The War in the Ukraine

redion said:

Today yet another Russian Naval Infantry frontal assault on the direction of Vuhledar has end it in yet another disaster !!!!!!!

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sheogorath said:

I see a distinct lack of snow for that to be a "new attack". The area had plenty of snow the last few weeks so I wouldn't put it past a NAFO account to make things up with old unreleased footage.

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redion said:

It was indeed a new assault from today end it in the same way as before in a disaster

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1629540093638725636

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Sinnavuuty said:

The commander of the AFU ground forces was in Bakhmut and they began to undermine communication lines, city entrances and checkpoints. Ukraine is already withdrawing the best units from within the city and has created another line of defense further out, leaving the most combat-incapable units within the city to ease the burden of withdrawing the remaining units and causing casualties to Wagner.

In addition, they blew up a dam north of the city to stop the advance:

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With the capture of Dubovo-Vasylivka, the Russians are now maneuvering towards a small village to the northwest. It is a vital point for a breakthrough against Bohdanivka. If the Russians take it, they will have closed off all escape routes for the Ukrainians, whether by physical means or road fire control.

This Russian offensive at Vuhledar is an operational disaster, there is usually no defense for it and there are several reasons to explain this failure and praise the Ukrainians' defensive tactical planning.

Before any offensive, in order to fulfill the assigned tasks, adequate training is needed for well-coordinated ISR actions, interoperability between combat units involved, systematic use of artillery and engineering units. UAV crews and forward mobile reconnaissance units (DRGs) identify enemy positions and gunners, along with aircraft, fire on strongholds and fortified areas in close air support. At the same time, electronic warfare teams must ensure complete suppression of enemy drones and communications, with engineering troops and sappers must carry out mine clearance from the surrounding area – otherwise the offensive is doomed to failure.

The delay in the entry into battle of the motorized infantry units and the subsequent defeat of the Russian armored column were only possible due to the general unpreparedness of the infantry involved in this sector. This is because due to the large-scale laying of mines and the inappropriate use of available electronic warfare equipment, a predictable result was obtained: a very narrow passage was made between several explosive mine barriers, through which a column of Russian armored vehicles advanced. , being damaged and defeated.

The entire route of the decimated Russian column was tracked by UAVs and attacked by artillery and anti-tank teams of Ukrainian forces. From the nine-story buildings in Vuhledar, all city entrances, supply and rotation routes and the notorious Pavlovka were visible, allowing anti-tank guided missiles (launched from Vuhledar's skyscrapers) to be instrumental in destroying Russian armor, although part was destroyed by AFU artillery in precise drone-guided fire.

In this way, the advance of tanks and motorized columns along narrow roads along rare forest plantations in ideally flat terrain (since there are minefields on the sides), without air cover and by electronic warfare forces, ended in defeat for the Russian forces. .

In more specialized analyses, it is considered that the cause of the tragic events for the Russian forces was the general unpreparedness of the battalion commanders at a tactical level, the lack of coordination between the units involved and the interruption of the combat mission at a time pertinent to the initiative.

Russian motorized infantry units were supposed to enter the battle almost simultaneously with the marines, but this did not happen. The commanders of the combat formation, probably fearing punishment, reported the complete readiness of their subordinates for the assault, which was far from reality and generated enormous vulnerability materialized in defeat.

Due to the lack of electronic warfare – elemental EW and air defense coverage, as well as objective difficulties such as a prior full demining operation from all directions to and around Vuhledar, the Russian forces found themselves with no better option of movement. The entire column was within sight of the AFU positions on the Vuhledar Hills, in an elevated position tactically favorable for ambushes.

At the same time, all the equipment was not destroyed, as the Ukrainian media and sections of the Western media say. Some were just damaged, some remained intact. Under favorable conditions, such tanks can be withdrawn and repaired. Judging by the open hatches, most of the personnel were successfully evacuated, but dozens and even hundreds are estimated dead (Ukrainian sources).

Fear of command, unwillingness to work on mistakes, failure to use experience based on learning curve over 1 year and bureaucracy leading to tactical immobilization are the main reasons and causes of the recent Russian defeat in Vuhledar.

The attack on Vuhledar is now compared to the Russian defeat crossing the Seversky Donets near Belogorovka in May last year. It was the last major defeat of Russian armored vehicles. In that battle, Russia lost dozens of armored vehicles, while the attack on Vuhledar brought even greater losses.

