It appears the anti-China alliance between the US and India remains unchanged, with the earlier humiliation of India seemingly a personal impulse on Trump's part.
Trump 2.0 official thread
- Thread starter siegecrossbow
- Start date
Thats exactly what i have been saying, i dont think that our friend understands this. The US has been trying for decades to bring India by herside and the US has even made many concessions to India (alllowing Indis in NSG despite violating the rules and reluctance by other members, pushing for relocation of US/Western/Korean/Japanese/Taiwan companies from China to India, allowing US IT services to relocate to India which is actually one of India's largest source of revenue, etc etc) . However, India hasnt changed her position or policy at all to the fustration of washington. What people forget is that this fustration didnt start with Trump, it has been the case even with past american administrations if you pay attention to past articles. Trump is just more emotional, direct, and cut throat in his response and quick to use US HARD POWER directly, while others were still trying to be patient with India hoping New delhi will change her policy and ally with the US(which i dont believe would have ever happened anyway. Lol)
Just like Lutnik said, India will come to the negotiatiin table snd agree to US demands. They simply have no choice, what can they do? Turn to China? Lol Russia? Loool. So it's realistic that Modi will have to give in on this one and play the long game, its the rational thing to do. You dont run a country based on your emotions or your feelings but on pragmagtic thinking and hard choices while looking at the bigher picture.
So forget all the sweet or bitter talks between head of states, look at what transpired between both sides at the end of the day. India will cave , that is realpolitik. Obviously it doesn't mean they suddenly like each other, and forgot about their bad blood. Lol far from it. Its just politics.
Last edited:
Courting India is a lot like bribing Indian government officials — you pay exorbitant sums not to get things done, but to stop them from sabotaging you. Does Trump strike you as the type who would give in to blackmail?
AssassinsMace
Lieutenant General
Trump is going to the APEC summit next month taking place in South Korea. Apparently he’s hoping to meet Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un while over there. Trump so eager to look Presidential to the world after what happened at China’s Victory Day parade. I was watching a French news round table on YouTube and they were asking why no European leaders were there. Do they have to ask? Like if they were invited, they then wouldn’t reject it to act like it not important enough to be bothered with? And Trump wants the photo-op of being around bigger world leaders than the ones in Europe.
AssassinsMace
Lieutenant General
Frankly it sounds like what the US policy was all along. The US will act for its own interests. It’s all the other stuff like helping to defend others for their own interests was always the bull. US interests could mean anywhere in the world. So what’s different from how it is now? China is making inroads in South America. Like the Monroe Doctrine says… that’s the US’s backyard. The US is open to stopping China there at all costs dictating with military force what South America can or cannot do. The US is just being honest now that it’s only about what the US wants now. It relieves the US of any burden and obligation to honor any treaties and/or agreements.
Biden essentially forced US allies to serve US interests first even as it’s destroying its allies economies to this day. Why is that different from Trump? Because they can hide under the cloak of human rights principles? And US allies have to now buy US energy to survive something the US is making huge amounts of money where allies even complained about to Biden. In these dark times for the world economy, the US manages to force allies to sacrifice so the US can survive under these conditions. That’s what they had in mind for China to serve the West and the reason why they hate China now not because they were thinking what was best for the whole world. See… Trump is just taking away the veil of civility from what they all were doing in the first place.
And here's to hoping the veil never goes back on. Keeping the veil off makes it much easier for the lower IQ portion of the global population to understand what is really at stake.
Yes, the Indian government’s foreign policy is highly independent. They see themselves as leaders of the Global South while actively attracting Western investment and technology to counterbalance China. Therefore, India will absolutely not distance itself from the U.S. and Europe to move closer to China and Russia—they are merely practicing realist diplomacy. Moreover, I still believe that the contradictions between China and India are greater than those between the U.S. and India or Europe and India.
India benefits significantly from its large-scale imports of Russian oil. First, over 80% of India’s oil needs are met through imports, and Russian oil is very cheap. By refining Russian oil, India can export large quantities of refined oil products to balance its international payments. Let me reiterate my point: for a country like India, which is relatively resource-scarce and has an industrial scale insufficient to match its population size, foreign exchange is its lifeline. Additionally, the many by-products of oil refining can be used for India’s own infrastructure development, including cement, asphalt, and, most importantly, fertilizers. India is still an agricultural nation, and fertilizers are crucial to its food security. Russian oil has a high sulfur content, which can be used to produce phosphate fertilizers, while naphtha can be used to make nitrogen fertilizers. This is also why India hopes China will lift restrictions on fertilizer trade with India.
