The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
These interception rates are fantastical. As in, based on fantasy and not reality.
[/QUOTE]
These figures are woefully out of date as reported by the Pavel Luzin in his "One-Way Ticket" article for Ridl. The methodology he uses to even get these figures is ridiculous. Just for reference here is the direct text;
"Consequently, from the 1990s to the mid-2010s Russia managed to three turbojet engines for its cruise missiles: the R125−300 engine, a simplified version of the R95−300 with reduced thrust, and two variants of the TRDD-50 turbojet. And while the R125−300 is suitable for the Kh-35 missiles, the two variants of the TRDD-50 give the missiles a range of up to 1,000 km and 2,500 km (or even more), respectively. The former variant is installed on most Kalibr missiles, as well as the 9M729 and Kh-59 missiles. The latter is installed on sea-launched Kalibr-NK and air-launched Kh-101 missiles, with of this variant launched as late as in 2014−2015. Here, it can be added that workforce productivity at the United Engine Corporation’s is 6 to 11 times lower than at the US companies and , which are also involved in the production of engines for cruise missiles. As a result, the annual production of TRDD-50 turbojets can be estimated at 45−50 units in each of its two variants. That is, the total annual production of the Kalibr, Kh-101, 9M729 and Kh-59 cruise missiles is unlikely to exceed 100 missiles."
The last sentence in particular has been shown to be ridiculously false. So no. Publicly available sources are shit, and have assumed that what the Russian MIC delivered between the years 2000-2021 represents the peak of what Russian MIC can deliver for that time period. This is objectively a bad assumption to make. In fact, it would be very safe to assume that Saturn can manufacture well above 100 engines per year even as far back as 2018.
Why?
It is well known in Russian analysis circles that Russian Ground Forces got a massive shafting in the SAP 2020 program, an issue that was rectified only in SAP 2027. SAP 2020 injected a lot of cash into Naval and Aerospace forces, and the MIC failed to deliver in those areas. By contrast, the Ground Forces got a lot less inventory in the same time period, the major bottleneck was not in munitions production as far as I could tell. No, in fact Russian MOD was skittish about ordering PGMs and next-gen platforms until the Russian intervention in Syria, at which point PGM orders consistently trended upwards.
So again. No. It is reasonable to expect Russia's true production rate of missiles to be considerably higher than what Pavel estimated. This shouldn't even be a debate.
The individual didn't know how to film the target. In fact, the person that pointed out the missile was not an individual, but Telegram and Twitter accounts who took the time to look at the video frame by frame.
I'm not gonna argue this point with you, I'm simply going to wait for a report from a professional publication who will most likely analyze this footage and reference this. RUSI has done so before, someone will definitely do so with this clip. It is too distinctive to ignore.
Last edited:
=======================================
I am referring to Kharkov Oblast, not Kharkov the city specifically.
These numbers are definitely inaccurate. Siege of Mariupol concluded in May of 2022. Russia withdrew from Kiev in April of 2022. Russia did not even deploy 200,000 regulars at the onset of the invasion.
Moreover, the city itself was completely surrounded by March and that's when the most intense urban battle began.
As I've said before in this thread, Russians achieved a breakthrough but lacked the operational mobility to close the Mariupol pocket. The vast majority of Ukrainian troops escaped Mariupol and Russians failed to cut them off twice. First on H20 highway at Privilne, and the second time on H20 highway at Volnovakha. This is despite Russians trying to move as fast possible to intercept Ukrainian retreat.
And at no point at any of these engagements did Russian have 200,000 troops involved. Firstly, because the most personnel heavy operations took place when nearly an entire third of the Russian Army was still involved in Northern Kiev. Second, because the majority of the Ukrainian Army disengaged from Mariupol relatively early to avoid encirclement.
The textbook is literally being re-written as we are speaking right now. Whatever you think you know about infantry combat, you better rethink it, because Russian/Ukrainian infantry tactics are being significantly changed every 6 months. But anyway.
The idea that Russia will have to marshall hundreds of thousands of troop to capture Kharkiv is wrong, simply because Ukraine will be unable to mobilize hundreds of thousands of troops to defend Kharkiv.
And the combat ratios required are simply wrong. As we've seen from this war, the actual force ratios used to attack can be as high as 20:1 and as low as 1:1 during assaults. It is dependent on a very large variety of factors. I don't know what the condition of each army will be come mid-2024, but I fully expect Russian Armed Forces to return to Kharkiv Oblast. In fact, it is the most logical area to return to once Russia achieves its first major objective of the year, the full capture of Donbass.
I am referring to Kharkov Oblast, not Kharkov the city specifically.