One of the hottest points on the line of contact between Russian and Ukrainian forces remains Vuhledar, a highly relevant fortification for Ukrainian forces' logistical control of Donbas.

The situation on the defense side of the Ukrainian forces is as follows: currently, soldiers from the 35th, 68th, 72nd and 80th Brigades of the AFU are stationed in the city and in the suburbs. Although worn out with heavy losses in the recent fighting, in which the 72nd Brigade's losses in the last week are estimated to have reached 2/3 of the entire composition, the replenishment of troops comes from newly mobilized residents of the southern regions of Ukraine.

Defense lines are built in multi-layers, with Ukrainian soldiers being placed in the front lines and mercenaries placed in the front lines of defense. It can be Polishs, Germans, Georgians, Americans and citizens of other countries. The Ukrainians are the first to face the battle, but the mercenaries are given the opportunity to retreat, regroup and even permission to fire on the retreating forces.

An important role in the successful defense of Vuhledar by Ukrainian forces was played by the structuring of minefields built in the paths of Russian armored columns and the combined use of artillery and drones that nullified the power of the armored advance.

In addition, the use of combat drones, even improvised civilian models such as the Chinese MJI, makes it possible to instil panic in the ranks of the infantry, leaving armored vehicles without cover.

In this war, the combination of powerful artillery, although not very precise, and drones adapted for attacking trenches, even if not very powerful, but accurate in destroying armored vehicles and enemy platoons by launching grenades and loitering ammunition, allows a significant defeat to the adversary, when integrated into an effective ISR network.

Despite the defeat with significant casualties, the Russian forces do not seem to give up the siege of Vuhledar and the formation of a salient to gradually establish an operational siege to such a settlement and finally take it from the Ukrainian forces, since from the tactical-operational point of view it will allow to cut supplies to the remaining AFU-controlled settlements in Donestsk; stop the supply of weapons, ammunition, fuel and other supplies from Dniepropetrovsky (an important logistical center for the Ukrainian military effort); expand and solidify the line of defense and contact along the entire axis of Zaporizhzhia, still one of the front sectors of the theater of operations that is a priority for the future Ukrainian offensive, which will be destined to take Melitopol and build a bridgehead to isolate the Russian forces from the left bank of the Dnieper and launch artillery barrage attacks on Crimea.

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zxcv872 said:

I think the idea that cost is proportional to the duration of the war is way too simplistic. To illustrate why, I will create a slightly less simplistic cost model and show how it gives a fundamentally different result. It will involve some equations, and that might confuse some readers, however I think it would be even more confusing if I didn't write any equations. I upload a PDF as images because as far as I know that is the easiest way of writing a post with equations on this forum.

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This cost model is of course a huge simplification. The point is just to show how a slightly less simplistic model can give a fundamentally different result than your linear model. One could take into account how the duration of the war might affect enemy behaviour. Another thing that one could take into account is interest, which is another reason to defer war expenditures into the future as much as possible rather than front-load it. Due to the sanctions and cut supply chains, there are a lot of investments that Russia needs to make right now to repair supply chains, and the sooner those investments are made, the sooner they can start yielding returns.

Of course, Putin is a politician, and the currency he cares most about is political capital. There is a political value in spreading out war expenditures over time. He won't lose much in the polls over a 5% cut in social spending. This can be achieved easily by simply printing money and inflating the money supply by about 5%, and most people won't even notice. However a 50% cut will yield immediate protests.

Someone might argue that Russia should be using maneuver magic to decouple l from its dependence on d, so that they can finish the war faster without taking higher losses. Of course, maneuver is great - when it works. I already wrote a lengthy post #4,797 on why I don't think maneuver can work for Russia in Ukraine.

You talk about the opportunity cost of the war. Yet before discussing opportunity costs of the war, or declaring this war an disaster for Russia and implying it was a mistake, one must consider what the alternatives were and how costly those would have been. You assume zero cost without the war. Yet what would be the cost to Russia of letting Ukraine mass-produce a very large stockpile of Hrim-2 and Neptune missiles, and then using those to strike Russian infrastructure and Russian commerce in the Azov sea if Russia interferes with Ukrainian attempts to recapture Donbass and Crimea? What would be the cost to Russia of vacating Crimea and Donbass and letting Ukraine join NATO? What increased defense expenditures would that cause for Russia? Consider that those defense expenditures would be incurred every year for eternity.

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