SAM launchers are soft targets. We had the video of one shot sniper API round making them do fireworks, stunning explosions.
The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
The flag of Russia is lowered over the building of the former Kherson regional administration, but this is not the building where the Russian authorities are located
Russian flags remain on the building of the City Council and other state institutions.
Information about Russia's intentions regarding Kherson was mixed up for weeks by Ukrainians and Western analysts. Based on statements from the Russian side, and specifically from General Surovikin, the possibility of withdrawing from the right bank of the Dnieper was considered so as not to have troops surrounded on the slope of the river, but it was also reported that the arrival of the 80,000 mobilized to stabilize the forward were also sent to Kherson to fortify the other side of the river.
The news is lower due to an expected period of eama + repositioning + local advances and retreats instead of big trades. But the war remains intense, only weak from shocking news.
But here's a tweet updating:
A few thoughts on the current course of the war, and some impressions after a recent visit to Ukraine with several colleagues from the mil analysis community, including areas near the front in Kherson. /1
The general sense one gets is that Ukraine is winning the war & morale is high, but like any military operation, you see friction up close that you can’t from a distance. A fair bit of the UA effort is ground up, based on horizontal linkages, volunteers, apps, etc. 2/
Russia’s military appears at its most vulnerable going into the winter, but UA has seen some modest impact from RU mobilization. Troops are being deployed to try and stabilize Russian lines, and increase force density relative to terrain. 3/
The situation in Kherson is clear as mud. Russian forces seemed to withdraw from some parts, evacuated, and drew down, but also reinforced with mobilized personnel. The fighting there is difficult. Despite constrained supply, Russian forces do not appear to be out of ammo. 4/
I think this is a fog of war issue right now, with contradictory indicators, but to me the preponderance of evidence points to a Russian decision to steadily retreat from the right river bank and avoid being cut off there, while also trying to exact a high cost. 5/
UA folks I spoke to seemed optimistic they can press Russia out of Kherson (west of the river) by the end of the year. There are outstanding questions about the Khakovka dam, and whether RU might sabotage it upon withdrawal. This issue is more salient than talk of RDDs. 6/
Still, it remains unclear whether RU intends to fight for Kherson city, perhaps using more expendable or mobilized units while preserving better troops. I'm skeptical RU will abandon all positions on that side without being forcibly pressed out, but could be wrong on this. 7/
Forcing a Russian retreat from Kherson’s right bank will bring UA systems within range of some ground lines of communication from Crimea. But, it will also give RU forces a large natural barrier, less terrain to defend, and a higher force density to terrain ratio. 8/
Overall, it seems unlikely that the war will die down over the winter, even if some months make offensive operations challenging. UA will likely leverage its advantage in range and precision to attrit the Russian military over this period. 9/
Strikes across Ukraine are leading to blackouts and electricity conservation. UA is resolving these blackouts quickly, and if anything the bombardment campaign bolsters resolve, but over time the challenges from these strikes could mount, straining equipment and ADS ammo. 10/
I’ve been dismissive of the Belarus vector, despite recent RU deployments there. But the situation merits tracking over the coming months if numbers of Russian troops grow and they are provided heavy equipment. 11/
Mobilization, and its potential downstream effect 3-4 months from now introduces a degree of uncertainty. It could extend the war, or make future UA offensives more costly, but I think UA is preparing for a range of possibilities depending on what mobilization yields. 12/
On mobilization I largely hold to the thoughts in this earlier thread. It seems RU is taking a staggered approach, throwing some mobilized personnel with little training to stabilize lines, but holding many back to reconstitute units or form reserves.
RU strategy appears to be focused on defense over the winter, hoping that mobilization can rebuild their forces. If the pressure lets up they will use the time to get more equipment out of storage (including from Belarus) & potentially ammo from sources like DPRK. 14/
In the east RU forces appear desperate to hold the Troitske-Svatove-Kreminna line and are trying to dig in for the winter. Here a UA breakout could prove significant. In general it seems RU approach is to try and fix a defensible line and hope to maintain over the winter. 15/
UA objectives are likely to prevent Russian force reconstitution over the winter, generate additional forces in the interim (which requires more equipment), and acquire air defenses to reduce the threat from the Russian strike campaign against critical infrastructure. 16/
Russian flags remain on the building of the City Council and other state institutions.
Information about Russia's intentions regarding Kherson was mixed up for weeks by Ukrainians and Western analysts. Based on statements from the Russian side, and specifically from General Surovikin, the possibility of withdrawing from the right bank of the Dnieper was considered so as not to have troops surrounded on the slope of the river, but it was also reported that the arrival of the 80,000 mobilized to stabilize the forward were also sent to Kherson to fortify the other side of the river.
The news is lower due to an expected period of eama + repositioning + local advances and retreats instead of big trades. But the war remains intense, only weak from shocking news.
