Yes, the Indian government’s foreign policy is highly independent. They see themselves as leaders of the Global South while actively attracting Western investment and technology to counterbalance China. Therefore, India will absolutely not distance itself from the U.S. and Europe to move closer to China and Russia—they are merely practicing realist diplomacy. Moreover, I still believe that the contradictions between China and India are greater than those between the U.S. and India or Europe and India.
India benefits significantly from its large-scale imports of Russian oil. First, over 80% of India’s oil needs are met through imports, and Russian oil is very cheap. By refining Russian oil, India can export large quantities of refined oil products to balance its international payments. Let me reiterate my point: for a country like India, which is relatively resource-scarce and has an industrial scale insufficient to match its population size, foreign exchange is its lifeline. Additionally, the many by-products of oil refining can be used for India’s own infrastructure development, including cement, asphalt, and, most importantly, fertilizers. India is still an agricultural nation, and fertilizers are crucial to its food security. Russian oil has a high sulfur content, which can be used to produce phosphate fertilizers, while naphtha can be used to make nitrogen fertilizers. This is also why India hopes China will lift restrictions on fertilizer trade with India.
Therefore, I don’t believe the Trump administration’s sanctions against India were merely irrational actions. If you observe the regions where the Trump administration has intervened—whether Iran, Yemen, or Venezuela—its actions almost always revolve around oil. The Trump administration clearly wanted to pressure India into absorbing U.S. oil exports to balance U.S.-India trade.
I must remind everyone that there are intricate connections between the upper echelons of the U.S. and India. As a country with mature electoral politics and lobbying systems, India’s elites can influence U.S. leadership through political lobbying, electoral impact, and business relationships. Similarly, U.S. elites can influence India in the same way. In fact, this is also why political trust between China and the U.S. is extremely low. China’s political system is highly independent, and any external attempts to influence it trigger the highest level of vigilance. At the same time, due to ideological reasons, U.S. elites also reject potential Chinese influence on them. Therefore, the controllability of India-U.S. relations is far greater than that of China-U.S. relations.
Finally, for China, the benefits of courting India are limited, as it does not help maintain China’s relative power advantage over India. Pakistan and Bangladesh remain two strategic anchors for China’s South Asia strategy. First, given the current political climate in India, the BJP’s method of consolidating Indian society will inevitably continue to provoke conflicts between Hindus and Muslims, which will spill over into India’s relations with Islamic countries. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh view India with significant vigilance and distrust, so their stance toward India is likely to remain firm in the future. Second, India’s current total fertility rate is around 1.6–1.9, while Bangladesh and Pakistan’s rates are still between 2 and 4. Together, Pakistan and Bangladesh will form a market of at least 500 million people in the future, and a larger population means more room for growth. Although Pakistan’s current political and economic environment is indeed unhealthy, this does not mean Pakistan lacks value for China. Meanwhile, since the fall of the Hasina government, public opinion, political parties, and the upper echelons in Bangladesh have begun shifting away from India and toward China. Therefore, both Pakistan and Bangladesh will inevitably become increasingly important for China’s strategy in South Asia and even Southeast Asia.