Skywatcher
Captain
You'd think they could at least spare some money to build a 76mm cannon.
Taiwan Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter Gollevainen
- Start date
Taiwan itself doesn't have the tech to build any cannon above 20mm (which they copied from the Northrop F-5 autocannon), let alone 76mm cannons.
antiterror13
Brigadier
so building 76mm cannon is more difficult than producing 5nm chips?
... logic for some people that often apply to China
Photos of the new corvette:
Armament: 76mm gun, Phalanx CIWS, 8 HF-2 AShM, 4 HF-3 AShM, 16 anti-air version of TC-II missile, 4 7.62mm MG (still not sure if there will be torpedoes)
It has all of the necessary search and guidance electronics suite for anti-ship and anti-air duties as well as early warning, electronic warfare and decoy systems, however one thing it lacks is anti-submarine weapons and a fixed sonar below the hull (however it is also possible that the new corvette will be using a towed sonar instead)
Armament: 76mm gun, Phalanx CIWS, 8 HF-2 AShM, 4 HF-3 AShM, 16 anti-air version of TC-II missile, 4 7.62mm MG (still not sure if there will be torpedoes)
It has all of the necessary search and guidance electronics suite for anti-ship and anti-air duties as well as early warning, electronic warfare and decoy systems, however one thing it lacks is anti-submarine weapons and a fixed sonar below the hull (however it is also possible that the new corvette will be using a towed sonar instead)
I don't know what you're talking about. If a country doesn't have the tech to build something then it can't build it. Making advanced chips has nothing to with making cannons.so building 76mm cannon is more difficult than producing 5nm chips?
Skywatcher
Captain
Taipei might just not be willing (read cheap) to speed to money to buy the forging and tooling machines, and hire/train people to develop 76+mm artillery.so building 76mm cannon is more difficult than producing 5nm chips?
There is still a lot more to building navy guns than building army howitzers. Being able to build army howitzers doesn't mean one can build navy guns. Plus the only howitzers Taiwan can build are the Type 63A 105mm howitzer copied from the antique WW2-era M101 howitzer and the T-65 155mm howitzer copied from the yet another WW2-era M114A1 howitzer.
Last edited:
antiterror13
Brigadier
@tupolevtu144 and @Skywatcher
It seems you don't sense sarcasm from my post above
I remember when China wasn't able to make Ballpoint Pen, a lot of medias criticised how backward China was, etc, etc
It seems you don't sense sarcasm from my post above
I remember when China wasn't able to make Ballpoint Pen, a lot of medias criticised how backward China was, etc, etc
This is from the Foreign Affairs website. The authors talk about the Sino-America strategic competition overall, but the focus is really on short- or near- term (within 10 years), during which the risk of war is greatest according to the authors. And they're really talking about a conflict over Taiwan. I think the authors have correctly sense the danger given what have been going on in the last few years, particularly over last year.
What's interesting to this thread is the military strategy they advocate in this article: Taiwan needs to retool its military to fight asymmetrically. It's also noteworthy that they suggest that if necessary, the United States should cut funding for costly power-projection platforms, such as aircraft carriers, to fund the rapid deployment of loitering cruise missiles and smart mines near Taiwan. The latter is a far cry from the AirSea Battle concept that was quite popular less than a decade ago.
The military strategy of either Taiwan or the US for the potential Taiwan contingency seems to be still evolving. Taiwan and Pentagon do not appear to be aligned exactly right now. We'll see if they converge and that should be eventually reflected in the arms sales/purchases and training/exercises.
The Risk of War Is Greatest in the Next Decade
By
December 17, 2020
In foreign policy circles, it has become conventional wisdom that the United States and China are running a “superpower marathon” that may last a century. But the sharpest phase of that competition will be a decade long sprint. The Sino-American contest for supremacy won’t be settled anytime soon. Yet history and China’s recent trajectory suggest that the moment of maximum danger is just a few years away.
[snip]
...
Basically the authors making a case why China's long term prospect is pessimistic because, you know, democracy, demographics, and debts, etc. Therefore don't worry about the long-term. It's the next decade that is worrysome.
...
[snip]
Taiwan and Tech
Washington’s first priority must be shoring up . If China absorbed Taiwan, it would gain access to the island’s world-class technology, acquire an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” to project military power into the western Pacific, and gain the ability to blockade Japan and the Philippines. China also would fracture U.S. alliances in East Asia and eliminate the world’s only ethnically Chinese democracy. Taiwan is the fulcrum of power in East Asia: controlled by Taipei, the island is a fortification against Chinese aggression; controlled by Beijing, Taiwan could become a base for continued Chinese territorial expansion.
China has spent decades trying to buy reunification by forging economic links with Taiwan. But Taiwan’s people have become more than ever to their de facto independence. Consequently, China is brandishing its military option. Over the past three months, its air and naval patrols have presented a show of in the Taiwan Strait more provocative than any in the last twenty-five years. An invasion or coercive campaign may not be imminent, but its likelihood is rising.
Taiwan is a natural , but Taiwanese and U.S. forces currently are ill equipped to defend it, because they rely on limited quantities of advanced aircraft and ships tethered to large bases—forces China can neutralize with a surprise air and missile attack. Some American and are calling on Washington to formally guarantee Taiwan’s security, but such a pledge would amount to cheap talk if not backed by a stronger defense.
