Just out of interest, what direction do the tides travel in, in that area?
Would be be a general northerly direction?
Would be be a general northerly direction?
Taiwan Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter Gollevainen
- Start date
now we know how the korean ship was sunk. kim jung il was innocent afterall:roll:
Want to know how the torpedo was lost? Well if the ROCN operates anything like the USN and assuming it was a training torpedo..A telemetereing pack is installed in the guidance section of the torpedo. This pack sends a signal out so the torpedo can be retrieved after its run. Apparently this one failed..if this is the case.
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it failed because it experienced collision with an UFO-unidentified floating object:coffee:
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Now that is funny! LAMO!:roll:
zoom
Junior Member
Here is an article on the Taiwan(/US)-China situation >
To me it seems to be swaying decisively in China's favour and i don't hold much hope out for the options listed for Taiwan.If China are patient enough maybe economics will achieve its goal for them and thus spare most of the potential bloodshed.Without meaning to resurrect what i am sure is an age-old argument on the forum,i hope at least for some ,this article will be worth a look.
To me it seems to be swaying decisively in China's favour and i don't hold much hope out for the options listed for Taiwan.If China are patient enough maybe economics will achieve its goal for them and thus spare most of the potential bloodshed.Without meaning to resurrect what i am sure is an age-old argument on the forum,i hope at least for some ,this article will be worth a look.
Skywatcher
Captain
Most of those won't work.
Now let's explore the options:
1) Exile government planning- Look at how effective the Dalai Lama is today, oh wait, I guess not. There's a reason why exile governments are considered such jokes.
2) Snipers- Not going to be nearly effective as Mr. Fisher thinks they will be. Sniping off a few company or battalion commanders isn't going to really do much, and with the advent of anti-sniper radars and very small UAVs, this is going to get dangerous for the ROCA's one thousand 'basic snipers'.
3) Exercises with foreign countries- Its highly unlikely that Taiwan is going to gain very much in what essentially amounts to a fancy multiplayer RTS session. It could acheive results for maybe high and mid ranking officers but that isn't going to be very useful to the rank and file. I suspect this is probably being done anyways.
4) Upgrade ROCAF F-16s. A sensible idea, though I think Fisher underestimates Taiwan's ability to domestically improve the avionics and weapons fit of the F-16s. I doubt the ROCAF can get the Meteor, so they're better off modifying their AMRAAMs and TC-2s.
5) Upgrade the IDF. Also very practical. I doubt that Taiwan will ever be able to afford a meaningful purchase of the F-35B, assuming the Lightning II ever becomes available. The STOL is doable (Beijing is less likely to object to engines compared to a whole fighter aircraft) and Taiwan should be able to do HMS on the TC-1.
6) Small coastal submarines. I'm actually surprised that Taipei hasn't done this one already. Though I don't think Taiwan needs any foreign help to build what is essentially an upsized midget submarine, so no need to involve the Italians or Russians (yeah, like the ROCN had a chance with them in the first place). The idea of the USN buying any conventional submarines is ridiculous though, even for OPFOR purposes. The request with 8 submarines of the 2000 to 3000 ton displacement is most probably not going to go anywhere.
7) Ballistic missiles. Since the PLA has invested heavily into BMD, this isn't really a practical option unless Taiwan wants to buy MGM 141 Block 1A missiles in the high several hundreds, which would take up a disproportionate and disruptive part of whatever service of the ROCAF they get saddled with. And then there's the issue of China selling or gifting 300km ranged missiles to Venezuela and Cuba in return.
Fisher surprisingly doesn't talk very much about the HF-2E cruise missile, though that has some problems of itself. A discussion between Seaskimmer and myself had Seaskimmer pointing out that those cruise missiles were probably going to be targeted at China's power plants. However I think the PLA would address that threat by first the installation of CIWS systems like the LD-2000 and FN-2000, as well as heavier SAMs like the HQ-16. And there's a new small radar guided Chinese missile (Fisher noted its similarity to the R Darter) and has been seen on the JH-7 and is presumably compatible with other PLAAF and PLANAF fighters. Now I wondered why the PLAAF would need such a niche weapon which is clearly inferior to the PL-11 and PL-12 in performance and range. I believe that the PL "R Darter" will most likely be used to intercept cruise missiles and UAVs, whose performance would be improved by PLAAF AEW&C capabilities and future fighter AESA radars. The smaller PL-"R Darter/Derby" would also be more cost effective compared to the PL-11 and PL-12 for intercepting small targets like cruise missiles and a J-8 or J-10 can carry more missiles per sortie.
