It seems to me that this configuration would easily allow the deployment of 3 full squadrons of J-35s, with 29 on deck and 7 in the hangar along with 2 more KJ-600s and the usual complement of helos, a far bigger complement than the America class in lightning carrier mode, with the benefit of AEW&C to boot.
Type 076 LHD/LHA discussion
- Thread starter banjex
- Start date
Honestly not a fan of such fantasizing. I suspect it stems from the usual "whatever the US has, we must also have" mentality, where seeing the Lightning Carriers prompts a desire to have our J-35s on it asap.
The 076 doesn't need to worry about squads of J-35s right now. Just figure out how to effectively operate GJ-11s in the context of amphibious warfare and it will be more than fine.
The 076 doesn't need to worry about squads of J-35s right now. Just figure out how to effectively operate GJ-11s in the context of amphibious warfare and it will be more than fine.
This is a part of the reason people come here, or didn't you know. There's nothing wrong with envisioning the many possibilities for this absolutely unique class of ship. I have already imagined fighter heavy, mixed fighter/UAV, UAV heavy, mixed UAV/helo, helo heavy, etc. All of these are possible at this stage of the ship's reveal.
Even the idea of a "Lightning Carrier" is a bit silly for the America/Wasp class to be honest. However they are useful for the purposes of imaging, even if the likelihood of any J-35s being part of 076s regular air wing is unlikely, let alone an airwing fully configured for J-35 operations.
GJ-11 and J-35 pose essentially same problem from deck ops point of view.
J-35(more or less Phantom-sized aircraft) shouldn't be a problem for an Essex-sized Sichuan.
It's also rather "?" what's the special use of "just" a strike drone in amphibious operations context. If anything, it's presense of J-35 in air that can make GJ-11s a sensible amphibious operations multiplier.
Pretty sure the EM cat is not some kind of toss-this-into-the-design because it was cheap. It will not be cheap, will not take little space, and the power generation (and power storage) for it has to be accounted for from the very beginning of the ship's design. The length of this EM cat is close to or identical to that on the Fujian, so clearly there is at least the intention of launching aircraft that are significantly heavier than a GJ-11, either a larger UCAV or a fighter like the J-35, or even the KJ-600.
Lethe
Captain
Trying to make sense of 076 in relation to USN LHA-6/7 "Lightning Carriers" encounters the problem that those ships themselves are rather perplexing, in that it is difficult to imagine any non-specialized USMC/USN requirement that could be addressed with only two ships.
Delving into the history of these vessels, we find that LHA(R) was indeed intended to feature a well-deck as of . We further find that, , a well-deck featured in the then-favoured "plug plus" configuration that increased both length (+77ft) and beam (+11ft) over preceding LHD-8. Yet a scant few years later we find that LHA-6 has been laid down with baseline dimensions near identical to LHD-8, increased aviation capacity, and no well deck, to be followed up by additional ships (LHA-8 and beyond) that restore the well deck, presumably at the cost of reduced aviation capacity, returning to something like the baseline provided by LHD-8. A more detailed comparison of LHA(R) "plug plus" and final approved LHA-6 "Flight 0" configurations can be found in presentation.
How do we account for this series of decisions? The major feature to be explaining is the apparent insistence on increased aviation capacity for LHA-6/7 (envisioned for JSF and MV-22) followed by subsequent reversion to the mean with LHA-8 and beyond. It appears that the more ambitious (and well-deck-including) "plug plus" configuration was likely foreclosed by budget considerations but, when a retreat from that configuration was required, the enhanced aviation capacity was kept at the cost of the well deck. In the absence of a smoking gun that clearly establishes the facts, two narrative pathways present themselves: (1) That this is all part of the general malaise and doctrinal uncertainty of post-Cold War and GWOT-era USN/USMC. See: Zumwalt, LCS, Desert Storm, Donald Rumsfeld, Revolution in Military Affairs, Revolution at Sea, Forward from the Sea, SC21, etc. No doubt this is all implicated, yet a tighter narrative also presents itself:
The years of consideration and approval of LHA-6/7 with enhanced aviation capacity also coincide with years of debate concerning the size of USN's aircraft carrier inventory, as the last of USN's conventional carriers (USS John F. Kennedy CV-67 and USS Kitty Hawk CV-63) and the earliest of its nuclear carriers (USS Enterprise CVN-65) approached the end of their careers. In what is now a familiar dynamic, USN sought to retire elderly ships while Congress sought to maintain numbers, culminating in legislation requiring the Navy to maintain "not less than 12 operational aircraft carriers" (subsequently amended to 11). 2006 CRS report notes that Navy officials specifically pitched the expanded aviation capabilities of LHA(R) as partly compensating for the proposed retirement of USS John F. Kennedy CV-67.