But here's a tweet updating:
A few thoughts on the current course of the war, and some impressions after a recent visit to Ukraine with several colleagues from the mil analysis community, including areas near the front in Kherson. /1
The general sense one gets is that Ukraine is winning the war & morale is high, but like any military operation, you see friction up close that you can’t from a distance. A fair bit of the UA effort is ground up, based on horizontal linkages, volunteers, apps, etc. 2/
Russia’s military appears at its most vulnerable going into the winter, but UA has seen some modest impact from RU mobilization. Troops are being deployed to try and stabilize Russian lines, and increase force density relative to terrain. 3/
The situation in Kherson is clear as mud. Russian forces seemed to withdraw from some parts, evacuated, and drew down, but also reinforced with mobilized personnel. The fighting there is difficult. Despite constrained supply, Russian forces do not appear to be out of ammo. 4/
I think this is a fog of war issue right now, with contradictory indicators, but to me the preponderance of evidence points to a Russian decision to steadily retreat from the right river bank and avoid being cut off there, while also trying to exact a high cost. 5/
UA folks I spoke to seemed optimistic they can press Russia out of Kherson (west of the river) by the end of the year. There are outstanding questions about the Khakovka dam, and whether RU might sabotage it upon withdrawal. This issue is more salient than talk of RDDs. 6/
Still, it remains unclear whether RU intends to fight for Kherson city, perhaps using more expendable or mobilized units while preserving better troops. I'm skeptical RU will abandon all positions on that side without being forcibly pressed out, but could be wrong on this. 7/
Forcing a Russian retreat from Kherson’s right bank will bring UA systems within range of some ground lines of communication from Crimea. But, it will also give RU forces a large natural barrier, less terrain to defend, and a higher force density to terrain ratio. 8/
Overall, it seems unlikely that the war will die down over the winter, even if some months make offensive operations challenging. UA will likely leverage its advantage in range and precision to attrit the Russian military over this period. 9/
Strikes across Ukraine are leading to blackouts and electricity conservation. UA is resolving these blackouts quickly, and if anything the bombardment campaign bolsters resolve, but over time the challenges from these strikes could mount, straining equipment and ADS ammo. 10/
I’ve been dismissive of the Belarus vector, despite recent RU deployments there. But the situation merits tracking over the coming months if numbers of Russian troops grow and they are provided heavy equipment. 11/
Mobilization, and its potential downstream effect 3-4 months from now introduces a degree of uncertainty. It could extend the war, or make future UA offensives more costly, but I think UA is preparing for a range of possibilities depending on what mobilization yields. 12/
On mobilization I largely hold to the thoughts in this earlier thread. It seems RU is taking a staggered approach, throwing some mobilized personnel with little training to stabilize lines, but holding many back to reconstitute units or form reserves.
RU strategy appears to be focused on defense over the winter, hoping that mobilization can rebuild their forces. If the pressure lets up they will use the time to get more equipment out of storage (including from Belarus) & potentially ammo from sources like DPRK. 14/
In the east RU forces appear desperate to hold the Troitske-Svatove-Kreminna line and are trying to dig in for the winter. Here a UA breakout could prove significant. In general it seems RU approach is to try and fix a defensible line and hope to maintain over the winter. 15/
UA objectives are likely to prevent Russian force reconstitution over the winter, generate additional forces in the interim (which requires more equipment), and acquire air defenses to reduce the threat from the Russian strike campaign against critical infrastructure. 16/
it boils down the speed and sustainability of mobilization. ukraine won the last round because russia didnt even mobilize, hence the dramatic shift in battlespace. but the next round of mobilization race is like to be won by russia, as ukraine is running out of able-bodied men from the first seven rounds. and the current 300k mobilization certainly will not be its last. russia can easily just do another couple rounds of lesser numbers. once its bureaucracy and industrial production is reoriented towards the war effort, i think russia will begin to find ease with replenishing the front with fresh troops and equipment.
Russia always tends to start the war by loosing initially and then regaining momentum later
It is so realistic.
I mean, if you drop a random company, and ask about the current state of them the best that you receive is a generic happy statement about the very good standing of the business, the bright future and so on.
Even if the given business will be in bankrupcy in few hours.
Now, anyone expect that a random person, whom job is to relay infomration to the public could receive anyting better than my above example ? I mean, anything that can be interpreted by not "lie"?
If the answer is yes from anyone then please PM me, I have the Eiffel tower for sale. It is really cheap.
Ukraine has 60k soldiers/fresh recruits being trained all over Europe and a few weeks ago 10k being trained in UK returned to Ukraine fully geared and with transport vehicles. Ukraine will be more than fine unlike Russian recruits who many of them are refusing to fight for lack of pay and equipment.
I have heard all sorts of bollocks propaganda including that Russian soldiers are poorly paid.
For example this British propaganda on Youtube claims the salary of the Russian soldiers they called up is 40,000 rubles ($638) per month.
But if you know the actual official information...
""Military pay has been settled for the citizens called up for military service under mobilization in accordance with the position they hold, but not less than 195,000 rubles ($3,177) per calendar month," the defense minister said."