Washington should instead deploy hordes of missile launchers and armed drones near, and possibly on, Taiwan. These forces would function as high-tech minefields, capable of inflicting severe attrition on a Chinese invasion or blockade force. China needs to control the seas and skies around Taiwan to achieve its objective, while the United States just needs to deny China that control. If necessary, the United States should cut funding for costly power-projection platforms, such as aircraft carriers, to fund the rapid deployment of loitering cruise missiles and smart mines near Taiwan.
The United States also needs to help Taiwan retool its military to fight asymmetrically. Taiwan plans to acquire enormous arsenals of missile launchers and drones; prepare its army to deploy tens of thousands of troops to any beach at a moment’s notice; and reconstitute a million-strong reserve force trained for guerrilla warfare. The Pentagon can hasten this transition by subsidizing Taiwanese investments in asymmetric capabilities, donating ammunition, and expanding joint training on air and coastal defense and antisubmarine and mine warfare.
Finally, the United States should enlist other countries in Taiwan’s defense. Japan might be willing to block China’s northern approaches to Taiwan in a war; India might allow the U.S. Navy to use the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to choke off Beijing’s energy imports; European allies could impose severe economic and financial sanctions on China in case of an attack on Taiwan. The United States should try to convince partners to commit publicly to taking these types of actions. Even if such measures are not decisive militarily, they could deter China by raising the possibility that China might have to fight a multifront war to conquer Taiwan.
[snip]
What's interesting to this thread is the military strategy they advocate in this article: Taiwan needs to retool its military to fight asymmetrically. It's also noteworthy that they suggest that if necessary, the United States should cut funding for costly power-projection platforms, such as aircraft carriers, to fund the rapid deployment of loitering cruise missiles and smart mines near Taiwan. The latter is a far cry from the AirSea Battle concept that was quite popular less than a decade ago.
The military strategy of either Taiwan or the US for the potential Taiwan contingency seems to be still evolving. Taiwan and Pentagon do not appear to be aligned exactly right now. We'll see if they converge and that should be eventually reflected in the arms sales/purchases and training/exercises.
The Risk of War Is Greatest in the Next Decade
By
December 17, 2020
In foreign policy circles, it has become conventional wisdom that the United States and China are running a “superpower marathon” that may last a century. But the sharpest phase of that competition will be a decade long sprint. The Sino-American contest for supremacy won’t be settled anytime soon. Yet history and China’s recent trajectory suggest that the moment of maximum danger is just a few years away.
[snip]
...
Basically the authors making a case why China's long term prospect is pessimistic because, you know, democracy, demographics, and debts, etc. Therefore don't worry about the long-term. It's the next decade that is worrysome.
...
[snip]
Taiwan and Tech
Washington’s first priority must be shoring up . If China absorbed Taiwan, it would gain access to the island’s world-class technology, acquire an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” to project military power into the western Pacific, and gain the ability to blockade Japan and the Philippines. China also would fracture U.S. alliances in East Asia and eliminate the world’s only ethnically Chinese democracy. Taiwan is the fulcrum of power in East Asia: controlled by Taipei, the island is a fortification against Chinese aggression; controlled by Beijing, Taiwan could become a base for continued Chinese territorial expansion.
China has spent decades trying to buy reunification by forging economic links with Taiwan. But Taiwan’s people have become more than ever to their de facto independence. Consequently, China is brandishing its military option. Over the past three months, its air and naval patrols have presented a show of in the Taiwan Strait more provocative than any in the last twenty-five years. An invasion or coercive campaign may not be imminent, but its likelihood is rising.
Taiwan is a natural , but Taiwanese and U.S. forces currently are ill equipped to defend it, because they rely on limited quantities of advanced aircraft and ships tethered to large bases—forces China can neutralize with a surprise air and missile attack. Some American and are calling on Washington to formally guarantee Taiwan’s security, but such a pledge would amount to cheap talk if not backed by a stronger defense.
Washington should instead deploy hordes of missile launchers and armed drones near, and possibly on, Taiwan. These forces would function as high-tech minefields, capable of inflicting severe attrition on a Chinese invasion or blockade force. China needs to control the seas and skies around Taiwan to achieve its objective, while the United States just needs to deny China that control. If necessary, the United States should cut funding for costly power-projection platforms, such as aircraft carriers, to fund the rapid deployment of loitering cruise missiles and smart mines near Taiwan.
The United States also needs to help Taiwan retool its military to fight asymmetrically. Taiwan plans to acquire enormous arsenals of missile launchers and drones; prepare its army to deploy tens of thousands of troops to any beach at a moment’s notice; and reconstitute a million-strong reserve force trained for guerrilla warfare. The Pentagon can hasten this transition by subsidizing Taiwanese investments in asymmetric capabilities, donating ammunition, and expanding joint training on air and coastal defense and antisubmarine and mine warfare.
Finally, the United States should enlist other countries in Taiwan’s defense. Japan might be willing to block China’s northern approaches to Taiwan in a war; India might allow the U.S. Navy to use the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to choke off Beijing’s energy imports; European allies could impose severe economic and financial sanctions on China in case of an attack on Taiwan. The United States should try to convince partners to commit publicly to taking these types of actions. Even if such measures are not decisive militarily, they could deter China by raising the possibility that China might have to fight a multifront war to conquer Taiwan.
[snip]
Last edited:
Skywatcher
Captain
Of course, the asymmetric warfare strategy might stop an amphibious assault (at least before massed formations of amphibious and amphibiously transported autonomous UGVs become a thing), but it won't stop the Mainland from cutting traffic to and from Taiwan by regularly bombarding ports and airports.