I think it would also require China to shift its position of not negotiating individually. The other would be how to address the sovereignty issue, whether as condition precedent, subsequent or non conditional.
I think China would probably be willing to discuss the terms of any joint patrol and the joint use of the new airbases in a multilateral manner, but I think it would not negotiate on the actual issues of sovereignty itself as part of the negotiations regarding the operations itself. That is, China would try to separate issues of sovereignty from the negotiation of how to conduct joint patrols and use of the airbases.
Of course, that means only certain nations more willing to tolerate China's sovereignty claims in certain parts would be more likely to participate in such an effort in the first place.
In a way, it is asking nations whether they'd be willing to not raise the issue of the new islands too much in return for being on better terms with China and having more ways of reducing tensions via joint patrols (and also reducing China's likelihood of militarizing the islands against those nations), versus those nations who are unwilling to remain silent on China's new islands and the overall territorial disputes in SCS and would be more willing to risk a conflict with China in the region.