8 ) Energy weapons- Large cost and long wait time for Taiwan to do one its own. Piggybacking with DARPA is rather unlikely because of information security concerns (the ROC has suffered several espionage breaches in the past).
9) "Gain the Lead in Robot Wars" The problem with America sharing unmanned vehicle technology with Taiwan is that if it seriously alters the balance of power in the Taiwan Straits (and maybe not even then) China will becoming a lot more willing to spread their own robotic technology around. I don't really care for the idea of waking up one morning and finding that Iran has leapfrogged in UAV and USV technologies. And building a wide range of unmanned systems is going to be very expensive. I doubt that Taiwan has either the money or the political will to do so. Oh, and I think Taiwan would need a network of communications satellites to take full advantage of a UAV and UUV network.
Thoughts?
Now let's explore the options:
1) Exile government planning- Look at how effective the Dalai Lama is today, oh wait, I guess not. There's a reason why exile governments are considered such jokes.
2) Snipers- Not going to be nearly effective as Mr. Fisher thinks they will be. Sniping off a few company or battalion commanders isn't going to really do much, and with the advent of anti-sniper radars and very small UAVs, this is going to get dangerous for the ROCA's one thousand 'basic snipers'.
3) Exercises with foreign countries- Its highly unlikely that Taiwan is going to gain very much in what essentially amounts to a fancy multiplayer RTS session. It could acheive results for maybe high and mid ranking officers but that isn't going to be very useful to the rank and file. I suspect this is probably being done anyways.
4) Upgrade ROCAF F-16s. A sensible idea, though I think Fisher underestimates Taiwan's ability to domestically improve the avionics and weapons fit of the F-16s. I doubt the ROCAF can get the Meteor, so they're better off modifying their AMRAAMs and TC-2s.
5) Upgrade the IDF. Also very practical. I doubt that Taiwan will ever be able to afford a meaningful purchase of the F-35B, assuming the Lightning II ever becomes available. The STOL is doable (Beijing is less likely to object to engines compared to a whole fighter aircraft) and Taiwan should be able to do HMS on the TC-1.
6) Small coastal submarines. I'm actually surprised that Taipei hasn't done this one already. Though I don't think Taiwan needs any foreign help to build what is essentially an upsized midget submarine, so no need to involve the Italians or Russians (yeah, like the ROCN had a chance with them in the first place). The idea of the USN buying any conventional submarines is ridiculous though, even for OPFOR purposes. The request with 8 submarines of the 2000 to 3000 ton displacement is most probably not going to go anywhere.
7) Ballistic missiles. Since the PLA has invested heavily into BMD, this isn't really a practical option unless Taiwan wants to buy MGM 141 Block 1A missiles in the high several hundreds, which would take up a disproportionate and disruptive part of whatever service of the ROCAF they get saddled with. And then there's the issue of China selling or gifting 300km ranged missiles to Venezuela and Cuba in return.
Fisher surprisingly doesn't talk very much about the HF-2E cruise missile, though that has some problems of itself. A discussion between Seaskimmer and myself had Seaskimmer pointing out that those cruise missiles were probably going to be targeted at China's power plants. However I think the PLA would address that threat by first the installation of CIWS systems like the LD-2000 and FN-2000, as well as heavier SAMs like the HQ-16. And there's a new small radar guided Chinese missile (Fisher noted its similarity to the R Darter) and has been seen on the JH-7 and is presumably compatible with other PLAAF and PLANAF fighters. Now I wondered why the PLAAF would need such a niche weapon which is clearly inferior to the PL-11 and PL-12 in performance and range. I believe that the PL "R Darter" will most likely be used to intercept cruise missiles and UAVs, whose performance would be improved by PLAAF AEW&C capabilities and future fighter AESA radars. The smaller PL-"R Darter/Derby" would also be more cost effective compared to the PL-11 and PL-12 for intercepting small targets like cruise missiles and a J-8 or J-10 can carry more missiles per sortie.
