I don't see why.
Limited logistics is doable(if prepared for this contingency) even after prolonged, "no bullshit", strategic bombing/interdiction campaign. 20/80 rule.
We're talking about a compressed one here(no time to waste here), against a fortified island, protected by a very robust a2/ad and significant Air Force. And yes, while it is useless for this conversation, I don't really see such "no bullshit" operation. There is a clear political agenda in this campaign, and it goes again destruction of civilian life.
Hunter-killer UAVs overhead will have to wait till AD network is degraded into nothing. They're the most persistent, but also the most vulnerable form of aerial interdiction.
I think we have differing opinions as to just how well fortified Taiwan currently is as an island and how well trained their ground forces are for the kind of operation you're talking about, at present.
I think we also have significant differences in opinion as to the actual survivability of their air force.
Hunter killer UAVs will obviously require the destruction or crippling of their main IADS and primary radars but ROCAF SAMs are not mobile in the same way Russian and PLA SAMs are and are limited in numbers and various deployment sites likely extensively recce'd by the PLA over the years. Couple that with the scale of PLA ELINT and EW capabilities, I don't see ROC IADS being able to put up much of a fight within a week or so of a bombardment starting.
The PLA will suffer UAV losses of course here and there, but that's not the point.
Taiwan itself is a hub for ASM, mining, and more. Many of these weapon systems are about as resilent as it can possibly be, and can be completely and reliably shut down only by physical occupation of ground under them. And this, in turn, will take a lot of time and land combat.
The weapon systems you've listed...we still have gun&mortar artillery, when there are so many cool and fancy rockets and bombs. This is something much of this list can't really do. And what's left is clearly
nowhere near enough for the task. Solution requires expanded beachhead.
P. s. Yes, i am acutely aware of both their number and capabilities. This was part of my first master's thesis.
Count radii and daily turn-out rate for two-way trips, loading/offloading complications, and so on. It's a very complex operation, and operation unavoidably vulnerable to disruptions.
A successful "A2/AD" strategy requires you to have the strategic depths to have platforms to your weapons in the first place, where your deployment platforms should optimally be at as low risk of physical destruction from enemy fires as possible.
Taiwan has no strategic depth given the scale and range of PLA fires and recce and the proximity of Taiwan to China.
This isn't to say that spamming mines and AShMs will not be able to exact casualties of their own, but when your opponent has fires and ISR that outmasses and out-envelopes you to the degree the PLA currently does, the viability of your "A2/AD" weapons is much reduced due to sheer proximity.
As for gun and mortar artillery -- of course those systems are relevant. Those systems will be landed after the seizure of the beach, or perhaps even partially during the seizure of the beach by virtue of the PLA's own amphibious capable SPHs. No one suggested the entire ground invasion would rely on MLRS, SRBMs, and air power for the entire conflict. The role of MLRS, SRBMs, and airpower will be to enable the seizure of the beach and assist in interdicting enemy forces that attempt to counter attack initially.
Hah. Not impossible (same example with Medina in 2003), and i don't expect such conditions to materialize nowhere near instantly anyway.
Furthermore, even in such conditions, Taiwan still has geographical "second line". Terrain matters.
p. s. Come to think of it, Iraq '2003 is actually a really good (and largely unknown!) example. It's a war, which is perceived by most as a slaughter on IR screen(recent Karabakh fills this description just as well). Actual operational warfare(quite interesting one) is simply forgotten and left to boring professional periodicals. Who cares about boring stuff when you can count IRBMs, Bayraktars and other flashy cabooms...
I agree with "not impossible". The likelihood of something like that happening is of course certainly greater than zero.
This isn't exactly the first time this is the case in history of warfare.
Taiwan, unlike most such cases, has favourable(and prepared) ground and means of A2AD.
I really don't see how you interpret Taiwan's geography and proximity to China as "favourable" to its efforts to seek an effective defensive strategy with the current and foreseeable balance of forces.
Yes, we can agree on this.
I, however, currently assume what complete grinding down of ROC armed forces(as well as too bold of a rush) is unlikely, for two main competing reasons: on one hand, PRC is very likely to be running against the clock. Taiwan conflict simply can't be taken out of context, this context, after all, is perhaps the single reason it still exists. On the other hand, though, current PLA has to be cautious. Days when it could simply absorb causalities are gone.
I don't expect the
complete grinding down of the ROC armed forces, but I do expect the ROCAF, ROCN and ROC IADS, C4I, to be either crippled or significantly degraded after a week of conflict (unless ROC procurement in the near future
significantly changes), and that the effectiveness of the ROCA would be significantly impeded by lack of air control and the exposed nature of the western coast that would make an attempt to counter attack difficult to coordinate at best.
If we're talking about the potential for US intervention, well yes obviously the PLA will be holding back the majority of its naval and air forces and longer range missile systems in reserve, the bulk of its amphibious assault ships and SRBMs and MLRS, or its heavy and medium CABs won't be useful in a high intensity air-naval conflict against the US anyway.
If you're arguing that the ROCA may be able to exact the most casualties against the PLA in the ground phase of the operation, particularly in urban warfare and warfare deeper into the island properly, sure, I have no disagreement with this at all and is a position I've held for quite a long time as well.
I feel like all of this discussion might be missing the point a little.
I'm not suggesting that such a conflict would be "easy" for the PLA to achieve a victory in, or that it would be effortless or that they would suffer no/minimal casualties or require no political and societal resolve.
What I am suggesting is that in the context of the PLA's capabilities today, and into the foreseeable future, the balance of likelihoods of a PLA success vs a ROC success is now meaningfully in the former's corner, and that what used to be useful geographical distances and depth that Taiwan as an island could enjoy as a "natural fortress", are now largely either hindered or made irrelevant by the range, persistence and scale of contemporary PLA air, missile and naval capabilities.
To paraphrase a foreign policy article written a few years ago, yes Taiwan "can" win a war against China, in the sense that the word "can" implies a possibility that is greater than zero.
