At the dawn of the 35th day, 5 weeks into the Russo-Ukrainian War, I thought I would post an update and attempt at some analysis. I have been really busy and dealing with things IRL. I have been following the thread here, but not been posting.
That said, this thread has a serious digression problem. We really, really need to focus on the war itself, not other nations and their internal squabbles. Not possibly - in a carnival mirror sort of way - analogues with other places in the world. Unless we can demonstrate why historical event is a direct tie to what is happening and it is spelled out, we should leave that for other discussions and other threads. We are and should be better than this...this mess...this thread has become. We have a crap ton of propaganda to sort through and knowledge to gain. This war is a tragedy. There's little any of us can do to change its course, but we can learn from it. Focus, folks.
Lol. I agree as well. It nearly became a Twitter thread.
2. Now then, let me say I was wrong. Again. I expected Russia to have taken Mauripol by now and just be dealing with some minor mop up actions. That has still not happened. Should I venture another guess? Or am I somehow cursing the Russian effort down there? Where can I properly hone this power? Just kidding. So at 6 weeks, will the Russians have finished their conquest of Mauripol? I would think so, but, hell, I've been rather wrong here. I expected this to be done and over two to three weeks ago.
Urban warfare is extremely complicated. The Second Battle of Fallujah lasted for more than a month (precisely a month, two weeks, and 2 days), and the Coalition wasn't attacking Iraq on multiple fronts simultaneously. Plus, the insurgents' training is abysmal. In this case, I expect the Ukranians to put up stiff resistance against them since they are better armed and trained. Also Mariupol has a lot more multi-story buildings than Iraq, and the people trapped in the city aren't helping the Russians' situation at all. So the battle for Mariupol could last quite a long time.
3. I do not think the push in the north was a feint. Ritter's statement of it being so doesn't pass the sniff test of the amount of resources committed. The push on Kiev and the north was massive. There would be no need for the meat grinder seen there if it was a feint. Feints are best with a few skirmishes and threats, not real engagements and huge numbers of troops. I do agree with the assessment about the marines and Odesa being a feint. That operation works exactly as a feint should: drawing off troops in excess and out of proportion of what you have committed.
Good point. The Russians could have kept their forces there in constant engagement but not to the point in which a meatgrinder occurred. The sheer number of Russian troops there could possibly create paranoia among the Ukranian command staff since they would be blinded by the fog of war regardless of the isr reports they receive. For example, if they attempt to send reinforcements and leave the city with little personal, those Russian troops could immediately surge into the city. If they don't, then the Ukranian Western and Southern fronts would be starved of reinforcements. The effects would be the same, but the cost would be much lower.
However, I'd say that it was a feint nonetheless since the Russians need to make the threat from the north real. Due to the mobility and firepower of modern militaries, it is possible that the defensive forces in Kiev could hold off a Russian surge if the Ukranians attempt to reinforce their understrength fronts. You have to remember that the best Ukrainian military units are mostly in Donbas. Their loss would be extremely catestrophic, and the Ukrainians would most likely take the risk of sending their reinforcements there. So a meatgrinder must occur in order for the Ukranian command staff to view Kiev as the highest priority.
11.
@Temstar asked why the Russians were hitting the Ukrainian fuel depots. IMO, it is an attempt to prevent the Ukrainians to be able to do major armored offensives. It doesn't matter if the Ukrainians preserve an armored corps for later if they don't have or can't get fuel. No gas: no go. It will be interesting to see if NATO et al start supplying fuel and other logistics trucks. If we do see that, I have a hunch the Ukrainians are not just going to do localized counteroffensives.
Agreed. Also, it delays the reinforcements to a collapsing unit.
As always, I appreciate the *cough* relevant and polite *cough* posts and prognistications from you regardless on how we view the ongoing conflict. Hopefully, this thread doesn't get nuked due to a useless argument. That would just be outright sad and, frankly speaking, pathetic.
