Actually, he said that it makes no military sense for Russia to hold the west bank of Dnieper in Kherson. He said that well before the Ukrainians launched an offensive there. The fact that Russia withdrew from that area validated his assertion.
I think he provides important insight on the operational level. His impression after visiting the frontline in Kherson was that there is no evidence that HIMARS has significantly degraded Russian forces ability to keep themselves supplied. The intensity of Russian fires 10 days before they withdrew exceeded the Ukrainian. The Russians withdrew in good order, unlike in Kharkiv area.
He is also quite objective in his assessment of the Ukrainian army when he dismisses the media narratives that the key to their success is their post Soviet innovation and NCOs which allow them to operate on a much more flexible and creative way than the Russians. After visiting Kherson, he reported that he saw very little to support that thesis.
He understands the Russian army organization and structure very well: in the summer of last year he gave a very educational podcast on the Russian BTGs and why they failed so badly in Ukraine.
As for predicting the course of the war: I don’t think anyone can do that. War is inherently unpredictable. Look no further than the unrealistic plans Russia started the war in Feb 2022. I don’t take his nor anyone else’s predictions too seriously.
Perhaps only on a strategic level one could
make predictions with any degree of certainty: like Mearsheimer who in 2014 warned that unless we change course we are on a collision course with Russia and that Ukraine will pay the highest price.