[/QUOTE]
These numbers are definitely inaccurate. Siege of Mariupol concluded in May of 2022. Russia withdrew from Kiev in April of 2022. Russia did not even deploy 200,000 regulars at the onset of the invasion.
Moreover, the city itself was completely surrounded by March and that's when the most intense urban battle began.
As I've said before in this thread, Russians achieved a breakthrough but lacked the operational mobility to close the Mariupol pocket. The vast majority of Ukrainian troops escaped Mariupol and Russians failed to cut them off twice. First on H20 highway at Privilne, and the second time on H20 highway at Volnovakha. This is despite Russians trying to move as fast possible to intercept Ukrainian retreat.
And at no point at any of these engagements did Russian have 200,000 troops involved. Firstly, because the most personnel heavy operations took place when nearly an entire third of the Russian Army was still involved in Northern Kiev. Second, because the majority of the Ukrainian Army disengaged from Mariupol relatively early to avoid encirclement.
The textbook is literally being re-written as we are speaking right now. Whatever you think you know about infantry combat, you better rethink it, because Russian/Ukrainian infantry tactics are being significantly changed every 6 months. But anyway.
The idea that Russia will have to marshall hundreds of thousands of troop to capture Kharkiv is wrong, simply because Ukraine will be unable to mobilize hundreds of thousands of troops to defend Kharkiv.
And the combat ratios required are simply wrong. As we've seen from this war, the actual force ratios used to attack can be as high as 20:1 and as low as 1:1 during assaults. It is dependent on a very large variety of factors. I don't know what the condition of each army will be come mid-2024, but I fully expect Russian Armed Forces to return to Kharkiv Oblast. In fact, it is the most logical area to return to once Russia achieves its first major objective of the year, the full capture of Donbass.
Russia likes to claim big it's there thing. Remember the many HiMARS they destroyed?
The Russians can just surround Kharkiv and wait them out. The population and any who want to surrender are bussed out and then they will attack city block by city block. @MarKoz81 talks as if the Russians don't have experiences with similar sieges of cities of the size of Kharkiv. Guess what, Siege of Aleppo in Syria 2015-16. Aleppo was a city originally with 2.5 million people. Aleppo is a city with more population than Kharkiv.
The Russians didn't do it early in the campaign because, like @HighGround said, the Russians initially had less troops to attack with and had them spread more thinly. I also think they had way more limited initial goals and expectations that the negotiations with Ukraine in Turkey to guarantee their neutrality would be successful. Well that failed.
The Russians didn't do it early in the campaign because, like @HighGround said, the Russians initially had less troops to attack with and had them spread more thinly. I also think they had way more limited initial goals and expectations that the negotiations with Ukraine in Turkey to guarantee their neutrality would be successful. Well that failed.
Actual production is apparently way over that, and engine manufacturing should be taken with a special grain of salt.
For instance, because GUR didn't list kh-59, and those fly daily for more than a year.
While Russia did claim a few destroyed HIMARS, it hasn't been particularly many.
Trolls do however like to pretend that claimed HIMARS missiles destroyed is HIMARS systems.
It isn't really that useful a metric w/o air dominance.
Himars systems are very difficult to destroy in artillery duel, sure, but most importantly they're cheap as f.
Launcher costs comparable with a single 6-pack (which are being "lost" through use every day any way). Nor that it's especially rare, losses will be replaced immediately.
So either they can be destroyed at will (basically drones/planes overhead), or it's ~impossible to win against them.
Two destroyed Leopard 2A4 with Kontakt-1. The ERA didn't save them. This appears to be in Rabotino.
Ukrainian tank gets knocked out by an ATGM from the 58th SPN Battalion.
An AGS-17, a machine gun and a communications array are knocked out by drones from the Beaver detachment.
Ukrainian radar, likely supplied by NATO, gets knocked out by Lancet on the Ukrainian side of Kherson, by the 810rd Marine Brigade.
Cruise missiles arriving to its targets in Kiev.
ATGM targets a Ukrainian DRG in the Kupyansk direction.
Kupyansk front. Russian tanks firing at Ukrainian strongholds in close range. Wondering what happened to the Ukrainian ATGMs and FPV drones on this one.
Ukrainian evacuation site in the Kupyansk gets Krasnopoled by the 138th Brigade.
Lancets knocked out three Leopard tanks in the Kupyansk front.
Sumy region. Ukrainian ammo depot in a warehouse gets targeted and hit by Russian artillery.
In the Dniepr front, a Ukrainian landing boat gets hit by a Lancet. Ukraine continues to double down on this area and reinforcements are getting hit by Lancet and air strikes.
Poorly concealed Ukrainian SPG on the right bank of the Dniepr gets hit by a Lancet.
