I am really scratching my head in respect of what I am hearing about Kherson.
The line seems to be that the Ukraine has amassed a force of up to 200,000 in the Kherson area and that this has forced the Russians to re-deploy up to 30 BTG's to their Kherson front in order to counter it.
200 thousand people is close to the entire MTOAE of Ukrainian Armed Forces. The figure might be true but involves all mobilized personnel under Southern Theater Command.
A BTG is not a "battalion" but a combined arms tactical formation deployed by a brigade or regiment rotating two or three battalions as part of BTG structure. If Russian brigades and regiments are at full strength then it is possible to count "two BTGs" per regiment or brigade in units consisting of four battalions. However since Russian forces other than VDV were deployed at 60% of nominal strength due to legal constraints then a "BTG" deployed by a Russian unit includes an entire brigade or regiment. "30 BTGs" means
30 brigades or regiments and there are no such force available until wartime mobilization is announced.
A force sized at "30 battalions" is plausible but it tells us nothing about combat potential.
This is a simplified comparison of nominal strength i.e. not including actual numbers for units which have been deployed in the theater for the last two months.
- bz/BZ - mechanized/motor-rifle battalion/brigade
- bcz/BPanc - tank battalion/brigade
- bzmot/BZmot - motorized battalion/brigade
- (R) - reserve unit, mobilized
- dart - artillery division
- czołgi - tanks
- bwp - ifvs
- 152/155, 122, AR 122 - artillery / rocket artillery divisions
+/- indicates an unit added or subtracted from calculus. This table reflect state at the end of June.
Based on this Cherson is the only place along the entire front where Ukraine has 2:1 advantage in tanks per nominal figures and holds or approaches parity in other areas. Both sides have had their units decimated so the actual figures will be very different.
As for Kherson. Are the Ukrainians really planning to pit large, but badly equipped and poorly led, mainly light territorial foot infantry units against up to 30 Professional Russian BTG,s in open steppe, where the Russians dominate in terms of Air Power and Artillery? Really?
If they do, it could be the real knock out blow that ends the effective part of the war altogether.
If "Kherson" is understood as the section of the front from city of Kherson to Nikopol/Enerhodar and the operation limited to eliminating Russian presence on the western bank of Dnepr then it is the only area where Ukraine holds advantage over Russia. Ukraine doesn't need to push across the Dnepr because as long as they have access to GMLRS they can isolate and disrupt Russian logistics all the way to Perekop and Novoaleksiyvka-Melitpol line essentially making it impossible for Russia to field its forces in that area.
This is map of GMLRS range fired from locations behind current frontline. The range is sufficient to interdict all logistics supporting defense on the western bank of Dnepr.
This is a map of indicative phases of advance to the Dnepr line (PL: Faza 1/ EN: Phase 1) and further - depending on the outcome of phase 1. Phases 2 to 4 are viable if Russian defenses in the area collapse and relocate to a more sustainable line at Crimea boundary and Novoaleksiyvka-Melitpol in the east. The blue circles are nominal ranges of GMLRS and S-300 (big circle) and BM-21/27 and Buk (small circle). The red lines denote main road and rail junctions. Conditional on GMLRS supply it becomes impossible to maintain supply lines in this theater as soon as Ukrainian forces reach the Dnepr.
This is an indicative diagram of Russian air defenses in the theater. Due to GMLRS range it uses Dzhankoi base as S-400 site and available Southern Military District air force assets. The dashed lines are radar horizon - numbers indicate altitude of the horizon and distance from radar. Red circles are ranges of 9M96 and 40N6 missiles. The aircraft display three ranges for air-to-air missiles: maximum, effective and no escape zone.
As indicated the altitude below 1km is safe for UAF pilots and possibly all the way to 2km due to radar horizon and insufficient Russian AEW cover which is limited in time.
Southern Military district is the weakest of all the three main districts. It has no Su-35 unit at full operational capability and uses Su-27SM3 and SM as standard air superiority fighters. Majority of Su-30SM of SMD are based east of Donbas which leaves Su-34 as the best air superiority aircraft.
Considering NATO AEW presence this is the only area where the remnant of Ukrainian air force can contest air superiority - unsuccessfuly to gain it, but successfully to deny it to Russia - and counter air strikes. Such operation would incur losses but Russian air force operates at reduced capability due to continuing operations which should have ended three months ago if air war manuals were followed and therefore it can't afford to lose any significant number of aircraft e.g. 10 airframes. Russian tactical aviation units are not fungible and can't be shifted around like infantry or artillery units. All the advantages that Russia enjoys in the east of Ukraine are not present here. The only viable way to prevent such counter is to conduct an intensive air operation from the north to absorb remaining Ukrainian assets in defense of Kiyv etc.
Helicopters operating from Dzhankoy have limited range so the most important advantage is neutralized in the crucial Dnepr approach. Russian artillery is not as problematic due to extreme logistical constraints.
If Russia concentrates sufficient forces in this area - and there were various rumors of VDV units being redirected there - it might prove decisive, but in the other direction. It is the single worst area for anyone to defend, and the same reasons why Ukrainian defenses collapse on the very first day will hamper Russia if it chooses to defend territory. Russian positions west of Dnepr as very bad long-term. East of Dnepr there are no real "positions" to speak of. In such conditions Russian concentration and then defeat means combat power loss forcing negotiations to freeze conflict. Ukrainian defeat means status quo because Russia currently doesn't have means to push further.
Therefore the factor that will determine the outcome is politics since expending resources here will have consequences in other areas. The obvious tradeoff is that an achievable success in Kherson, will mean loss of Donbass. While strategically feasible it might be problematic politically.