So it is like 5x as much as what the propaganda claims. Way more than the average Russian salary. Heck more than the average salary in most Western countries.
Sure there might have been the occasional hiccups. It happens when you draft hundreds of thousands of people. But so far the government has been trying to solve all issues as they show up with decent success at that.
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Yes, when it comes to the Russian mobilizations, there are all sorts misinformation from the West, saying they are poorly equipped, poorly trained, low moral and many trying to escape the draft. The thing is, the Russians have no trouble at all reaching their quotas for the mobilization. So far, the few complains that I heard the West dredged up were soldiers complaining about lack of equipment. This means the soldiers are willing to go fight and wanted to be well equipped for the job. There is no one complaining about not wanting to fight. What is more, most of these are veterans that had training and many have fighting experience.
Thus far, the Ukrainian dead and seriously wounded was estimated at 110K. Given the low number of fighters on the Russian side, even if they were to lose half of that number, it would have a serous impact on their fighting capability. From what I have read that seem reliable, the number on the Russian counterpart maybe 20-30K if you include local forces. The Russians rotated their troops so losses are evenly distributed. If you consider that at the beginning, the Russians loss more people due to their mad dash across the country, and that later they have really calibrated their operations to minimize losses, the current kill ratio might be 5:1 or 6:1 or even higher. We can see this in the recent fighting in Bhakmut. There were times when the Russians have already entered the city and were driven back by the Ukrainians. The Russians were able to take Lysychansk once they entered the city despite reinforcements sent there by the Ukrainians. What changed in Bhakmut? I think the Russians found a situation in Bhakmut that is favorable to them to do the war of attrition and are in no hurry to take Bhakmut. After fighting for months, you know every building where Ukrainians will put their troops. You have established a supply line for your cannons and troops. You have even worked out tactics that allow you to maximize the number of Ukrainians kill per cannon shell. As long as the Ukrainians keep sending people there, you would just keep the good thing going. Why would you engage in street to street fighting when the cannons can do the job with far fewer losses.
Even with 200K+ men in training, we are seeing the Russians resuming their offensive in Vuhledar and Avdiivka. The Ukrainian offensive in Kherson is stalled not for lack of trying. Once the fully mobilized troops are ready, things are going to look bleak for the Ukrainian side.
Recently, Ukrainians were said to mobilize 100K troop to make up for the losses. This confirms the 110K killed or seriously wounded as estimated by the Russians. It also point to an exhaustion of available manpower. You would think that they would at least match the 300K number the Russians are doing. If anything, you need more troops to make up for the lack of equipment and logistics.
Thus far, the Ukrainian dead and seriously wounded was estimated at 110K. Given the low number of fighters on the Russian side, even if they were to lose half of that number, it would have a serous impact on their fighting capability. From what I have read that seem reliable, the number on the Russian counterpart maybe 20-30K if you include local forces. The Russians rotated their troops so losses are evenly distributed. If you consider that at the beginning, the Russians loss more people due to their mad dash across the country, and that later they have really calibrated their operations to minimize losses, the current kill ratio might be 5:1 or 6:1 or even higher. We can see this in the recent fighting in Bhakmut. There were times when the Russians have already entered the city and were driven back by the Ukrainians. The Russians were able to take Lysychansk once they entered the city despite reinforcements sent there by the Ukrainians. What changed in Bhakmut? I think the Russians found a situation in Bhakmut that is favorable to them to do the war of attrition and are in no hurry to take Bhakmut. After fighting for months, you know every building where Ukrainians will put their troops. You have established a supply line for your cannons and troops. You have even worked out tactics that allow you to maximize the number of Ukrainians kill per cannon shell. As long as the Ukrainians keep sending people there, you would just keep the good thing going. Why would you engage in street to street fighting when the cannons can do the job with far fewer losses.
Even with 200K+ men in training, we are seeing the Russians resuming their offensive in Vuhledar and Avdiivka. The Ukrainian offensive in Kherson is stalled not for lack of trying. Once the fully mobilized troops are ready, things are going to look bleak for the Ukrainian side.
Recently, Ukrainians were said to mobilize 100K troop to make up for the losses. This confirms the 110K killed or seriously wounded as estimated by the Russians. It also point to an exhaustion of available manpower. You would think that they would at least match the 300K number the Russians are doing. If anything, you need more troops to make up for the lack of equipment and logistics.
More up to date drone kills. A couple of howitzers.
Pr. 305 kill. This weapon is underrated.
Quadcopter dropping a grenade on an open hatch of an M113. Seen a number of videos by the DPR and LPR doing this, and on trenches. Particularly favored by the Somali and Sparta Battalions. At times it's not a grenade but a mortar shell.
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IDK how accurate this site is but E-7 sergeant 1st class salary is the equivalent of whatever the Russians are paying as the bare minimum. Basic pay for US privates is apparently $1833 per month. Interesting that the Russians are offering that much money as the basic salary.