8 ) Energy weapons- Large cost and long wait time for Taiwan to do one its own. Piggybacking with DARPA is rather unlikely because of information security concerns (the ROC has suffered several espionage breaches in the past).
9) "Gain the Lead in Robot Wars" The problem with America sharing unmanned vehicle technology with Taiwan is that if it seriously alters the balance of power in the Taiwan Straits (and maybe not even then) China will becoming a lot more willing to spread their own robotic technology around. I don't really care for the idea of waking up one morning and finding that Iran has leapfrogged in UAV and USV technologies. And building a wide range of unmanned systems is going to be very expensive. I doubt that Taiwan has either the money or the political will to do so. Oh, and I think Taiwan would need a network of communications satellites to take full advantage of a UAV and UUV network.
Thoughts?
The article had a few good things and a few bad things. I thought the plan for lots of high-school trained snipers was silly for example. That's just a good way to waste money and get kids killed. There's a reason why snipers are considered elite: you can't train for a few months when you're a senior in high school and be ready for scout/sniping.
Also the idea of Taiwan getting ballistic missiles from the US and submarines from Russian companies is just silly. Focus on a domestic small diesel-electric sub program and anti-ship missiles to go with it. The F-16 deal isn't going to go through, so reallocate those resources because Taiwan's airfields are going to go down real fast anyway.
SAMs: Taiwan needs to strike the right balance between long enough range and ease of mobility/hiding. More PAC-3s are always welcome to protect critical sites from ballistic missiles, but focus on Sky Bow because Taiwan can't rely on foreign suppliers.
Hybrid Offensive/defensive firepower: Again, mobility and stealth are crucial. The HF series of missiles is a good start, and the ROCA needs to develop the ability to deploy them on, for example, vehicles that appear to be civilian trucks from the outside. Also, procuring the HIMARS system would be a good idea as I think the US would be willing to sell, and it could direct absolutely devastating firepower onto an invasion beach while remaining reasonably survivable.
Give infantry the power to hit hard: Taiwan needs to make sure its infantry is heavily armed with MANPADS and ATGMs. They're going to have to deal with PLAAF air superiority, but that's not as bad as it sounds. The Chinese have never fought a combined arms war, so they don't have as much experience as, for example, the US does in CAS. Nor does the PLAAF have the same amount of systems for CAS as the US (mainly UAVs and attack helis). Russia's CAS was inadequate in the Georgia War, will China's be up to snuff in Taiwan?
The point is that by making the air environment very hostile to the low and slow fliers (UAVs and helis) Taiwan can take away the most important assets China has for CAS, and threaten what will undoubtedly be a vital heli supply line to Chinese airborne troops on Taiwan. As for ATGMs, we saw in Lebanon 2006 how even small ATGM teams can hamper, frustrate, slow or even totally stop a large armored force supported by excellent CAS. Taiwan would need that ability in the critical 24 hours after the first Chinese boot steps ashore.
Mines and stuff: Taiwan needs the ability to quickly release a lot of mines into the Taiwan Strait and onto its own beaches. Not sure how this might be done, but even a relatively small amount of mines will require a fairly large resource allocation by the PLAN (a bunch of slow minesweepers and assets to protect them) and would scare away merchant shipping, harming China's economy. Also, we've seen how effective IEDs are at slowing and degrading military units of all kinds, even ones optimized to deal with them, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now imagine mass-produced IED-like devices, scattered throughout Taiwan on routes likely to be used by a Chinese invading force that has no experience with IEDs. It could produce very large delays and degrade combat power significantly.
Public relations warfare: In the 21st century, the best way to get your enemy to cease offensive operations is to provoke an international outcry about civilian casualties. That's what happened at 1st Falluja, in Lebanon in 2006, in Gaza in 2009, the Sri Lankan Army slowed down while crushing the Tigers due to international pressure...the list goes on and on. Therefore, Taiwan needs to get it's splattered civilians in front of the cameras as soon as possible once the missiles start falling, and keep them there.
Also the idea of Taiwan getting ballistic missiles from the US and submarines from Russian companies is just silly. Focus on a domestic small diesel-electric sub program and anti-ship missiles to go with it. The F-16 deal isn't going to go through, so reallocate those resources because Taiwan's airfields are going to go down real fast anyway.
