Currently there are two good examples of small countries with large militaries which support this explanation:
Both examples had such air forces for as long as they could maintain them. In the Israeli case - since well before its current degree of military superiority was established.
I.e. it's outright the opposite - training squadrons or no, neither AF is designed to fly away.
Especially not the Israeli one. Both countries maintain strong air forces for a simple stupid reason: they could before and still can. Bad luck to those around who can't.
While Taiwanese F-16s are indeed 90% likely to be sent elsewhere - this is clearly not the
original intention of the force. Current structure of the force appeared at the times when ROCAF could outright contend for the air superiority with the whole PLAAF (which wasn't that far ago, historically speaking). Afterward, ROCAF as a structure simply develops by inertia in the same direction.
Also worth noting outright: it isn't that ROCAF is weak
, nor is it somehow oversized for the size of the Island. If anything, it's most of the modern airforces that are severely understrength (and just can't absorb significant losses as a result).
For the sake of crude analogy - overall numbers of ROCAF are reasonably close to that Japan tended to base there during combat operations during WW2 (for example - low 700s on Dec. 7, 1941).
Basically - Taiwan AF development simply rolls in the more or less same trajectory it did before. Now they simply got money.
Nor US is especially guilty of making Taiwan choose that structure - though, they're probably starting
.
Taiwan buys US equipment because (1)it already has it, (2)no one else will sell them such a high-profile package. Certainly not 2010s Sweden. (3)Securing US goodwill (and not securing its bad will, which is just as important) is the aim, too.
Taiwan is also an island off the coast of China which can effectively be surrounded from the air. Sweden in 1989 lies across the Baltic Sea from USSR but has Finland, Norway and Denmark securing its other flanks.
1989 was that far that it was forgotten already? ;p
Sea has a notable advantage of being part of physical geography. I.e. it actually won't go away (1940 La Manche example).
Swedish CW defensive plans always had to work under assumptions:
(1)"other countries securing flanks" doesn't work. They may, ergh, disappear. Examples od Denmark and Norway disappearing somewhere were very fresh in the memory, and direct border with Russian Empire was still in the memory of the living, too.
So sometimes reliable 100 miles ain't that bad.
(2)Air cover is necessary
regardless of the territorial integrity of the country. And yes, in some cases it meant being based firmly within firing range of the opponent. Yep, that sucks, but when you have to worse - better be losing discovered planes than not having them in the first place(or having them gone on day 1). In the end, Sweden planned for survival(otherwise that's the point) - but it also planned to be
too annoying to touch - the exact thing that saved them during WW2. In the end, CW SU was just not a something Sweden could stop.
(3)Going over the fence - Soviet Air Force always planned to have fighter squadrons based
as close to the frontline as possible. Because, until it's out of range of field artillery and direct sound reconnaissance - it was based on where the army was, not on where enemy means are. All this austere field performance wasn't for show; for example, one of the limits on Mig-29 size was the
camouflage limit (maximum size that can be effectively hidden on the ground, fast).
Same is applicable to the Swedes. And the same is
not applicable to USAF fighters - they never had this concern (or, to be exact - preferred to keep shut about it - admitting that your whole basic concept of operations - airfield basing - may be flawed would've been a peacetime disaster).
This is why most modern non-USMC US equipment has quite a footprint on the ground.
JAS 39C/D costs the same as equivalent F-16C/D Block 52+. F-16V with AESA radar is equivalent to JAS 39E/F but Gripen NG is more expensive and is only being introduced. If Taiwan wanted to buy Gripens it would buy aircraft which are inferior to the ones it's acquiring now. Gripen has notably lower cost of sustainment than any F-16 but you still have to train and maintain the pilots and those may or may not be a bottleneck. Overall in Europe we can compare Gripen and F-16 in terms of cost and effectiveness and Gripen is not significantly better. There are no hidden advantages to be found there, especially that its best weapon - MBDA Meteor - would not be exported to Taiwan.
Jas-39C/D has quite clearly undercut F-16 in price on several occasions(recent example - Bulgaria); listed contract prices for E series stand somewhat lower than contemporary F-16V(Blk 70/72) prices (or, to be exact, they include more stuff for a similar contract price). And that's
for a new plane.
As for the plane itself - things are pretty straightforward: Gripen(including E), as uninspiring as it is, is designed for precisely such a situation (defensive/desperate) - and checks all the primary
and secondary boxes. In addition, from some perspective, it is the fighter to win the most from Meteor (i think it's fair to assume both together - as no one will sell Gripen E to ROC either).
F-16V - while it has some useful tricks (radar set tuned specifically against cruise missiles, for example) and is overall a highly advanced and a very solid modern fighter - just doesn't. Heck, being worse than F-CK-1 in some
key metrics is quite something.
A good fighter to be in when you're on the right side of history
and nothing depends on you personally.
