The emphasis is on the specific point in time in question, ie, now. Both Russia and China said there wasn't any such request of that nature.
But, should such request does happen, it's worth pulling the pin out, as Russia wouldn't ask for something they don't need to achieve their goal, which perfectly lines up with that of China's. Russian security is China's first line of defense as it turns out, given the not so subtle telegraphing of Americans' hostile strategic intent and locking up significant parts of their military and economic capabilities to specific hostile focus on China. Providing weapons in case of Russian request and need is basically China's defensive offensive preemptive offshore strike of a sort, or a proxy war, to keep the active conflicts away from her own border, exact mirror of what is normal standard US practice. Economic reasons are always a distant secondary when it comes to strategic survival of a state. What exactly is the point of being rich and technologically advanced society when you are already dead and buried and long ceased to exist?
I have seen some posters here who would spout appeasenik FUD nonsense like economic factors are absolute priority over a nation's survival, as an unbreakable axiom of truth, much like what a veritable American think tank with an hegemonic axe to grind would proselytize. Not trying to jingle anybody's bells, but that line of thinking would have a sell by date of 1989. This is 2022 now. Grow up, or change your appeasenik FUD line of tactics.
Geopolitical competition involves multiple domains yes -- included in that are proxy conflicts and supporting one's own economic and technological growth/advancement, among others.
But the weighting of various domains is not always equal, and some domains (at any given point in time) may have significantly greater bearing on one's ability to wage geopolitical competition.
All of this, leads me to a few questions which I don't think have been addressed here by proponents of the idea of providing Russia with military arms/military support during active warfighting in Ukraine:
1. If Russia has requested -- or if Russia does request (in future) -- military arms from China, does such a request actually reflect on how Russia's current war in Ukraine is progressing in terms of Russia's political goals in waging this war, in terms of failure or success?
2. Does a Russian failure to achieve some or all of its political goals in Ukraine, pose an existential threat to Russia as a nation or security, and thus pose a risk to China's security?
3. Does a Russian success to achieve some or all of its political goals in Ukraine, significantly enhance Russia's security trajectory as a nation, and thus similarly enhance China's security?
Given the balance of power, it is impossible for Russia to "lose" a war against Ukraine through conventional military means -- it basically becomes a question of how many of Russia's political objectives in Ukraine can actually be attained.
My belief is that if Russia is unable to achieve all of its stated political objectives in Ukraine and have to settle for some sort of "negotiated peace," that Russia's overall security situation does not greatly change compared to if Russia was somehow able to achieve all of its stated political objectives in Ukraine.
This is because Russia's future national security and the threat to it as a nation is
no longer whether Ukraine is or isn't going to be a major staging area for the US/NATO, but
rather it is because of US, European and US client state
sanctions against Russia, and the impact it will have on Russia's economy, and in turn its civilian and military technological industries -- and US/European/client state sanctions are going to continue against Russia regardless of how much Russia "wins" or "loses".
So, I would pose this set of counterarguments to everyone freaking out over Russia's war in Ukraine and saying that China needs to supply Russia with arms so Russia can "win" in Ukraine:
A) It is of significant interest to China to ensure that Russia remains a stable nation that is able to maintain a trajectory where its future as a nation is not under existential threat, and China should be willing to make proportionate sacrifices and endure proportionate pain to ensure that Russia is not under existential threat of collapsing.
B) Regardless of how much Russia "wins" in a war in Ukraine, its economic consequences from the US/Europe/client states is already sealed and unlikely to be lifted.
C) The greatest existential threat to Russia is not how much Russia "wins" in Ukraine, but rather the economic and technological threats that it faces going forwards. How much Russia "wins" in Ukraine will not change those aforementioned economic and technological threats.
D) If China did provide Russia with military arms in the short term, it will only influence how much Russia "wins" in its war in Ukraine, but it will not change the economic and technological threats that Russia faces. However, China providing Russia with military arms will almost certainly result in greater economic and technological decoupling from the US/Europe/client states, in a manner that may be sooner and more destabilizing than China wishes.
E) Therefore,
because Russia not being able to attain all of its political aims in Ukraine is not an existential threat to Russia, it does not make sense for China to provide military arms to Russia on the basis that China's interests for seeking Russia remains stable and not under threat of collapse. China providing military arms does not change Russia's own domestic stability.
F) Instead, the best thing China can do for Russia, is to provide Russia with economic and technological support in the short, medium and long term --
which China can best achieve, by further economically and technologically developing and advancing itself, which benefits from continued trade and somewhat stable relationships with the US/Europe/client states. China's trade and relationships with the US/Europe/client states therefore are only worth being degraded or sacrificed if there is a sufficient gain or risk that requires it to be done (for example, in event of a conflict over Taiwan).