SAMs: Taiwan needs to strike the right balance between long enough range and ease of mobility/hiding. More PAC-3s are always welcome to protect critical sites from ballistic missiles, but focus on Sky Bow because Taiwan can't rely on foreign suppliers.
Hybrid Offensive/defensive firepower: Again, mobility and stealth are crucial. The HF series of missiles is a good start, and the ROCA needs to develop the ability to deploy them on, for example, vehicles that appear to be civilian trucks from the outside. Also, procuring the HIMARS system would be a good idea as I think the US would be willing to sell, and it could direct absolutely devastating firepower onto an invasion beach while remaining reasonably survivable.
Give infantry the power to hit hard: Taiwan needs to make sure its infantry is heavily armed with MANPADS and ATGMs. They're going to have to deal with PLAAF air superiority, but that's not as bad as it sounds. The Chinese have never fought a combined arms war, so they don't have as much experience as, for example, the US does in CAS. Nor does the PLAAF have the same amount of systems for CAS as the US (mainly UAVs and attack helis). Russia's CAS was inadequate in the Georgia War, will China's be up to snuff in Taiwan?
The point is that by making the air environment very hostile to the low and slow fliers (UAVs and helis) Taiwan can take away the most important assets China has for CAS, and threaten what will undoubtedly be a vital heli supply line to Chinese airborne troops on Taiwan. As for ATGMs, we saw in Lebanon 2006 how even small ATGM teams can hamper, frustrate, slow or even totally stop a large armored force supported by excellent CAS. Taiwan would need that ability in the critical 24 hours after the first Chinese boot steps ashore.
Mines and stuff: Taiwan needs the ability to quickly release a lot of mines into the Taiwan Strait and onto its own beaches. Not sure how this might be done, but even a relatively small amount of mines will require a fairly large resource allocation by the PLAN (a bunch of slow minesweepers and assets to protect them) and would scare away merchant shipping, harming China's economy. Also, we've seen how effective IEDs are at slowing and degrading military units of all kinds, even ones optimized to deal with them, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now imagine mass-produced IED-like devices, scattered throughout Taiwan on routes likely to be used by a Chinese invading force that has no experience with IEDs. It could produce very large delays and degrade combat power significantly.
Public relations warfare: In the 21st century, the best way to get your enemy to cease offensive operations is to provoke an international outcry about civilian casualties. That's what happened at 1st Falluja, in Lebanon in 2006, in Gaza in 2009, the Sri Lankan Army slowed down while crushing the Tigers due to international pressure...the list goes on and on. Therefore, Taiwan needs to get it's splattered civilians in front of the cameras as soon as possible once the missiles start falling, and keep them there.
i think fisher is a joke, gets a lot of the info off of Chinese internet anyways.
two things i have to say about Taiwan's military
1. doesnt matter who's got your back, if you dont got the money, you are bound to lose the arms race. Taiwan should forget it...in 10 years or so they'll be lucky to get to eat PLA's dust.
2. dont expect a lot of resistance if PLA does make the landing on Taiwan. insurgency does not work on islands as well as they do on continents....afterall, where do you get ammo and food? besides, most ppl in Taiwan are livin good lives, and will be treated as well as are people of HK...no reason to risk your life over some lame objective that you are never gonna achieve
two things i have to say about Taiwan's military
1. doesnt matter who's got your back, if you dont got the money, you are bound to lose the arms race. Taiwan should forget it...in 10 years or so they'll be lucky to get to eat PLA's dust.
2. dont expect a lot of resistance if PLA does make the landing on Taiwan. insurgency does not work on islands as well as they do on continents....afterall, where do you get ammo and food? besides, most ppl in Taiwan are livin good lives, and will be treated as well as are people of HK...no reason to risk your life over some lame objective that you are never gonna achieve
the article is misguided. Taiwan's military prep should be solely for the purpose of preventing the PLA to make a landing. the idea is to keep PLA off its shores for long enough for the US gov and public to think that they have a "good shot" at this. because once the PLA lands, all those guerilla stuff wont deter them at all...and that's to assume that it will happen. neither will PR war have any effect. the logic is simple, if Beijing goes to war, it puts everything on the table including foremost its legitimacy to rule. so a lil PR and casualty wont shake its will at all, since Taiwan is so close, they'll just keep on pumping hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of armour onto the island. how to prevent this? well dont let them land...so whatever resource the Taiwanese have, use them wisely.