Ukrainian Buk-M1 gets hit by Lancet on the right side of the Dniepr. Have Western SAMs already been adapted to Ukrainian Buks?
Rostec announces that tests of the new tracked Pantsyr-SMSV have been completed.
Swedish CV-90 gets hit by FPV drone and left abandoned by injured crew.
M-TAS factory destroyed in drone or missile strike. Company produces tactical equipment and clothes including that of Ukrainian leaders including Zelensky and Zaluzhny.
Ukrainian army concentration gets rained by Russian MLRS, credited to the Russian 114th Brigade. This should be in Avdiivka.
Ukrainian tank gets knocked out by an ATGM from the 58th SPN Battalion.
An AGS-17, a machine gun and a communications array are knocked out by drones from the Beaver detachment.
Ukrainian radar, likely supplied by NATO, gets knocked out by Lancet on the Ukrainian side of Kherson, by the 810rd Marine Brigade.
Cruise missiles arriving to its targets in Kiev.
ATGM targets a Ukrainian DRG in the Kupyansk direction.
Kupyansk front. Russian tanks firing at Ukrainian strongholds in close range. Wondering what happened to the Ukrainian ATGMs and FPV drones on this one.
Ukrainian evacuation site in the Kupyansk gets Krasnopoled by the 138th Brigade.
Lancets knocked out three Leopard tanks in the Kupyansk front.
Sumy region. Ukrainian ammo depot in a warehouse gets targeted and hit by Russian artillery.
In the Dniepr front, a Ukrainian landing boat gets hit by a Lancet. Ukraine continues to double down on this area and reinforcements are getting hit by Lancet and air strikes.
Poorly concealed Ukrainian SPG on the right bank of the Dniepr gets hit by a Lancet.
Ukrainian Buk-M1 gets hit by Lancet on the right side of the Dniepr. Have Western SAMs already been adapted to Ukrainian Buks?
Rostec announces that tests of the new tracked Pantsyr-SMSV have been completed.
Swedish CV-90 gets hit by FPV drone and left abandoned by injured crew.
M-TAS factory destroyed in drone or missile strike. Company produces tactical equipment and clothes including that of Ukrainian leaders including Zelensky and Zaluzhny.
Ukrainian army concentration gets rained by Russian MLRS, credited to the Russian 114th Brigade. This should be in Avdiivka.
Last edited:
The Five Stages of Grief over their neocon/neolib regime change project:
"To the editor: Bernard-Henri Levy is most certainly correct that with or without U.S. military assistance. But he's wrong to suggest that Ukraine is a make-or-break moment for global democracies or for U.S. power and influence around the world.
While Levy doesn't state it outright, he seems to believe that a U.S. failure to send Kiev additional military aid will embolden authoritarian states such as Russia, China and Iran to test U.S. resolve in other theaters.
Theoretically, this could be true and shouldn't be totally ruled out. Yet in reality, this isn't how credibility works in international relations.
What the U.S. chooses to do in Ukraine tells us little about how the U.S. would act if China invaded Taiwan, Iran made the operational decision to acquire a nuclear weapon or Russia was reckless enough to attack a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member. These countries' leaders can't count on the U.S. acting the same way in all circumstances.
Not all crises in the world have the same stakes, and foreign policy isn't a cookie-cutter enterprise..."
IMHO, one of the morals of the Story is: "Do not install Anti-Russian stooges/puppets at the border or Russia (i.e. Ukraine)."
- denial.
- anger.
- bargaining.
- depression.
- acceptance. <- Some neocon/neolib regime bots/trolls/propagandists seems to be here:
- Los Angeles Times
"To the editor: Bernard-Henri Levy is most certainly correct that with or without U.S. military assistance. But he's wrong to suggest that Ukraine is a make-or-break moment for global democracies or for U.S. power and influence around the world.
While Levy doesn't state it outright, he seems to believe that a U.S. failure to send Kiev additional military aid will embolden authoritarian states such as Russia, China and Iran to test U.S. resolve in other theaters.
Theoretically, this could be true and shouldn't be totally ruled out. Yet in reality, this isn't how credibility works in international relations.
What the U.S. chooses to do in Ukraine tells us little about how the U.S. would act if China invaded Taiwan, Iran made the operational decision to acquire a nuclear weapon or Russia was reckless enough to attack a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member. These countries' leaders can't count on the U.S. acting the same way in all circumstances.
Not all crises in the world have the same stakes, and foreign policy isn't a cookie-cutter enterprise..."
IMHO, one of the morals of the Story is: "Do not install Anti-Russian stooges/puppets at the border or Russia (i.e. Ukraine)."