Hence it is my interpretation that the aviation-centric configuration of LHA-6/7, while a mixed bag from USMC perspective who really wanted "all of the above" (i.e. a well deck as well), was likely sought and approved by USN because it helped to mollify Congress regarding declining carrier numbers and secure approval for the retirement schedule of the aforementioned three carriers. This task having now been accomplished, and carrier numbers more-or-less stabilised at 11, with future retirements more-or-less paired with inductions, LHA-8 returns to the LHD-8 mold, again with a well deck and reduced aviation capacity.
Delving into the history of these vessels, we find that LHA(R) was indeed intended to feature a well-deck as of . We further find that, , a well-deck featured in the then-favoured "plug plus" configuration that increased both length (+77ft) and beam (+11ft) over preceding LHD-8. Yet a scant few years later we find that LHA-6 has been laid down with baseline dimensions near identical to LHD-8, increased aviation capacity, and no well deck, to be followed up by additional ships (LHA-8 and beyond) that restore the well deck, presumably at the cost of reduced aviation capacity, returning to something like the baseline provided by LHD-8. A more detailed comparison of LHA(R) "plug plus" and final approved LHA-6 "Flight 0" configurations can be found in presentation.
How do we account for this series of decisions? The major feature to be explaining is the apparent insistence on increased aviation capacity for LHA-6/7 (envisioned for JSF and MV-22) followed by subsequent reversion to the mean with LHA-8 and beyond. It appears that the more ambitious (and well-deck-including) "plug plus" configuration was likely foreclosed by budget considerations but, when a retreat from that configuration was required, the enhanced aviation capacity was kept at the cost of the well deck. In the absence of a smoking gun that clearly establishes the facts, two narrative pathways present themselves: (1) That this is all part of the general malaise and doctrinal uncertainty of post-Cold War and GWOT-era USN/USMC. See: Zumwalt, LCS, Desert Storm, Donald Rumsfeld, Revolution in Military Affairs, Revolution at Sea, Forward from the Sea, SC21, etc. No doubt this is all implicated, yet a tighter narrative also presents itself:
The years of consideration and approval of LHA-6/7 with enhanced aviation capacity also coincide with years of debate concerning the size of USN's aircraft carrier inventory, as the last of USN's conventional carriers (USS John F. Kennedy CV-67 and USS Kitty Hawk CV-63) and the earliest of its nuclear carriers (USS Enterprise CVN-65) approached the end of their careers. In what is now a familiar dynamic, USN sought to retire elderly ships while Congress sought to maintain numbers, culminating in legislation requiring the Navy to maintain "not less than 12 operational aircraft carriers" (subsequently amended to 11). 2006 CRS report notes that Navy officials specifically pitched the expanded aviation capabilities of LHA(R) as partly compensating for the proposed retirement of USS John F. Kennedy CV-67.
Hence it is my interpretation that the aviation-centric configuration of LHA-6/7, while a mixed bag from USMC perspective who really wanted "all of the above" (i.e. a well deck as well), was likely sought and approved by USN because it helped to mollify Congress regarding declining carrier numbers and secure approval for the retirement schedule of the aforementioned three carriers. This task having now been accomplished, and carrier numbers more-or-less stabilised at 11, with future retirements more-or-less paired with inductions, LHA-8 returns to the LHD-8 mold, again with a well deck and reduced aviation capacity.
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Direct comparison is not indicative, but American EMALS by itself, without traps, costs as much as several 075 ships.
Even if Chinese EMAL is many times cheaper, it is anything but "just as well".
Then there's rest of the ship to match it, including different (way more expensive in procurement and operation) and much more powerful powerplant.
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Crew members of 076 LHD Sichuan sending Chinese New Year greetings. Posted by @WenJian0922 on Twitter.
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