Ukrainian War Developments

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Atomicfrog

Major
Registered Member
Fede_LV said:
https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1504099143320576001

I was looking at this footage of an alleged Ka52 shoot down. One thing I noted was that the helicopter is fairly intact, despite the fire damage, the rotor, tail and radome are still "attached" to the fuselage. So the helicopter probably got hit by the enemy or experience some sort of technical problem and then made an emergency landing. After that it was then deliberately set on fire.
The Ka52 proved to be a tough helo.
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It's not the same that crash landed a while ago that was put in fire ? First day of battle or so ?
 
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Mirabo

Junior Member
Registered Member
RottenPanzer said:
Still don't understand the point of his 1st and 3rd assessment
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On the first point, I don't know how he measured a 3:1 numerical advantage for the Ukranians. Maybe the Ukranians have that many troops on paper if you include reservists. Most indications suggest around 1:1 in reality.

On the third point, Russian units are not organized like in NATO militaries. They have small, flexible, and highly-mobile units called 'battalion tactical groups'. They are small combined arms units (around 800 men) with a mix of tanks, IFVs, and some infantry. With the crazy mobility that they have, it's not surprising that some units were able to advance 50-70km per day in the first 3 days of the war.

The problem is that BTGs are so fast and independent that logistics get left behind, and when the fuel trucks try to catch up, they get ambushed by Ukranian units that have not been properly screened. This would not be a problem if Russia had organized a main echelon of units to advance behind a smaller and more focused BTG push.

However, instead of a layered offensive, the Russian army has been organized completely into BTGs, and all of them just rolled as far into Ukraine as they could without follow-up. So the author's point is that, if prepared and used properly, BTGs can be very strong. But in this war, there are not just a few BTGs for calculated tactical offensives - instead the whole Russian army had been reorganized into BTGs, even regular units that might not have been trained for high-intensity manoeuvre warfare.

So now the Russians are finding out the strategic and logistical limits of BTGs the hard way. There is a relatively high rate of equipment losses and abandonment from fuel or other logistical shortages. There are also many units getting ambushed because BTGs are too scattered and move too quickly to clean up properly. The overall strategic failure of this 'mass BTG' concept will force Russia to rethink the way they organize their armies and how BTGs should be used in the future.
 
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Weaasel

Senior Member
Registered Member
Mirabo said:
On the first point, I don't know how he measured a 3:1 numerical advantage for the Ukranians. Maybe the Ukranians have that many troops on paper if you include reservists. Most indications suggest around 1:1 in reality.

On the third point, Russian units are not organized like in NATO militaries. They have small, flexible, and highly-mobile units called 'battalion tactical groups'. They are small combined arms units (around 800 men) with a mix of tanks, IFVs, and some infantry. With the crazy mobility that they have, it's not surprising that some units were able to advance 50-70km per day in the first 3 days of the war.

The problem is that BTGs are so fast and independent that logistics get left behind, and when the fuel trucks try to catch up, they get ambushed by Ukranian units that have not been properly screened. This would not be a problem if Russia had organized a main echelon of units to advance behind a smaller and more focused BTG push.

However, instead of a layered offensive, the Russian army has been organized completely into BTGs, and all of them just rolled as far into Ukraine as they could without follow-up. So the author's point is that, if prepared and used properly, BTGs can be very strong. But in this war, there are not just a few BTGs for calculated tactical offensives - instead the whole Russian army had been reorganized into BTGs, even regular units that might not have been trained for high-intensity manoeuvre warfare.

So now the Russians are finding out the strategic and logistical limits of BTGs the hard way. There is a relatively high rate of equipment losses and abandonment from fuel or other logistical shortages. There are also many units getting ambushed because BTGs are too scattered and move too quickly to clean up properly. The overall strategic failure of this 'mass BTG' concept will force Russia to rethink the way they organize their armies and how BTGs should be used in the future.
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During the second Chechen War, the Russians were much more cautious and deliberate in their advances and approaches towards towns and cities. They wouldn't rarely move their forces quickly ahead of the necessary logistics. It looks like they did not apply that in this war.
 
