around the plasma cloud as signals aren't completely cut off from re-entry vehicles. That is all. No one is claiming space based kill chain makes ASBM an invincible weapon. It is just that having a space based kill chain is something the US is yet to complete and India is yet to even begin.
Any country would have to have C4ISR capabilities relevant to the task of targeting ships at sea and extend and integrate this ASBM architecture as much as possible. The difficulty of aiming increases significantly with distance. The space ISR system refers to the means for target recognition, it is not merely a means of relaying missiles re-entering the atmosphere. The means of relaying missiles re-entering the atmosphere has been solved for decades. Simulating a task for the ISR constellation in space would be that as soon as an OTH radar locates a naval TF at 1,500 km, providing an "approximate" target position for the ISR satellites to begin searching a pre-determined area, the satellites could thus indicate more precisely the area where the targets are as soon as they are located, indicating a more precise coordinate for other ISR systems to select targets in real time. The only problem with this kill chain is that neither OTH radars nor satellites can offer the precision to hit a moving target, other means of reconnaissance are still needed to do this. The kill chain could work by "skipping" certain steps, for example, a drone carrying out a selected search for an opportunity could run the ASBM without the need for other kill chain processes; an OTH radar could indicate an areal location of a given target and send MPA aircraft to do maritime surveillance and so on.

The relevance of ISR architecture in space is necessary and will be extremely vital in the coming decades. See the US efforts to create an anti-hypersonic constellation in space, the fundamental of this system is that it will allow it to defend against this threat and at the same time suppress mobile launchers, which is in fact complicated to reach moving targets at these distances (interior of the China/Russia/North Korea), the Americans are in the process of migrating most of their ISR platforms to space but this will take two decades or more. Real-time reconnaissance capability deep within enemy territory is vital for long-range weapons against tactical and time-sensitive targets to work. That's why there's little point in the Americans rushing in with their hypersonic missiles that will be used against time-critical targets in the heart of enemy territory since today the US doesn't have the deep reconnaissance capability to make the kill chain work.

What's the point of having a missile like the CPS with a 4000 km range and Mach 17 speed capable of hitting a DF-26B launcher in the interior of China if the Americans don't know where the launcher is and where it will be at a given moment?

Every long-range engagement against mobile targets (moving or relocatable) requires a complex kill chain, which becomes more complex the deeper into enemy territory the targets are. And the kill chain becomes progressively more complex as the target is more protected, so a USN CSG is a heavily defended target, which makes it a difficult task to make an ASBM work correctly.
Oh you seem to have left out Iran from your list of ASBM wielding nations. Got there before India, using assumed similar levels of kill chain "capabilities". North Korea may or may not be in a similar position. Iranian MRBMs with MaRV at least can hit static ground targets with great accuracy. No one seems to have paid them much attention when they claimed to have ASBM based on those MaRV tech.
I just wanted to demonstrate that other countries follow this trend. It was not my objective to provide an in-depth analysis of all countries trying to achieve this capability.
 

Sinnavuuty

Senior Member
Registered Member
The frequency of a satellite's flyby is a problem and if the target is speeding, it may be well out of range of the tracking satellite. Even with a constellation of satellites, you lose track of it until the next satellite arrives, which can take hours (the specs get a little complex). He could be somewhere completely different. Remember that nuclear aircraft carriers can travel at high speeds, in excess of 30 knots. In an hour, they are many miles from where you last saw them.

Satellite tracking is not real-time, but lagged tracking. Real-time tracking comes from reconnaissance aircraft, surface vessels, drones, submarines and a network of maritime surveillance sensors. This upgrade cannot be from the ASBM launcher, as due to the curvature of the Earth, it is not in a direct line of sight with the OTH target, which implies that this upgrade would have to start from a platform that is in the direct line of sight of the target. This platform needs to be in direct line with the target and connected directly to the missile. The fact is that this platform would have to remain "on station" until the MaRV is able to take over and acquire the target on its own. And this in an extremely challenging environment that is within the defensive bubble of a CSG that has at least 5 to 6 Aegis destroyers and cruisers, plus the aircraft carrier itself, plus around 70 to 80 aircraft, including fighters equipped with AESA radars and long-range air-to-air missiles, AEW also equipped with long-range AESA radars and some specialized electronic warfare aircraft (EA-18G) that can act defensively, circling the CSG and interfering with enemy communications, including satellite communications.

As a hypothetical example, the attack on a CSG by the DF-21D could go something like this:

1- ELINT reconnaissance satellites locate a CSG and send this data to the command center;
2- the WZ-8 equipped with radar is sent to search the determined area, staying approximately 200 km from the target and confirms the “threat” and validates the targets;
3- 2 or 3 ASBM DF-21D are launched against targets;
4- the drone recognizes when reentry vehicles enter the network and connects to them, sending updates on the position of the targets;
5- when they are already in the atmosphere, the maneuverable reentry vehicles move their fins and take the updated course different from the initial ballistic one, better positioned to find the targets;
6- around 50 km from the targets, the MaRV performs a pop-up braking maneuver to allow the use of the radar;
7- at a distance of around 40 km (more or less) the MaRVs radar is activated and starts scanning the area and acquires the target (in this case, the aircraft carrier) around 10 km from it, with 10 seconds remaining for impact.

The Chinese solution to the problem was “brilliant”: they developed an anti-ship missile with a range of 1500 km (the DF-21D), well beyond the range of aircraft carrier fighters. This creates an area denial situation (A2AD) for the aircraft carrier that would have to be vulnerable to be able to operate since onboard aviation does not have a range of 1500 km, so it defeats the first premise in the use of aircraft carriers that face is attack without being able to be attacked. Either that, or it becomes useless, and that's where the A2AD (anti-access) capability comes in.

Everything would be simple if it weren't. The DF-21D has a range of 1500 to 2000 km, American naval fighters have a maximum range of 1100 km (with refueling it would reach close to 1500 km). Ready!

But it doesn't exactly work in that simplistic way. The DF-21D missile is just part of the system and the means necessary for it to work must invariably invade the defensive bubble raised by the CSG (more than 500 km in radius, reaching 1000 km) and this is due to an indisputable fact, the Earth it is not flat.

Why do these means invade the defensive bubble and not operate outside it, say 1500 or 2000 km? Because there are limitations regarding the sensors and the altitude at which the aircraft flies.

And what about satellites? Satellites are not an effective means of targeting. They are extremely useful for finding a CSG in the middle of the oceans and even "suggesting" where a CSG might be, but as a rule they cannot follow it, track it, in real time, for obvious reasons (they revolve around the Earth at immense speed).

But what about a constellation of satellites where there is always one in a direct line with the target?

This architecture is what the Chinese/Russians try to look for, but it is very complicated to put into practice, not to mention it is highly vulnerable to electronic warfare.

But what about OTH radars? They do not have the precision necessary to operate in combination with ballistic/hypersonic missiles that require an extremely refined firing solution.
 

aahyan

Senior Member
Registered Member

U.S. Navy Eyes Next-Generation Jammer's Mid-Band IOC In Late FY24​

The U.S. Navy is aiming to declare initial operational capability (IOC) for the Next-Generation Jammer’s mid-band system before the end of September after development snags set back the test schedule. The ALQ-249 jammer is designed for use on the EA-18G Growler to augment and eventually replace the...

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