Therefore, I don’t believe the Trump administration’s sanctions against India were merely irrational actions. If you observe the regions where the Trump administration has intervened—whether Iran, Yemen, or Venezuela—its actions almost always revolve around oil. The Trump administration clearly wanted to pressure India into absorbing U.S. oil exports to balance U.S.-India trade.
I must remind everyone that there are intricate connections between the upper echelons of the U.S. and India. As a country with mature electoral politics and lobbying systems, India’s elites can influence U.S. leadership through political lobbying, electoral impact, and business relationships. Similarly, U.S. elites can influence India in the same way. In fact, this is also why political trust between China and the U.S. is extremely low. China’s political system is highly independent, and any external attempts to influence it trigger the highest level of vigilance. At the same time, due to ideological reasons, U.S. elites also reject potential Chinese influence on them. Therefore, the controllability of India-U.S. relations is far greater than that of China-U.S. relations.
Finally, for China, the benefits of courting India are limited, as it does not help maintain China’s relative power advantage over India. Pakistan and Bangladesh remain two strategic anchors for China’s South Asia strategy. First, given the current political climate in India, the BJP’s method of consolidating Indian society will inevitably continue to provoke conflicts between Hindus and Muslims, which will spill over into India’s relations with Islamic countries. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh view India with significant vigilance and distrust, so their stance toward India is likely to remain firm in the future. Second, India’s current total fertility rate is around 1.6–1.9, while Bangladesh and Pakistan’s rates are still between 2 and 4. Together, Pakistan and Bangladesh will form a market of at least 500 million people in the future, and a larger population means more room for growth. Although Pakistan’s current political and economic environment is indeed unhealthy, this does not mean Pakistan lacks value for China. Meanwhile, since the fall of the Hasina government, public opinion, political parties, and the upper echelons in Bangladesh have begun shifting away from India and toward China. Therefore, both Pakistan and Bangladesh will inevitably become increasingly important for China’s strategy in South Asia and even Southeast Asia.
India benefits significantly from its large-scale imports of Russian oil. First, over 80% of India’s oil needs are met through imports, and Russian oil is very cheap. By refining Russian oil, India can export large quantities of refined oil products to balance its international payments. Let me reiterate my point: for a country like India, which is relatively resource-scarce and has an industrial scale insufficient to match its population size, foreign exchange is its lifeline. Additionally, the many by-products of oil refining can be used for India’s own infrastructure development, including cement, asphalt, and, most importantly, fertilizers. India is still an agricultural nation, and fertilizers are crucial to its food security. Russian oil has a high sulfur content, which can be used to produce phosphate fertilizers, while naphtha can be used to make nitrogen fertilizers. This is also why India hopes China will lift restrictions on fertilizer trade with India.
Therefore, I don’t believe the Trump administration’s sanctions against India were merely irrational actions. If you observe the regions where the Trump administration has intervened—whether Iran, Yemen, or Venezuela—its actions almost always revolve around oil. The Trump administration clearly wanted to pressure India into absorbing U.S. oil exports to balance U.S.-India trade.
I must remind everyone that there are intricate connections between the upper echelons of the U.S. and India. As a country with mature electoral politics and lobbying systems, India’s elites can influence U.S. leadership through political lobbying, electoral impact, and business relationships. Similarly, U.S. elites can influence India in the same way. In fact, this is also why political trust between China and the U.S. is extremely low. China’s political system is highly independent, and any external attempts to influence it trigger the highest level of vigilance. At the same time, due to ideological reasons, U.S. elites also reject potential Chinese influence on them. Therefore, the controllability of India-U.S. relations is far greater than that of China-U.S. relations.
Finally, for China, the benefits of courting India are limited, as it does not help maintain China’s relative power advantage over India. Pakistan and Bangladesh remain two strategic anchors for China’s South Asia strategy. First, given the current political climate in India, the BJP’s method of consolidating Indian society will inevitably continue to provoke conflicts between Hindus and Muslims, which will spill over into India’s relations with Islamic countries. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh view India with significant vigilance and distrust, so their stance toward India is likely to remain firm in the future. Second, India’s current total fertility rate is around 1.6–1.9, while Bangladesh and Pakistan’s rates are still between 2 and 4. Together, Pakistan and Bangladesh will form a market of at least 500 million people in the future, and a larger population means more room for growth. Although Pakistan’s current political and economic environment is indeed unhealthy, this does not mean Pakistan lacks value for China. Meanwhile, since the fall of the Hasina government, public opinion, political parties, and the upper echelons in Bangladesh have begun shifting away from India and toward China. Therefore, both Pakistan and Bangladesh will inevitably become increasingly important for China’s strategy in South Asia and even Southeast Asia.