RottenPanzer

RottenPanzer

Junior Member
Registered Member
Mirabo said:
On the first point, I don't know how he measured a 3:1 numerical advantage for the Ukranians. Maybe the Ukranians have that many troops on paper if you include reservists. Most indications suggest around 1:1 in reality.

On the third point, Russian units are not organized like in NATO militaries. They have small, flexible, and highly-mobile units called 'battalion tactical groups'. They are small combined arms units (around 800 men) with a mix of tanks, IFVs, and some infantry. With the crazy mobility that they have, it's not surprising that some units were able to advance 50-70km per day in the first 3 days of the war.

The problem is that BTGs are so fast and independent that logistics get left behind, and when the fuel trucks try to catch up, they get ambushed by Ukranian units that have not been properly screened. This would not be a problem if Russia had organized a main echelon of units to advance behind a smaller and more focused BTG push.

However, instead of a layered offensive, the Russian army has been organized completely into BTGs, and all of them just rolled as far into Ukraine as they could without follow-up. So the author's point is that, if prepared and used properly, BTGs can be very strong. But in this war, there are not just a few BTGs for calculated tactical offensives - instead the whole Russian army had been reorganized into BTGs, even regular units that might not have been trained for high-intensity manoeuvre warfare.

So now the Russians are finding out the strategic and logistical limits of BTGs the hard way. There is a relatively high rate of equipment losses and abandonment from fuel or other logistical shortages. There are also many units getting ambushed because BTGs are too scattered and move too quickly to clean up properly. The overall strategic failure of this 'mass BTG' concept will force Russia to rethink the way they organize their armies and how BTGs should be used in the future.
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This is a better explanation for the many equipment losses than Russian soldiers simply abandoned their own military equipment cause of "lack of will to fight".
This certainly gave me De Javu with what the Wehrmacht did back in France Campaign, Battle of the Bulge, etc
 
windsclouds2030

windsclouds2030

Senior Member
Registered Member
Russia is in no hurry for an agreement with Kiev... it prioritizes on the QUALITY of agreement! This thing validates my earlier belief. Quality, fulfilment... over speed, timing! Over eight years of waiting... why be in rush now??? Tripping this far, yields must be comprehensive!

RUSSIA:

The operation in Ukraine will continue as long as it takes for Kiev to fulfill the requirements stated at the beginning of the operation: demilitarization, denazification, recognition of the LDNR, recognition of Crimea, etc. Since Russia's withdrawal from the Council of Europe on March 16, 2022, Russia no longer considers itself bound by its legal acts.

ASB Military News - 17 March 2022
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
 
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Fede_LV

New Member
Registered Member
Atomicfrog said:
It's not the same that crash landed a while ago that was put in fire ? First day of battle or so ?
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I wouldn´t be suprise if that was true, lot of miss information out theres specially twitter accounts reciclying old footage. But in this case we have the tail number, the Kamov you mention didn´t have a tail number or the red star on the tail. It´s a new helo.
 
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Fede_LV

New Member
Registered Member
windsclouds2030 said:
Russia is in no hurry for an agreement with Kiev... it prioritizes on the QUALITY of agreement! This thing validates my earlier belief. Quality, fulfilment... over speed, timing! Over eight years of waiting... why be in rush now??? Tripping this far, yields must be comprehensive!

RUSSIA:

The operation in Ukraine will continue as long as it takes for Kiev to fulfill the requirements stated at the beginning of the operation: demilitarization, denazification, recognition of the LDNR, recognition of Crimea, etc. Since Russia's withdrawal from the Council of Europe on March 16, 2022, Russia no longer considers itself bound by its legal acts.

ASB Military News - 17 March 2022
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
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Even though i hope they reach an agreement soon. Civilian population is suffering beyond what we could even imagine.
 
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