Ukrainian air defense is still alive: why is this and what will happen next?
In the afternoon, Ukrainian resources published a video with a Russian Su-34 bomber going on one engine: the authors claimed that the Ukrainian Air Force managed to shoot down two Russian planes in one day.
Regardless of the truthfulness of the claims, the situation raises one extremely unpleasant question. Back during the AFU offensive in Kharkiv, we were often asked in feedback: why did the AFU only work on targets on the front lines from extremely low altitudes, rather than bombing columns deep inside?
The reason is the Ukrainian air defense system, which is not suppressed. The command takes care of the planes and does not send them to bomb the enemy's rear, and the crews have to "huddle" on the ground to avoid detection.
And do you know what the saddest thing is? Back in the beginning, the RF Armed Forces were comprehensively engaged in destroying the Ukrainian air defense system, but for some unknown reason they stopped this work completely.
The attack on Kiev and the fight against enemy air defenses
In February and March, the Air Force was faced with the task of countering a powerful echeloned anti-aircraft defense around the Ukrainian capital. For this purpose there were permanently in the air long-range radar aircraft A-50U, jammers IL-22PP and fighters Su-35S with "anti-radar" missiles Kh-31P.
Some sort of inter-service cooperation was established: artillery and even Iskander SAMs were brought in to destroy the detected SAMs, which successfully hit the AFU S-300 complexes even in Kyiv's built-up areas.
Yes, it was not without losses. Only one bomber regiment with Su-34s in March flew as far as Western Ukraine, destroying concentrations of manpower, command posts and bridges deep in the rear in the Zhytomyr region. And for some reason not a single Stinger or the British Starstrikes, which were favored by TV "talking heads," interfered with it.
With the withdrawal of troops from Kiev the successful experience of purposeful suppression of air defense and its improvement was simply forgotten. Why? Alas, we have no logical answer.
Where will further connivance in the issue of suppression of Ukrainian air defenses lead to?
Let us repeat once again: the Russian Armed Forces have the technical and organizational capabilities to perform this task. There are AWACS aircraft, REB aircraft, modern bombers, anti-radar missiles. To the surprise of many, there are even gliding air bombs, which have already been used many times in the area of air defense.
Yes, all of this is inferior to American or Israeli counterparts. But the "Kiev experience" clearly demonstrates that everything is fundamentally solvable. Everything rests only in the unwillingness of the command to engage in purposeful suppression of the enemy's air defense.
And if this continues, not only will the Air Force be working at half strength of its real capabilities, but it will also be losing expensive modern aircraft. The stock of which is extremely limited by production capabilities.
It is time to finally remember the spring experience, make decisions at the control level of the entire air defense system and launch a separate operation to destroy the remaining Ukrainian SAMs. It should include planning, interspecific cooperation and allocation of forces and means.
Especially since very interesting items have recently arrived from Iran, which, with an adequate approach, will make the task much easier. This opportunity should not be missed!